RSS FeedUsing a Norwich Order to Reveal Gmail Accounts
The Ontario Superior Court of Justice released its decision on an application in York University v. Bell Canada Enterprises this Friday. The case is based on an allegedly defamatory e-mail about the President of York University, Mamdouh Shoukri, saying he had “perpetrated an outrageous fraud.”
A group calling itself “York Faculty Concerned About the Future of York University” protested the appointment of Martin Singer of the new Faculty of Liberal Arts and Professional Studies, questioning his credentials and attaching a letter from other academics who did disclose their names.
But the University is more interested in the identity of the unsigned e-mail, presumably by York faculty, sent from a Gmail account, yfcfyu@gmail.com.
G.R. Strathy J. approved a Norwich order against Bell Canada Enterprises and Rogers Communications Inc. to disclose the identity of the account owners. A previous order had been approved against Google back in May, which identified the two ISPs as the holders of the information.
A Norwich order is a pre-action discovery mechanism that is described by Spence J. in Isofoton S.A. v. The Toronto-Dominion Bank,
Requests for Norwich relief are largely unfamiliar to Canadian courts. A Norwich order essentially compels a third party to provide the applicant with information where the applicant believes it has been wronged and needs the third party’s assistance to determine the circumstances of the wrongdoing and allow the applicant to pursue its legal remedies.
The 5 elements identified in this case for granting such an order include:
(i) Whether the applicant has provided evidence sufficient to raise a valid, bona fide or reasonable claim;
(ii) Whether the applicant has established a relationship with the third party from whom the information is sought such that it establishes that the third party is somehow involved in the acts complained of;
(iii) Whether the third party is the only practicable source of the information available;
(iv) Whether the third party can be indemnified for costs to which the third party may be exposed because of the disclosure, some [authorities] refer to the associated expenses of complying with the orders, while others speak of damages; and
(v) Whether the interests of justice favour the obtaining of disclosure.
[emphasis added]
The privacy interests of the alleged wrongdoer were overcome by the last element, the interests of justice, because of the applicant’s equitable right to information. Spence J. pointed to Alberta v. Leahy and Bankers Trust Orders (from Bankers Trust Co. v. Shapira) indicating that court orders can override confidential information, even for financial records, and Glaxo-Wellcome PLC v. M.N.R. that the privacy interests of alleged wrongdoers is somewhat diminished.
What is troubling about the latter citation is that the rationale used by the Federal Court of Appeal was that the information could not be considered especially sensitive since it had passed through several hands. Although the York case does demonstrate that multiple parties may be involved in identifying a defendant, many privacy watchdogs would be concerned that IP information loses its privacy value simply because it is shared.
However, Spence J. did point to other reasons why the privacy expectation may be overridden, because the information is limited by terms of the order for specific purposes and the use of this information is not absolute. Additionally, a strong case of fraud removes the possibility of a frivolous or vexatious application of the order.
G.R. Strathy J. also discussed the necessity of granting the order for York by citing GEA Group AG v. Ventra Group Co,
…there is no suggestion in the established jurisprudence that [necessity] is a stand-alone requirement for the granting of a Norwich order…
In my opinion, the precise placement of the necessity requirement in the inventory of factors to be considered on a Norwich application is of little moment. The important point is that a Norwich order is an equitable, discretionary and flexible remedy. It is also an intrusive and extraordinary remedy that must be exercised with caution. It is therefore incumbent on the applicant for a Norwich order to demonstrate that the discovery sought is required to permit a prospective action to proceed, although the firm commitment to commence proceedings is not itself a condition precedent to this form of equitable relief.
…The crucial point is that the necessity for a Norwich order must be established on the facts of the given case to justify the invocation of what is intended to be an exceptional, though flexible, equitable remedy.
G.R. Strathy J. then pointed to a number of other ways that this information could be obtained without the Norwich order, including the pre-action disclosure in the now-infamous Cohen v. Google Inc. Although both ISPs had privacy policies for the customers, these could be overridden by s. 7(3)(c) of PIPEDA to comply with a court of law.
Given the recently ruling, and assuming it’s not overturned in the future, it’s likely were going to see more Norwich orders used for the purposes of identifying Internet activity.
The Cozy Bank-Law Firm Relationship May Not Be So Cozy After All…These Days Anyway, Part I
First posted on Commercial Law International on Jun 5, 2009.
In Canada an Ontario Superior Court of Justice ruling (McKenna v. Gammon Gold Inc.) has the potential to go viral like the latest YouTube sensation and challenge what can only be called one of the most incestuous relationships in the commercial world.
What am I talking about?
Well I am referring to the relationship, the very close relationship, between banks and law firms.
Ever wonder why, if and when, a bank or other financial institution is being sued it is very rare to find a big name law firm representing the plaintiff but they are very much present to represent the defendant bank? This my friends is no coincidence, it is a deliberate strategy on the part of the banks and other financial institutions. They set out to exploit the conflict of interest rules that lawyers are bound by – a lawyer may not generally represent two clients on opposite sides on the same matter – and they do a very good job of it. This is evidenced by the fact that banks and other financial instructions will spread the legal work they have around to as many international, national, regional and local based (powerhouse) law firms as they can in any market they operate.
The strategy is simple but effective: tie up the biggest, the brightest, the best and if need be the most belligerent legal talent out there. The benefits of this strategy accrue to banks in two significant and interconnect ways. The first is that they have the best legal talent working for them on ordinary transactions while at the same time having them in reserve ready to be unleashed like a pack of attack dogs. The second, which flows from the first, is that having such well trained and impressive attack dogs – oh sorry, I mean lawyers – at the ready will and does inspire fear in not only prospective claimants but other lawyers as well (though most would not admit it).
The law firms are not entirely innocent here, in fact not at all. They are willing subjects or is that objects of the strategy to exploit the conflict of interest rules. They enter this relationship; in fact they actively seek to forge these links, with their eyes, arms and billable hour’s dockets´ all wide open. Law firms know that the work from the banks is not only constant but very lucrative as well, so they are more than happy to be attack dogs for hire.
However, we now live in different times, as this once cozy relationship is being undone or at least it has hit a rocky patch called the current global recession. Whoever first said: it´s all about the money was so right. It is indeed all about the money for both banks and law firms. The former having less work to spread around now is also lacking a commercial rational that would satisfy shareholder costs´ accountability of having such high paid attack dogs in reserve. Consequently, the banks are now looking to cut costs and have aggressively gone after external legal costs reducing the number of attack dogs – sorry, I mean lawyers – it holds in reserve and how much it pays them.
The law firms for their part, seeing the writing on the wall have, have begun to seek out other clients. In fact this has resulted in the once impossible, law firms, well at least in this case, have begun to represent claimants against the banks.
The conflict of interest rules once untested and applied broadly, I would say too broadly, to the bank-law firm relationship is now set for realignment. No longer will law firms simply refuse or not actively seek out work, simply because a suit might be brought against one of their clients. I know I am only an attack dog in training- pardon me, I should say student at law – but my reading of the conflicts section of the Ontario Rules of Professional Conduct does not support such a broad application. Provided the issues are not related, the clients’ information in possession of the lawyer bares no relevance to each other and the lawyers that handle each client´s matter are different, it is difficult to see where a conflict of interest would be created.
Thankfully I don’t have to stand alone in my opinion. I now have Justice Lax in McKenna v. Gammon Gold Inc. to back me up when she ruled that Siskinds should not be disqualified for a conflict of interest from prosecuting a class action against an underwriting subsidiary of a client bank that it acts for in separate matters.
And how so? Well you are just going to have to stay tuned for part two.
