Being a terrorist is en vogue these days. And even if it isn’t, seems like you might have a hard time escaping the label.
Minister MacKay claimed pirates off the coast of East Africa were “financial terrorists,” apparently a new brand or flavour of the terrorist trend.
Even the National Post, usually a publication known more for perpetuating terrorist myths than clarifying them, was quick to criticize this move in an editorial,
Oh boy. Since Sept. 11, 2001, we have watched ruefully for the inevitable debasement of the verbal coin of “terror” and “terrorism”; and here we have what seems like a lamentably clear example. Mr. MacKay has something of a point, insofar as acts of piracy are now generally classed with terrorism under Canadian law and UN conventions.
But the term “terrorism” exists precisely to distinguish ordinary thefts and kidnappings, with ordinary motives, from ones intended to undermine the international order and the legitimacy of states. It functions as a license for governments to transcend the ordinary limits and procedures of law, where to observe them would mean surrender to the political program of a minority.
That’s actually the problem with the current law. Applying the terrorist label does not give governments a license to trample rights and transcend “ordinary limits,” although it seems that a recent decision might indicate that’s exactly what’s happening.
The first member of Canada’s only major alleged terrorist plot, the Toronto 18, was sentenced this week. But it appears as if he was guilty without any knowledge of anything remotely related to terrorism. The broad and vague language of the current terrorism provisions means he could be convicted for any form of material support – including shoplifting.
Thomas Walkon of the Toronto Star explains,
By any reasonable definition of the term, this young man is not a terrorist. He did not plot to blow up buildings or behead politicians. Nor, according to evidence at his trial, did he know of any such alleged plots…Â He did shoplift from Canadian Tire gear that the judge determined was intended, if not necessarily used, for the ill-fated camping trips…
So why was this juvenile, whose only overtly criminal behaviour consisted of shoplifting, convicted of terrorism?
The answer lies in the wording of anti-terror legislation, rushed through Parliament after 9/11.
Under these anti-terror provisions of the Criminal Code, a person need not know anything about a specific terrorist plot – or even if a such a plot is being planned – to be guilty of terrorism.
But he is guilty if he knowingly does something – even indirectly – that is intended to further the objects of a group that, in the most general sense, has terrorist intentions.
Such as shoplifting camping gear.
Indeed, a suspect can be found guilty of terrorism even if this shoplifted camping gear is never used.
This position is an embarrassment to the Canadian legal system. The hallmark of criminal law in the common law system is a mental element and an act element. Someone who commits a crime without intending to do the act cannot normally be convicted (with some exceptions).
Doing an act that is never intended for a terrorist act, then being punished for it when it is retroactively labeled as material support to a terrorism conspiracy, is a miscarriage of justice.
Justice Sproat who ruled in this case had no choice but to convict the young man in this case given the wording of the statute. The full blame of this rests on Canadian Parliament, who overreacted with xenophobia when passing this law in that it was worded so broadly that it could be abused in this manner.
Perhaps more specifically blame can be leveled at the Justice Minister at the time, Irwin Cotler, who was charged with reviewing Bill C-36 and ensuring an adequate balance was struck between civil liberties and national security concerns.
Prof. Don Stuart of the Faculty of Law at Queen’s University warned the Special Senate Committee on Bill C-36 at that time,
I see in this bill a wider pattern of quick-fix law and order legislation. This is the kind of legislation of which Canada should not be proud and should not accept…
When I look at this bill, it is something that Canada did not need. We had ample law… Those of us who have been thinking about criminal law teaching and principles for years would see absolutely no reason to create new crimes to deal with terrorism and the types of police powers and CSIS powers that have been created here. They are quite extraordinary. I do not think we need them at all. We have plenty of laws to deal with this situation…
Despite recent government amendments, I see that they do not yet meet the high standard of justification needed to support massive dragnet powers of this sort. Basic principles of a criminal justice system that deserves the name require a meaningful proof before you send someone to jail of a meaningful act and what we call fault. Also, we need to have people fairly labelled and punishment must be proportionate. Notwithstanding the amendments the government has approved – the tinkering around with the definitions – in my view, the definitions are still far too wide. I include in that a consideration of the listing section.
In my view, the devil of this bill is in the detail. I do not think there are too many people in this country who have read every provision of this bill… It is far too complicated. To suggest that we actually know or Parliament knew what they were voting on when they passed it seems to be a stretch.
If you actually look at the way these new offences have been defined, they do not achieve what they say they will. The Justice Minister stands up and says, “We have a narrow offence about knowingly participating in a terrorist group,” but when you look at the bill, the word “knowingly” is nonexistent.
[emphasis added]
Prof. Stuart elaborated further on the failings of the new Bill in a seminal paper,
The Anti-terrorism Bill (Bill C-36): An Unnecessary Law and Order Quick Fix that Permanently Stains the Canadian Criminal Justice System.
Even more to blame is a law enforcement establishment that cast a net so wide that even those peripherally involved with an alleged terrorist act can be held complicit, even if they knew nothing about it.
When Canadians re-gain their sensibility and re-examine the fairness and justice of these provisions, and the potential for abuse, it should be the first thing re-visited by Parliament.
This case proves that it is time to explore the anti terror act in detail, the structure and the wording of such vague terms, that allow the justice system, within the ‘law’ to treat Canadian individuals in an inferior manner that would not be deemed acceptable when comparing to the regular ‘criminal code’. Allowing for such laws that give the state so much power over individuals, puts the future of millions of Canadians at risk. We may not see it now, but we will in the future, if many many Canadians have to go through the same hardships as these individuals.
Therein lies my discomfort–reclassify a traditionally criminal law matter as an administrative one and poof! Gone are the standard rules of evidence. Maybe if the government wants to get your support on its anti-terrorism initiatives it just has to deem it an administrative matter, establish a quasi-judicial commission and do away with all the procedural safeguards of the criminal law.
My issue is with your double standard. For what its worth I agree with you regarding the troubling mens rea requirements in the Anti-Terror Act.
I’d be interested to know what the LawisCool folks would think of the idea of a quasi-judicial tribunal adjudicating with lower procedural standards and standards on proof on terrorism related subject.
Would you be agreeable to a new quasi-judicial tribunal which deals with complaints regarding persons expressing radical and/or violent ideologies on a civil standard? If that tribunal could only impose a gag order and fines would it be a reasonable limit on free speech?
I ask because some days you appear to be of the view that preventing terrorism is a less important state objective than the prevention of hate. Certainly in the view of myself (and many others as well) the former is at least as ‘pressing and substantial’.
FWIW I would not support what I am suggesting here.
Law is Cool:
None of us share a uniform position on almost anything in the law, but you’re free to poll our contributors if they’re willing to respond individually.
The position of this piece is that the legislation is not even preventing terrorism; it is imprisoning people for acts that were never intended for the purpose of terrorism at all, or with any knowledge of a terrorist plot.
Arguably miscarriages of justice of this type would only fuel the type of animosity that goes into genuine terroristic acts.
At present, this type of speech you refer to is already covered under current human rights codes and the Criminal Code. See the post Even Jihadists Have the Right of Free Speech.
Please continue your discussion of that topic on that post, or address the subject matter of this one directly.
KC: from my perspective, if someone is charged with a criminal offence for hate speech (e.g. under s. 319 of the Criminal Code) then they should absolutely be entitled to all the procedural safeguards and standards of proof of the criminal justice system.
As Law Is Cool said, we all have differing opinions. However, I don’t think anyone on this website has ever advocated anything else.
I’d have this discussion on the other thread, but it appears that commenting on it is disabled.
(Actually a few other views have been expressed before Lawrence joined the site, but they’re buried in all the other content. When we started getting the mass trolling we decided to collectively support the one individual contributor under attack by our guest visitors. Comments are now enabled.)