RSS FeedCase Comment – Gomboc Decision, 2010 SCC 55
Here is a link to my website for a case comment on the Gomboc that will be published in an upcoming issue of RegQuest.
Enjoy the reading.
Bilingualism and the Supreme Court
As reported by the Globe and Mail, a bill requiring that all future Supreme Court justices be bilingual was passed last week and now awaits Senate approval. The private member’s Bill C-232, tabled by NDP language critic Yves Godin, was harshly criticized by former Supreme Court puisne judge John Major on CBC’s “The Current” radio show.
Major argued that the only way to uphold the Rule of Law in Canada is to have the most competent people in the Supreme Court, not to put the emphasis on linguistics. Since there is far more bilingualism in the East, requiring bilingual Justices from the West would lower the grade of the talent pool. Major noted that both Parliament and the UN use translators. He said that in his 13 years on the Court there was never a single case where he didn’t fully understand the case, between translators and extensive case preparation. Major argued that “fluently bilingual” is a very high threshold to achieve, and most justices only learn French after they are appointed. Interestingly, Major criticized several times former justice minister Irwin Cotler and former lawyer Bob Rae for their support of the bill.
While Godin argued that Harper broke a fully bilingual Court by appointing Rothstein (who is currently taking language lessons), Major countered that it’s actually only two or three current Justices who are truly bilingual. Godin’s primary concern was that someone arguing a case before the Court would not be fully understood, a concern that Major effortlessly debunked.
Phil Fontaine, former National Chief of the Assembly of First Nations, called the bill is “elitist” because it does not fully reflect the diversity of Canada. I would call it elitist because it is only a small subset of Canada’s English-speaking population that has access to quality French-language instruction at a young age.
Are there inalienable rights in Canada?
We in Canada like to think of ourselves as free. We also like to think we have rights. The police can’t throw us in jail for our political views. And if they do throw us in jail for any reason, the police must let us call a lawyer. A part of Canada’s constitution, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees our rights and freedoms. But the constitutional rights and freedoms such as freedom of expression, a right against arbitrary detention or imprisonment, and even our right to life, liberty and security, are not absolute. The Charter leaves loopholes for the federal Parliament, provincial legislatures, or even judges to limit or take away any rights or freedoms. There are no inalienable rights in Canada.
A legal right is a claim to a benefit. The law sets legal rights, and the courts will enforce them if no one else will. When you sign a contract to lease an apartment in exchange for rent, your tenant has a right to use the apartment, and you have a right to some of the tenant’s money. Your right is always someone else’s duty, which is either to give up the benefit you claim or to let you claim the benefit freely. You can also have rights against the government. For example, habeas corpus is a right to see a judge if the police arrest you. Freedoms are like rights but they are more about enjoying benefits you already have, such as speech or movement. Still, the flip side of every freedom is someone’s duty to respect it. For example, if you have a freedom of religion, the government may not ban your faith.
But rights and freedoms in our relations with the government are tricky because the government is a sovereign. It means that within its geographic borders the government writes the law. What good is a right if the government can scrap it? That’s where a constitution comes into play. It’s a superlaw that tells the government what laws it can and cannot write. And it’s very difficult for the government to change the constitution. The Canadian Charter is the part of our constitution that orders the government to respect certain human rights. If a provincial or the federal legislature passes a law infringing on our Charter right, the courts can strike that law from the books. It will have no force and effect. That way the Charter protects us from the government.
Even democracies need this protection to stop majorities from oppressing minorities. For example, our legal tradition has very good reasons for protecting some rights of the criminally accused. Only a minority of the total population will ever need these rights. Whether justified or baseless, a fear of crime can bring a party that wants to do away with these rights to power. In theory, our Charter will always stop the Parliament from touching the rights of the criminally accused. Before the Charter, the Parliament could throw out the presumption of innocence or the law against self-incrimination. A constitution can also protect racial, gender, or other minorities from discrimination. We can be sure of our human rights only when they are safe from the majority and the government it elects.
The Charter promises us this safety, but it doesn’t really deliver. There are several loopholes in the Charter that let the federal parliament, provincial legislatures, or the courts take away rights. First, the notwithstanding clause in s. 33 empowers legislatures to suspend fundamental freedoms (s. 2) and legal (ss. 7-14) and equality (s. 15) rights. Perhaps for fear of the ballot box, legislatures tried it for real only very few times. But if the government can suspend the rights, they are not inalienable.
Second, the most obvious limitation on all rights and freedoms in the Charter is in s. 1. It basically says that sometimes the Charter will not protect our rights. Suppose the Parliament passes a law that bans newspapers in a certain language. If the government can justify this law as reasonable “in a free and democratic society,” it can get away with it under s. 1. Who decides what’s reasonable and what’s free and democratic? Ultimately, it’s the nine people on the Supreme Court of Canada. Sometimes a s. 1 justification is a very hard task, but a right or freedom is guaranteed only if it’s legally certain, not if it’s probable or very likely. So the government can strip anyone of any Charter right with the consent of the Supreme Court.
Third, the courts decide what each right and freedom in Canada actually means. For example, s. 7 allows the government to deprive anyone of “the right to life, liberty, and security of the person” only in accordance with “the principles of fundamental justice.” The Supreme Court decides what these principles are. Next, the Charter often defines rights using the principle of “reasonableness,” which is really a code word for letting the courts fill in the details. See, for example, the right against “unreasonable search” (s. 8), the right to be tried within a “reasonable time” (s. 11(b)), etc. When the police breach our Charter rights to obtain evidence against us in a criminal investigation, we have a right to have it excluded from our trial—but only if “the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute” (s. 24(2)). Again, the courts decide what that means by applying factors laid down by the Supreme Court.
Finally, if the government breaches your Charter rights, the courts decide what compensation you get if any. It is little comfort to you and little deterrent to the government if the courts merely declare government action unconstitutional. Denied or insufficient remedies gut Charter rights and freedoms. As the recent case of Omar Khadr has shown, the Supreme Court can deny a meaningful remedy even for breaches of the most basic rights such as a right to fundamental justice in s. 7. Most Canadians don’t seem to like Omar Khadr or his family, so the majority is clearly not on his side. The Supreme Court didn’t say that it let the government off the legal hook because of the views of the majority of Canadians. But these views possibly encouraged the government when it violated Khadr’s Charter rights or denied him the requested remedy. What is the value of rights that depend on politics?
One can argue that these cases are extreme and that limits on our Charter rights are fine because we trust our government. After all we elect it. But consider this. First, majorities elect the government, and how certain are you what the majority will be like 20 years from now? Are you going to be in that majority? Do you want to entrust your most basic human rights to a majority? Second, even election rights in the Charter are not inalienable. Mix a national emergency with the right people on the Supreme Court (appointed by the Prime Minister; no Parliament’s consent required), and the words “reasonable,” “free,” and “democratic” in section 1 of the Canadian Charter can have a very different meaning.
The word “inalienable” expresses the idea of rights that the law can never let anyone take. An inalienable right is yours by the fact of your membership in the human species. No government or person gave you this right, so they can never take it away. It is yours by birth. It recognizes your inherent value as a human being regardless of who you are, what you did, or what you think. Very few rights can be inalienable but those that can are truly fundamental: a right to a fair trial, freedom of speech, habeas corpus. The US Declaration of Independence speaks of “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness” as inalienable rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes “the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.”
Our Charter does not have the word “inalienable,” neither in letter nor in spirit. It uses other words. But social conditions change, and what’s not “reasonable,” “free,” or “democratic” today can become such in the future. There is a fully legal path to breaches of any rights in Canada. It doesn’t necessarily mean it’s possible politically, socially, or economically, but legally our rights are uncertain. A constitution that fails to protect minorities from the majority’s changing moods does not guarantee rights. The loopholes in the Charter show that we have rights and freedoms only as long as the government and the Supreme Court let us. Rights and freedoms in Canada do not inherently belong to us as human beings but are revocable gifts from the government and the courts. And if we can’t change our Charter, we must at least hold our government to account especially strictly when it comes to human rights.
Grant v. Torstar and the defence of responsible communication: implications for bloggers and users of other online media
In the recent decision of Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61 (“Grant”) and its companion case, Quan v. Cusson, 2009 SCC 62 (“Quan”), the Supreme Court of Canada sought to strike a more appropriate balance between freedom of expression and the protection of reputation by creating the new defence of “responsible communication on matters of public interest” (the “Defence”). The Defence allows defendants in libel cases where statements of fact are at issue to evade liability if they can show that they acted responsibly in reporting on a matter of public interest, even if the statements of fact are untrue. Prior to the decision, defendants could not avoid liability in these cases unless they showed that the statement was substantially true (the defence of justification), or that the statement was made in a protected context (the defence of privilege).
Importantly, the Defence applies not only to journalists and print-based publishers – the types of defendants in Grant and Quan – but also to non-journalist bloggers and users of other online media:
[T]he traditional media are rapidly being complemented by new ways of communicating on matters of public interest, many of them online, which do not involve journalists. These new disseminators of news and information should, absent good reasons for exclusion, be subject to the same laws as established media outlets. I agree … that the new defence is “available to anyone who publishes material of public interest in any medium”. [Grant, at para. 96]
[Emphasis added]
Although the extension of the Defence to non-journalist bloggers and users of other online media is an important recognition of the growing relevance and legitimacy of these groups, the Defence is – at least currently – unlikely to protect most members of these groups. To gain the protection of the Defence, the defendant must establish two elements: (1) that the publication is on a matter of public interest; and (2) that the publication was responsible, in that the defendant was diligent in trying to verify the allegation. The trial judge will determine the first element. If the judge concludes that the first element is met, the jury will determine the second element, having regard to several factors:
- the seriousness of the allegation;
- the public importance of the matter;
- the urgency of the matter;
- the status and reliability of the source;
- whether the plaintiff’s side of the story was sought and accurately reported;
- whether the inclusion of the defamatory statement was justifiable;
- whether the defamatory statement’s public interest lay in the fact that it was made rather than its truth; and
- any other relevant circumstances
In assessing whether the defendant was diligent, the jury will be guided by “established journalistic standards”:
[M]any actions now concern blog postings and other online media which are potentially both more ephemeral and more ubiquitous than traditional print media. While established journalistic standards provide a useful guide by which to evaluate the conduct of journalists and non-journalists alike, the applicable standards will necessarily evolve to keep pace with the norms of new communications media. [Grant, at para. 97]
[Emphasis added]
This indicates that the same journalistic standard must be applied to every defendant irrespective of whether or not they are journalists. As a result, the Defence will likely not apply to non-journalist bloggers and users of other online media unless they perform the due diligence expected of a journalist in the circumstances.
The problem for many members of these groups is that they are generally not guided by established journalistic norms. Although they may approach online publishing in good faith and with a level of diligence reasonably expected of non-journalists, this level of diligence is unlikely to meet the required journalistic standard. For example, although journalists will generally make a point of seeking the plaintiff’s side of the story and speaking directly to witnesses and experts, non-journalist bloggers – who are generally unpaid for their efforts – will rarely have the time, resources, training, or willingness to do so. As one American commentator argues,
blogging and journalism clearly differ. The former ‘implies that a disinterested third party is reporting facts fairly’ (Andrews, 2003: 64). Blogs are ‘unedited, unabashedly opinionated, sporadic and personal’ (Palser, 2002) – in many ways, the antithesis of traditional US journalism. Some say that is the best thing about them. ‘Journalism is done a certain way, by a certain kind of people,’ but bloggers “are oblivious to such traditions” (Welsh, 2003). [Jane B. Singer, “The political j-blogger: ‘normalizing’ a new media form to fit old norms” (2005) 6(2) Journalism 173 at 176]
[Emphasis added]
Even if a non-journalist blogger or user of other online media does engage in the level of diligence required to meet the journalistic standard, they may unknowingly fail to do so in a way that produces a strong record of evidence from which a court can conclude that they did act diligently. As a result, many of these defendants may simply not have access to the protection of the Defence.
Nonetheless, Grant does not foreclose the possibility that courts will apply a different diligence standard to non-journalist bloggers and users of other online media as the “norms of new communications media” evolve. Although the court isn’t clear on this point, these groups might be able to gain the protection of the Defence in future cases even if they haven’t performed their diligence in the same way that a traditional journalist would have:
While established journalistic standards provide a useful guide by which to evaluate the conduct of journalists and non-journalists alike, the applicable standards will necessarily evolve to keep pace with the norms of new communications media. [Grant, at para. 97]
[Emphasis added]
Even if the standard applicable to these groups does not shift to allow them to gain the protection of the Defence, juries – who have been tasked with the responsibility for assessing whether the defendant was diligent – may be sympathetic to these groups and apply the journalistic standard less rigidly.
In summary, although the Defence extends to non-journalist bloggers and users of other online media, many members of these groups are unlikely to be protected by the Defence because it requires that they performed the due diligence expected of a journalist. Nonetheless, the law does not necessarily foreclose the possibility that courts will apply a different diligence standard to these groups in future cases, or that juries will less rigidly apply the existing journalistic standard.
Originally posted on Defamation Law Blog
SCC to hear Pickton’s Appeal
The Supreme Court of Canada has decided that it will hear an expanded list of “errors in law” that helped to convict serial killer Robert Pickton’s appeal.
Journalistic privilege
Paper fights to shield its source
Tonda MacCharles writes for the Toronto Star:
The constitutional guarantee of a free press is “meaningless” if it does not protect journalists from being forced to reveal the identity of confidential sources, media lawyers argued Wednesday before the Supreme Court of Canada.
In the second case this year revolving around the role confidential sources play in freedom of the press, lawyers for The Globe and Mail, a group of Quebec newspapers, the Fédération des journalistes professionelles du Québec, and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association urged judges to shield the identity of a source key to the reporting of the sponsorship scandal in Quebec.
If the client-lawyer relationship is privileged, why shouldn’t the journalist-source relationship be privileged too?
SCC: Quebec school laws for immigrants “excessive”
According to The Globe and Mail:
A group of Quebec immigrants has succeeded in striking down a controversial law that barred their children from entering English-language elementary schools.
In a 7-0 ruling today, the Supreme Court of Canada said Quebec must pass a less “excessive” provision within a year if it intends to replace the dead prohibition.
Within minutes, Quebec’s minister responsible for language, Christine St-Pierre, touched off what promised to be a day of political discord in the province by saying that she was “disappointed and angry” at the ruling. The ruling upheld a 2007 Quebec Court of Appeal decision that struck down the law, which prevented a child from attending a non-subsidized English-language elementary school for a year or less and then transferring into the English public school system.
Read the full decision in Nguyen v. Quebec (Education, Recreation and Sports), 2009 SCC 47
I have yet to get through the full decision (exams are creeping up), but please share your thoughts.
Ottawa abandons case against Charkaoui
Divisive terror law losing traction
Can we trust secret evidence, often borrowed from foreign countries, to throw people out of Canada?
Colin Freeze explains the security certificates:
… federal ministers sign off on a certificate after viewing secret CSIS information, which allows officials to immediately jail, and eventually deport, a non-citizen.
The “intelligence” used to do this is disclosed to judges but never fully revealed to the accused, drawn as it usually is from secret agents and wiretaps, sometimes placed within Canada but also frequently “loaned” from foreign governments on condition that the provenance be kept secret.
Charkaoui: the name every Canadian law student knows
Charkaoui, however, is the legal star of the five. He’s won two Supreme Court challenges and, as he gradually demolished Ottawa’s case against him, managed to make the government look like an idiot.
Litigious
Ottawa to launch Supreme Court appeal of Khadr ruling
The federal government will go to the Supreme Court of Canada to appeal a court order to bring Omar Khadr home from a U.S. military prison, according to a CBC report.
Hypnosis evidence and murder
Man admits committing 1992 murder
A former Canada Post supervisor admitted today to the 1992 killing of his girlfriend, two years after the Supreme Court of Canada threw out his conviction in a landmark decision because key evidence was obtained through hypnosis.
Major criminal law Charter cases to be released Friday: Grant, Suberu, Harrison
I have huge news for anyone interested in criminal law (and indeed, many accused persons).
After years of anticipation, the Supreme Court of Canada is finally set to release some of the most important criminal law Charter of Rights decisions since the Charter was introduced. This will have implications across Canada for thousands of criminal cases currently before the courts.
According to the latest bulletin, decisions in the following cases will be released on Friday, July 17, 2009:
- Musibau Suberu v. Her Majesty the Queen (Crim.) (Ont.) (31912)
- Donnohue Grant v. Her Majesty the Queen (Crim.) (Ont.) (31892)
- Curtis Shepherd v. Her Majesty the Queen (Crim.) (Sask.) (32037)
- Bradley Harrison v. Her Majesty the Queen (Crim.) (Ont.) (32487)
These cases promise to redefine the way that evidence is excluded from a criminal trial after a Charter breach has been found. The application of Charter, s. 24(2), and specifically the test for whether the adminstration of justice would be brought into disrepute by the admission of the evidence, is expected to be significantly different after Friday. The old test in R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 was certainly overdue for a review after over twenty years of application and modification by trial and appellate courts.
Summaries of the four cases and the issues can be found here.
