RSS FeedFree Internet to Citizens of Oppressed Nations: Genuine Interest in Democracy or Attempts to Monopolize Information?
Uncle Sam has $30M to bypass Chinese, Iranian ‘Net filters
By Nate Anderson
Need to get around a Chinese government firewall? Burning to smuggle your samizdat writings past Iranian Internet censorship? Hoping to blog with impunity in Burma? Uncle Sam wants to help. The US government has a $30 million pot of money to spend on “Internet freedom” programs around the world, and it’s not afraid to make a few enemies.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton last year gave a major speech on Internet freedom and the new “Information Curtain” of censorship that has fallen in some parts of the world. In that speech, she said that State would support development of tools that can bypass Internet censorship. She also outlined a program in which State would fund mobile phone apps that allow people to rate government ministries on responsiveness and efficiency and that can ferret out corruption through crowdsourcing. The hardware is already in the wild, she said; all what’s needed is some money to make it worth developers’ time.
This year, State has $30 million for such projects, and it’s asking interested parties to apply for the cash. Top on its list of wants: “counter-censorship technology” that can bypass firewalls and filters. Such tools may be general (like Tor) or can be specific to individual governments. China and Iran can probably look forward to some US-funded encryption and circumvention tools coming their way in the near future.
The grants will focus on “East Asia, including China and Burma; the Near East, including Iran; Southeast Asia; the South Caucasus; Eurasia, including Russia; Central Asia; Latin America, including Cuba and Venezuela; and Africa.” North America and Western Europe get a pass.
In addition to circumvention tools, State wants to fund secure mobile communications tech that can make mobile phone usage safer. The government will also help nonprofits and digital activists build communication platforms, and it wants to establish “virtual open Internet centers” that exist outside of closed countries and provide a spot to post and archive censored content.
If you’re part of a nonprofit or a university (and are not an affiliate of a “designated terrorist organization”), you have a month to submit an online statement of interest.
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Interesting comment by a reader:
“govt, doesnt give anything away to anyone (except themselves and their filthy bosses).it smells like a trick to start the censorship and as usual in the name of democracy.
I had heard many years ago that they are planning to introduce the Internet 2 and shut this one down.in any case the problem in USA and the West is Not the censorship the problem is Monopoly on info!
the rest of the world gets its info from this monopolized source!”
International Law Conference Tackles Tough Contemporary Issues
By Daisy McCabe-Lokos of Windsor Law.
The Canadian Council on International Law held their 37th annual conference last weekend in Ottawa. The conference ran three days and showcased a range of panels discussing a variety of issues.
I was surprised to see that a significant portion of the attendees were students from law schools across Canada. This being my first chance to attend I am unsure whether this student turnout was unprecedented, however it seemed to indicate to me the increasing relevance of international legal issues in young law students’ educational experiences.
The conference not only gave us a chance to get a sense of the professional opportunities that exist in the international sphere, but it also gave us a snapshot of the developing fields of contemporary international law.
The panel that I found most enlightening was entitled “Law Applicable to Overseas Government Operations”.
It was chaired by John Currie – Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa, and attended by Paul Champ - Raven, Cameron, Ballantyne and Yazbeck LLP; Oonagh Fitzgerald – Senior General Counsel, Department of National Defense/Canadian Forces Legal Advisor; Joanna Harrington – Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Alberta; Major General Lewis Mackenzie (retired); and Christopher Waters – Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Windsor.
The panel discussed the applicability of law – national and international – to international government operations. Much of the focus was on the debatable “hierarchy” of law present during overseas military operations.
The panel touched on questions such as – do and should Canadian Charter values and obligations follow our armed forces on international operations? Should the Canadian military be more susceptible to civilian oversight?
Professor Waters explored the courts’ deference to the military regarding issues of possible misconduct. He discussed the reluctance of Canadian, American and British courts to rule on the actions of their militaries that might be seen as conflicting with Charter values or other obligations to respect international human rights.
Paul Champ gave us a practical example how some of these issues play out by discussing the Afghan detainee case. This case deals with individual’s allegations of torture after being transferred (in Afghanistan) from the custody of Canadian military officials to the custody of Afghan military officials – where the alleged torture occurred. The complications of legal jurisdiction and civilian oversight of military operations are evident under these circumstances.
Major General Lewis Mackenzie provided a completely refreshing albeit troubling perspective.
Having been involved in numerous peace keeping and military operations with the Canadian Military, General Mackenzie was able to enlighten us civilians on exactly how the international legal initiatives sometimes pan out on the ground.
He clearly articulated his frustration with the sometimes impractical and unreadable legal mandates provided by the United Nations during peacekeeping operations. He expressed his concern about the bureaucratic and sluggish nature of legal process and its negative impact on the progress of UN missions and the ultimate safety of non-combatant civilians.
Overall the panel was balanced and informative. There were contrasting viewpoints and a variation of experience among speakers. Many of the other panels held by the CCIL were similarly enjoyable and did not disappoint.
International courts look at the Georgia-Russia conflict
Two posts on the International Law Observer on proceedings initiated by Georgia against Russia:
The Russia-Georgia war and the international law
Below is a cursory glance at the legality of what recently happened between Russia and Georgia. This analysis does not aim to be conclusive or exhaustive. It is an attempt to give a legal perspective on a matter that seems to be stuck in the court of mass media.
The most important questions are:
- Was there an armed attack against Russia?
- Was the Russian use of force in response necessary?
- Was it proportional?
Finally, although not discussed here, the 1999 NATO attack on Yugoslavia and several other recent examples of international use of force by major Western powers without a UN Security Council authorization are clearly relevant, especially in a possible theory that they have changed international law.
A historical background.
The Soviet Union was divided into territories, often by titular ethnic group. They had varying degrees of autonomy and different places in the administrative hierarchy. Modern countries like Georgia, Ukraine and Russia itself, known as “newly independent states” after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, held the highest place in the hierarchy as the constituent “republics” of the USSR.
Other territories like South Ossetia ended up as pieces of the larger units. Decisions about the structure of this hierarchy were made by Soviet authorities, and often by individual people like Joseph Stalin. These decisions were sometimes revised, and some units moved up or down in the hierarchy in almost 70 years of the Soviet history. Yet only the top-level territories composing the USSR at the time of its dissolution received international recognition.
When Georgia declared its independence from the Soviet Union, South Ossetia was an “autonomous” unit within the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia. As was often the case with “autonomous” regions, the ethnicity of the majority South Ossetia’s population was different from the titular ethnicity of Georgia. When Georgia separated from the USSR, South Ossetia declared its independence from Georgia, which sent troops to keep South Ossetia from breaking away. Russia brokered an agreement to end the war in 1992.
Russia stationed its troops in South Ossetia in 1992 under the deal with Georgia and South Ossetia. The troops had a peacekeeper status and a mandate to separate Georgians and South Ossetians. The latter have been de facto independent from Georgia for 16 years. During this time most of them received Russian citizenship.
Below are some resources on the background of the conflict and the 1992 agreement.
- A US Department of State fact sheet about the conflict.
- An account of the 1992 agreement on the Civil Georgia website.
- An interview with the former Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze on the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty website.
- “1991–1992 South Ossetia War” on Wikipedia.
What happened on August 8, 2008?
Georgia initiated a military assault on Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, on August 8, 2008 following a week of clashes with South Ossetian troops. Georgian military shelled the city of Tskhinvali with heavy artillery including MRLS (multiple rocket launcher system) and the Georgian air force conducted bombing raids of Tskhinvali. The city fell to Georgians soon after the attack. According to the Russian defence ministry, 12 of its troops stationed in South Ossetia under the 1992 agreement with Georgia were killed and 30 wounded. Their base in Tskhinvali was destroyed.
On August 8 following the Georgian shelling of Tskhinvali, Russian troops entered South Ossetia from Russia. In five days they repelled the Georgian troops and forced them out of South Ossetia. Russian air force systematically destroyed Georgian military infrastructure in various parts of Georgia and bombed the port of Poti. Russian military entered or occupied several towns in Georgia for various lengths of time declaring its intention to destroy or remove abandoned ordnance and maintain security.
Is the use of force by Russia legal?
Jus ad bellum – the law of entering into war, is generally based on the UN Charter. A state can use force either with permission of the Security Council or in response to an armed attack under Article 51 of the Charter. The use of force must pass the test of necessity and proportionality.
In their attack on Tskhinvali Georgian forces used weapons designed to inflict maximum destruction and casualties in a large area. The Georgian military was aware of the civilian population in the city and the Russian military contingent present in Tskhinvali under the 1992 agreement. Most residents of Tskhinvali are Russian citizens. South Ossetia is not Russian territory, and it is internationally recognized to be a part of Georgia although South Ossetian authorities dispute South Ossetia’s status within Georgia. Georgians acted in violation of the 1992 agreement and either targeted the civilians and the Russian military or attacked the city with reckless disregard for their safety and lives.
Even if we accept that the Georgian shelling of Tskhinvali was an armed attack on Russia, the legality of the Russian response by force depends on whether the use of force would be necessary for a legitimate goal under the UN Charter, and whether the cost of the response in civilian lives and damage to civilian property would not outweigh the benefit. For example, if Russians responded by destroying international oil pipelines in Georgia to eliminate competition to its energy transit routes, such use of force would be unnecessary and illegal. If Russia carpet-bombed Georgian cities (like Georgia bombed Tskhinvali) declaring its intention to destroy military bases, it would probably also be illegal because the massive loss of civilian lives in Georgia would be disproportionate to a potential loss of lives, had Georgia continued unfettered.
Russia did none of these things when it used force against Georgia. Instead, its troops appear to be systematically degrading Georgian military. Initially this was accomplished by artillery and air force with a small number of civilian casualties, and later the preferred method appears to be occupation of Georgian military bases and controlled detonation or removal of ordnance, military vessels, aircraft and infrastructure. At some point the Russian military stopped running into any significant resistance from the Georgian troops.
Are Russian actions necessary to protect the civilian population of South Ossetia and its contingent stationed under the 1992 agreement? Three facts stand out: the fierceness of the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali, continuing declarations of resolve to “reintegrate” South Ossetia into Georgia, and the intransigence of the Georgian leadership in accepting any responsibility for the war buoyed by the strong diplomatic support from the United States. To infer that Georgia will attempt another attack on South Ossetia if it retains significant military capability is reasonable.
The biggest question mark over the Russian response to the Georgian attack is its proportionality. To the Russians’ credit, the civilian casualties of their military operation appear minimal, especially compared to some of the recent examples of international use of force unauthorized by the Security Council. However, large numbers of Georgian refugees and the destruction of dual use facilities in Georgia weaken the Russian case. Still, the Georgian attack on South Ossetia also displaced many civilians and, if unfettered, could produce many more in the range comparable to the number of Georgian refugees. The bombardment of the Georgian port of Poti may go some way against assessing the Russian action as proportional although the use of the port to resupply the Georgian military is possible. The Russians can also argue that their air force refrained from destroying the Tbilisi International Airport for humanitarian reasons despite the strong possibility that its runway could be used to resupply the Georgian army or to bring back the Georgian troops from Iraq as reinforcements.
Here are some resources on the international law of war:
- The United Nations Charter on the Yale Law website.
- Judith Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
- Mary Ellen O’Connell, Book Review of Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States by Judith Gardam, (2006) 100 Am. J. Int’l L. 973.
- Proportionality and the Use of Force in the Middle East Conflict by University of Notre Dame law professor Mary Ellen O’Connell on the JURIST website.
- Russia, Georgia and the Use of Force by University of Windsor law professor Christopher Waters
- Conflict in the Caucasus: Restoring Peace and Principle by University of Notre Dame law professor Mary Ellen O’Connell
Cluster Bomb Ban a Moral Success
At an historic conference in Dublin this week, 111 countries agreed to a near-complete ban on the use of cluster munitions.
After 10 days of talks, and much lobbying and pressure from groups such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, delegates reached an agreement which is set to be ratified by their countries in December.
The agreement recognizes that there are a number of problems with cluster munitions. In particular, they spread deadly explosives over a large area which remain dormant on the ground. Unexploded ordinance spread in this way can pose a danger to civilians even many years after the conflict is over. In this respect, they are akin to landmines, which were banned by 158 countries under the Ottawa Treaty.
Signatories at the Dublin Conference will be required to stop manufacturing the weapons and will also have to destroy their existing stockpiles. Countries that have actually used cluster bombs in the past will also be required to assist in cleaning up the unexploded ordinance that they created. Though not all cluster munitions were banned, those that are still allowed to be used are required to have a self-destruct or self-neutralizing mechanism.
Unfortunately, not all of the major world military powers signed the cluster munitions ban on May 29th, 2008. Notably absent were The United States, China, Japan, Russia, India, and Israel.
The United States, one of the primary manufacturers and users of cluster munitions has been the subject of much criticism for refusing to participate in the Dublin process.
Some lawmakers have stepped up efforts to encourage the U.S. to sign on to the ban. That was the subject of a joint resolution introduced on June 3rd by Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Sen. Patrick Leahy, and Rep. James P. McGovern. The text of the resolution acknowledges that:
“Civilians make up 98 percent of those killed or injured by cluster munitions of which more than 25 percent are children.
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“[and that in] Laos alone there are millions of unexploded submunitions, left over from United States bombing missions in the 1960s and 1970s, and approximately 11,000 people, 30 percent of them children, have been killed or injured since the war ended.”
However, State Department spokesperson Tom Casey is quoted as saying:
“While the United States shares the humanitarian concerns of those in Dublin, cluster munitions have demonstrated military utility, and their elimination from U.S. stockpiles would put the lives of our soldiers and those of our coalition partners at risk.”
Despite the refusal of the United States and other military powers to sign on to the ban, the Dublin Conference was largely a success. This is especially so from a moral perspective: the international community has sent a clear signal that cluster munitions are intolerable and that using them will draw international condemnation and backlash.
Even those countries that have chosen not to sign the cluster munitions ban will be under significant pressure to avoid their use. According to the Christian Science Monitor:
“Activists are hopeful that the treaty will influence nonsignatories, pointing to the 1997 ban on land mines. Of a handful of nations – including the US – that didn’t sign it, only Burma still uses land mines, says Simon Conway, co-chair of Cluster Munitions Coalition.”
