Part of the International Conflicts series

Introduction

One of the only international instruments working in the DRC currently is the UN peacekeeping mission, MONUC.

According the UN’s peacekeeping website, this is the largest current UN peacekeeping mission, costing over 1/5th of the $5 billion peacekeeping budget, and featuring 16,000 armed troops along with another several thousand civilian staff.

The MONUC mission has, in some form, been in place since 2000, and has been at its current strength since 2004. In that time its mandate has changed from overseeing the 1999 Lousaka agreement cease-fire and engaging in human rights monitoring to maintaining an armed presence in key areas of volatility, protecting civilians in immediate danger, and facilitating arms collections from combatants.

Essentially, MONUC has evolved from being a facilitator, helping domestic groups end the conflict through advice and expertise, to an active participant in shaping the country.

MONUC and Corruption

With these facts taken into account, peacekeepers have been given an important role to play in ensuring that the future of the DRC is peaceful. However, recent events have shown that the MONUC mission may be impeded by factors both within, and outside, of its control.

For example, there is some concerns over corruption within the mission. Peacekeepers within the MONUC mission have been accused of gold and gun smuggling for armed groups. This was followed by an internal UN report, which confirmed some of the accusations, saying that some Pakistani peacekeepers had aided gold smugglers by protecting goods and personnel.

While I cannot speak to what motivated peacekeepers to help commit crimes they are supposed to stop, it does suggest a breakdown within MONUC. Perhaps these peacekeepers were disillusioned by a perceived lack of progress on the ground, as, seven years after the ceasefire agreement, violence and instability remain in large parts of the country.

Or perhaps these peacekeepers entered into the MONUC mission ready to act unethically, and the heads of the MONUC mission failed to engage in proper oversight in order to root out unethical behaviour or prevent it from happening. This is supported by the rather lukewarm response by the UN towards those Pakistani peacekeepers.

Human Rights Watch has stated that the UN has decided that the report confirming the gold-smuggling accusations was its final action.

Whatever the case, it is clear that these gold smuggling accusations bear an ill omen towards the success of the mission.

Unfortunately, this corruption accusation may only be a sign the MONUC mission faces serious difficulties.

MONUC and the Limitations of Peacekeeping

Besides these accusations of corruption, the most serious difficulties facing the MONUC mission are rooted in the particularities of UN peacekeeping in general.

The classical definition of peacekeeping is based on three principles: host-state consent, impartiality and minimum use of force (1).

These principles were established because peacekeeping was not designed as an international army, tasked with ending conflicts in the world, but to help enforce peace once it has already been established.

Peacekeepers are essentially third-party, multi-lateral, facilitators between two sides of a conflict who have decided to make a bid for peace.

However, the DRC, far from working for peace, is still embroiled in conflict. The MONUC mission was established after the 1999 Lousaka agreement, which included a cease-fire between all participants in the war that occurred after Laurent Kabila’s assent to power. This cease-fire did not last, as several rebel and armed groups have maintained violent campaigns across the country.

In 2006, Human Rights Watch noted that the national army attempted to rout out members of an armed insurgency through the use of terror tactics on civilians in the provinces of Katanga, Ituri, and North and South Kivu.

The actions of the government are mirrored by insurgency campaigns such as the Mai Mai rebellion, and the rebel group attached Gen. Nkunda, As well, the DRC continues to have problems with foreign rebel groups, notably from Rwanda and Uganda, who base themselves within the country.

In other words, while war would be an inappropriate term for the situation in the DRC, the country is far from peaceful.

Rather than withdraw the MONUC mission, which, of course, would be bad both morally and politically, the UN changed the mandate of the mission as the situation in the DRC changed.

In order to enforce peace, peacekeepers are now called upon to actively intervene in conflict in order to protect civilians. The most serious problem however is that by increasing the scope of MONUC’s mandate beyond the classical definitions of peacekeeping, its required tasks and goals become murky.

MONUC’s new mandate includes protecting civilians under immediate threat of violence. This brings up several questions.

Can MONUC peacekeepers protect civilians under threat from the DRC national government?

Could it even maintain host-state consent if it attempted to do so?

Can an armed force of 16,000 realistic protect the millions of people still under threat from violence in the country?

Are peacekeepers really trained and equipped in order to complete its mandate?

Peacekeeping and the DRC: An Improper Solution?

These new difficulties threaten to destabilize the MONUC mission, as well as attack its legitimacy as a positive force in the DRC.

Stories abound of attacks on civilians by armed groups close to MONUC centres, and yet peacekeepers did not intervene.

Recent refugees in Uganda have noted that villagers in Eastern Congo rioted “while protesting the failure of U.N. peacekeepers to protect them from militias.

Could peacekeepers really be called to intervene in these situations? They are not an army per se, as they are trained under the principles of minimum use of force, and they would likely not be able to stop the violence even if they tried to intervene.

By intervening, these peacekeepers would, by necessity, be placing themselves on a certain side of the conflict.

If they intervened against the national government, they could face expulsion from the country.

If they intervened against the rebel and insurgent groups, then they would be forced to align with the national government or face increased attacks against their operations.

With only 16,000 troops this is a frightening prospect, and would likely mean that MONUC would be forced out of the country. While it has been documented that UN peacekeepers have worked together to deal with armed insurgency groups, it cannot go too far down this path, otherwise it could face legitimacy issues, possibly being viewed across the country as a tool of the DRC government.

Therefore, once a cease-fire resumes within the country, the ability of the UN mission to fulfill the “classical” parts of its mandate may be hampered by distrust.

Not only is the MONUC mission complicated by its shifting mandate, but the situation in the DRC is preventing peacekeepers from fulfilling the original parts of its mandate in the country, tasks that peacekeeping missions normally engage in.

One of the most important tasks of any peacekeeping mission is to facilitate the disarming and demobilization of excess soldiers on both sides of a conflict.

This is of great importance within the DRC due to the widespread use of child soldiers on all sides of the conflict. While MONUC would be hard-pressed to take child soldiers from armed rebel groups, it also currently faces difficulty in obtaining child soldiers from the national military.

As part of its various cease-fire agreements, armed rebel groups were to be integrated into the national military in a process known as ‘mixage.’

As part of this agreement, these new army brigades were to give up their child soldiers. However, while MONUC has been able to set up centres for child soldiers, peacekeepers have recently had difficulty in obtaining child soldiers from army commanders.

This inability to obtain child soldiers is directly related to the continuing threat of violence within the country, as army brigades in the eastern part of the country have prevented peacekeepers from collecting their child soldiers.

In one case, army commanders in the province of North Kivu to the east continued to recruit child soldiers citing the need to “maintain sufficient soldiers to protect Tutsi living in North Kivu and enable the return of thousands of Congolese Tutsi refugees living in camps in Rwanda.”

Since peacekeepers are having difficulty demanding the release of child soldiers, they must rely on either the kindness of army commanders, or the ability of child soldiers to break away from army brigades and find refuge within MONUC centres on their own.

As well, AllAfrica.com has reported that UN peacekeepers have been having difficulty in fulfilling other aspects of their mission. Recently, peacekeepers were drawn into low intensity clashes while trying to investigate an assault on Congolese intelligence officers in North Kivu province.

If this trend continues, the MONUC mission could easily face violence and conflict as it tries to complete even its most basic tasks.

Overall, it appears that the MONUC mission in the DRC is in trouble. It simply boils down to the problem that the situation in the country does not match the optimal case for successful peacekeeping missions.

In order to create lasting peace in the DRC, it is the opinion of this particular writer that the MONUC mission must be reevaluated.
Solutions and Summary

What is the solution?

Simply eliminating the MONUC mission would also eliminate the most direct instrument that the international community has in effecting the outcome in the DRC.

What is necessary is a new type of force that can be called upon to take direct action to protect civilians and stop the violence in the country. While the UN should remain an important actor, it may be necessary to look towards other actors that can contribute.

For example, the UN mission to the Sudan is increasing its levels of armed troops, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has called upon its member states to provide the entire quota of 20,000 troops. This is part of a trend within Africa where regional powers, such as Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa, take the lead in helping troubled neighbours.

Perhaps it is time for the DRC to embark upon an entirely “Made in Africa” solution. However, this solution may not be appropriate considering the simple fact that the DRC’s neighbours have been a significant part of its problems.

I don’t intend to find a solution here, but only suggest that the key to peace in the DRC will be complicated, and no single solution can cover every eventuality.

What is most necessary is that a frank dialogue is opened in order to find an appropriate solution. While peacekeeping itself is not necessarily a “broken” institution, it should not be relied upon in all situations.

Notes

(1) Mats Berdal, “Ten years of International Peacekeeping” in International Peacekeeping, 2003