RSS FeedReview of Dennis Edney’s Lecture, “The Rule of Law in an Age of Terror”
“Human rights have a dysfunctional relationship with justice. The language is certainly beautiful, but it’s all dressed up with nowhere to go,” charged Dennis Edney in a scathing lecture at the Faculty of Law at UBC on September 15.
Edney worked from 2004 to 2011 on Omar Khadr’s defence against charges stemming from the July 2002 firefight death of a US soldier. Khadr, who is Canadian, was 15 at the time. American forces interrogated him for three months in the US-operated Bagram Theatre Detention Facility in Afghanistan, before transferring him to Guantanamo Bay, where he remains. In 2005, Khadr’s chief interrogator from Bagram, US Sergeant Joshua Claus, was found guilty of offences relating to the routine torture and homicide of Bagram prisoners. Claus received a five-month prison sentence. He testified at Khadr’s military trial in 2010.
In April 2009, the Federal Court ruled that Canada was complicit in the US’s torture of Khadr and ordered Ottawa to seek his repatriation. The Federal Court of Appeal concurred, but the Supreme Court ruled 9-0 that though Canada was violating Khadr’s human rights, it was not obliged to seek his repatriation.
In October 2010, after insisting on his innocence for years, Khadr pled guilty in a military trial to terrorism-related offences, in exchange for a promise from Canada to repatriate him by October 2011 to serve the rest of his prison sentence in Canada. On September 20, the Conservatives tabled the controversial omnibus Bill C-10, which adds “additional criteria” to decisions about “whether or not to allow the transfer of a Canadian offender back to Canada to serve their sentence.”
Shortly after the trial, Edney declared that Khadr “would have confessed to anything, including the killing of John F. Kennedy, just to get out of this hellhole” and that if he had refused, Khadr would have been faced with “an unfair [military] trial based on evidence that would be inadmissible in a real court.” On Thursday, Edney said the detainees are entitled “to all kinds of international protections, but our governments are not asking for them. And by not asking, we become complicit.” There are nearly 800 prisoners in Guantanamo, but only 4 have been charged and given a trial. Detainees cannot see the evidence used against them.
In his lecture, Edney denounced the Canadian government for perpetuating a culture of fear in the camp’s defence. Edney stated that “since there has always historically been terrorism, and since there will always be terrorist threats, this war on terror – if allowed to be one – is unlike any other, because it is never-ending.” Thus, last decade has been marred by “habeas corpus being abandoned, secret courts being created to hear secret evidence, guilt inferred by association, torture and rendition nakedly justified.”
“I went into Guantanamo Bay as a lawyer and I came out as a broken father,” said Edney. “I never thought that in my lifetime I would go to such an evil place and see such evil being done.” Of the infamous cages, Edney said that “people go into those cages thinking they’re having a holiday in there.” He drew attention to Camps 5, 6, and 7. The first two are “designed for enhanced interrogation tactics: torture.” He said about Camp 7 that “We are not allowed to talk about it. We have prisoners in there who came from Europe, about a year and a half ago, and they’re going to be there forever, because there’s no one there to help.”
Edney discussed the 9/11 witch hunt, in which “the US government detained hundreds, if not thousands, of people of colour on the suspicion of terrorist activity, some of them up to a year, all without charges.” He continued that “almost none of those individuals were found to have been in any way connected with terrorism. Yet many continue to be held without being formally charged with any crime or immigration violation.” In this way Guantanamo “provides powerful evidence of how America and the West are making war on terror synonymous with the war on Islam. No white Anglo-Saxon goes to Guantanamo Bay. Any American picked up for terrorism offences gets due process in a federal court system in New York.”
One audience member suggested that the camp must serve some purpose, because otherwise US President Barrack Obama would have followed through on his promise to shut it down. Edney responded that the camp primarily functions as “an important propaganda tool.” He argued the Obama administration has in fact “systematised” the culture of torture normalised under George W. Bush, for instance by disallowing victims of extraordinary rendition from suing Washington for torture suffered overseas.
Edney was also critical of “lazy” media and academics who have persisted in “slotting events into a sort of juicy clash of civilisations story,” as exemplified by mainstream media coverage of Anders Behring Breivik’s terrorist attack in Oslo. He killed 69 people in July, avowedly to protect Europe from Muslims. Edney said, “as soon as the bomb went off, media organisations began reporting on jihadist organisations.” This, he said, “fit perfectly the story we have all been telling each other since 9/11 that who else, who else could be so hateful, so crazy, so disrespectful of life but Muslims.” He pointed out that though Breivik is a white Norwegian Christian, “we don’t hold Christians or conservatives or liberals responsible for Brievek’s despicable acts.”
He said that “since September 11 2001, race, ethnicity, and religion have become proxies for suspected terrorist activity, which in turn has become a pretext for the application of Canadian immigration laws in an unequal manner towards Arabs, South Asians, Muslims and so on.” In an apparent nod to Bill C-4, the anti-refugee bill that the Conservatives tabled on Tuesday despite widespread condemnation, he noted that “we just have to listen to media descriptions coming out of Ottawa when we talk about refugees today. We call them queue jumpers and potential terrorists.”
Edney also expressed anger at the public’s willingness to be lulled into complicity. He described the transfer of the prisoners to Guantanamo “in rows in aircraft, hooded and shackled for transportation across the Atlantic” as similar to eighteenth century slave ships. He maintained that for “the watching world, no knowledge of international humanitarian conventions is needed to understand that what was being witnessed was simply unlawful.” He blamed public apathy for “allowing anti-Muslim sentiment to become part of our mainstream conversations.” He said, “I say to you we cannot tackle manifestations of intolerance, unless we learn and understand how the constant use of fear pervades our everyday life, and how that fear is being used to influence how you and I think and how you and I act. It’s that same manipulation of fear that has allowed military escapades into countries beyond those who bombed the twin towers. It is that same message that has been exploited by participating countries to reduce civil liberties and infringe upon human rights by allowing such places as Guantanamo Bay to exist.”
The need for action had been a prevailing theme throughout the lecture. Edney returned to it at his lecture’s close: “Not only does it [Guantanamo] continue to exist, they continue building it. Guantanamo is going to be there for a long, long time, unless you do something. Unless you really do something about it.” He concluded that “the only crime equal to wilful inhumanity is the crime of indifference, the crime of silence, the crime of forgetting.”
In that vein, we cannot afford to forget that Guantanamo Bay’s precedents in the West include Canada’s own internment camps, built in BC expressly to detain Japanese-Canadians during WWII. Similarly, Bill C-4’s predecessors include the Chinese head-tax policy.
Richard Dawkins’ “Root of All Evil.” Divide and Conquer 101: Separating Children Based on Religion
The divisive forces in this world constantly bombard us with messages that allow them to conquer our hearts and minds. It is important to be mindful of these “divide and conquer” strategies. As a critical thinker I suggest acting in a way that is inclusive. To form the most multicultured-multireligious-multilingual identity in the self. To always seek out those that are “different” and to engage them and to interact with them. The first of a few segments that can be found one after the other if you happen to find the material mind stimulating.
Supremacy of God and the Canadian Charter
Did you know that the “supremacy of God” is Canada’s founding principle? Read the Canadian constitution, if you don’t believe me. This is the preamble to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: “Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law …” Recently, a Quebec Superior Court Judge Gérard Dugré relied on these words to stop the Quebec government from blocking one private school’s religious curriculum. This caused secular activists to call for removing the reference to God from our Charter.
Secular Canadians took offence. To them, Judge Dugré’s novel use of the preamble appears to make non-religious Canadians second-class citizens. His ruling may also look like an attempt to cut the ancient Gordian Knot of whether God exists in one judicial stroke. Of course, this cannot be the meaning of the preamble to the Charter. But the words about God do not have to be empty rhetoric ignored by the courts either. A reasonable interpretation of the preamble treats “God” as a power that is superior to the state and that have endowed Canadians with rights and freedoms secure from the state.
I do not know if judge Dugré’s decision is correct. Nor am I trying to answer this question here. But regardless of his ruling, there is a reasonable interpretation of the entire preamble to the Charter.
First of all, the purpose of the Charter is to protect rights and freedoms of the people against the government. This principle should imbue every interpretation of this constitutional document.
One of the fundamental methods of testing legality is tracing claimed powers and freedoms to their source. Many state agents’ powers come from or are allowed by the sovereign—the federal parliament or provincial legislatures. Police powers, for example, come from statute or are allowed by statute because they pre-existed legislative intervention. No state power can exist without parliamentary consent or an explicit constitutional grant. Even “Crown prerogatives” such as international relations powers exist only until legislatures wish to withdraw them.
But people are not agents or creatures of the state. We pre-date the state.
To reserve some freedoms to the people, to protect them from the overarching sovereign, and to ensure the legality of freedoms, you need a source other than the sovereign itself. Otherwise, the sovereign would be free to take freedoms back from the people. This source cannot be the state, it cannot be a person, and it cannot be a corporation. The humanity have always imagined a source of power and freedom completely independent of the state. It’s been called different names but a common one in English is God. Why not? It’s good enough to symbolize the idea that fundamental human rights and freedoms are not a gift from the sovereign. We have them by birth or naturalization, or symbolically as a gift from “God.”
Second, to emphasize the idea that the state and our legislative sovereigns cannot expropriate the independent rights and freedoms of the people, a concept of supremacy is necessary. Not only is the source of our freedoms and rights independent from the state, it is also supreme to the state. This concept leaves not a shred of doubt about any ability of the government to repossess our freedoms.
For these two reasons, “Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God.” It is to protect our freedoms and rights from state intrusion, which is exactly the purpose of the Charter. The rule-of-law part is equally critical, because unless there is an institution that deeply believes in these principles and holds the state in check, the words alone are not worth much. Thank God for the independent judiciary and the independent legal profession. Yes, essentially: thank God for lawyers.
According to the Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed.), a preamble may help interpreting its enclosing document. The dictionary cites Den v. Urison, 2 N.J.L. 212 (1807), a New Jersey case: “… in case any doubt arises on the enacting part, the preamble may be resorted to to explain it, and show the intention of the law maker.” If our courts turn to the preamble of the Charter to inform their interpretation of that document, they should treat the words “supremacy of God” not in a religious sense but as an affirmation of Canadians’ rights and freedoms secure from and independent of the government.
(Post sponsored by AdviceScene)
Women in the Legal Profession
It’s 2010. Twenty-eight years ago, Canadian lawyers helped draft the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, guaranteeing, among other things, gender equality before and under the law. Canadian lawyers have also drafted provincial and federal human rights acts, and each of the law societies’ professional regulations, all of which prohibit public, non-governmental gender discrimination.
But like the old saying goes, “If you see smoke, don’t forget to check the fire station.”
Last year some classmates and I researched the issue of gender inequality in the legal profession. We were saddened to find that it does indeed exist, though it appears to be on a belated decline.
We interviewed two law professors at the University of Windsor on the issue. Here’s what they had to say:
To get involved in this important issue in Ontario, check out the Women’s Law Association of Ontario (WLAO), which has been “Speaking out for Women Lawyers Since 1919″. Or, help spread awareness and ideas online here, here, here, here or elsewhere.
And yes, “don’t forget to check the fire station” is not actually an old saying. However, once you abandon tradition you can find meaning in lots of new places.
Are there inalienable rights in Canada?
We in Canada like to think of ourselves as free. We also like to think we have rights. The police can’t throw us in jail for our political views. And if they do throw us in jail for any reason, the police must let us call a lawyer. A part of Canada’s constitution, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees our rights and freedoms. But the constitutional rights and freedoms such as freedom of expression, a right against arbitrary detention or imprisonment, and even our right to life, liberty and security, are not absolute. The Charter leaves loopholes for the federal Parliament, provincial legislatures, or even judges to limit or take away any rights or freedoms. There are no inalienable rights in Canada.
A legal right is a claim to a benefit. The law sets legal rights, and the courts will enforce them if no one else will. When you sign a contract to lease an apartment in exchange for rent, your tenant has a right to use the apartment, and you have a right to some of the tenant’s money. Your right is always someone else’s duty, which is either to give up the benefit you claim or to let you claim the benefit freely. You can also have rights against the government. For example, habeas corpus is a right to see a judge if the police arrest you. Freedoms are like rights but they are more about enjoying benefits you already have, such as speech or movement. Still, the flip side of every freedom is someone’s duty to respect it. For example, if you have a freedom of religion, the government may not ban your faith.
But rights and freedoms in our relations with the government are tricky because the government is a sovereign. It means that within its geographic borders the government writes the law. What good is a right if the government can scrap it? That’s where a constitution comes into play. It’s a superlaw that tells the government what laws it can and cannot write. And it’s very difficult for the government to change the constitution. The Canadian Charter is the part of our constitution that orders the government to respect certain human rights. If a provincial or the federal legislature passes a law infringing on our Charter right, the courts can strike that law from the books. It will have no force and effect. That way the Charter protects us from the government.
Even democracies need this protection to stop majorities from oppressing minorities. For example, our legal tradition has very good reasons for protecting some rights of the criminally accused. Only a minority of the total population will ever need these rights. Whether justified or baseless, a fear of crime can bring a party that wants to do away with these rights to power. In theory, our Charter will always stop the Parliament from touching the rights of the criminally accused. Before the Charter, the Parliament could throw out the presumption of innocence or the law against self-incrimination. A constitution can also protect racial, gender, or other minorities from discrimination. We can be sure of our human rights only when they are safe from the majority and the government it elects.
The Charter promises us this safety, but it doesn’t really deliver. There are several loopholes in the Charter that let the federal parliament, provincial legislatures, or the courts take away rights. First, the notwithstanding clause in s. 33 empowers legislatures to suspend fundamental freedoms (s. 2) and legal (ss. 7-14) and equality (s. 15) rights. Perhaps for fear of the ballot box, legislatures tried it for real only very few times. But if the government can suspend the rights, they are not inalienable.
Second, the most obvious limitation on all rights and freedoms in the Charter is in s. 1. It basically says that sometimes the Charter will not protect our rights. Suppose the Parliament passes a law that bans newspapers in a certain language. If the government can justify this law as reasonable “in a free and democratic society,” it can get away with it under s. 1. Who decides what’s reasonable and what’s free and democratic? Ultimately, it’s the nine people on the Supreme Court of Canada. Sometimes a s. 1 justification is a very hard task, but a right or freedom is guaranteed only if it’s legally certain, not if it’s probable or very likely. So the government can strip anyone of any Charter right with the consent of the Supreme Court.
Third, the courts decide what each right and freedom in Canada actually means. For example, s. 7 allows the government to deprive anyone of “the right to life, liberty, and security of the person” only in accordance with “the principles of fundamental justice.” The Supreme Court decides what these principles are. Next, the Charter often defines rights using the principle of “reasonableness,” which is really a code word for letting the courts fill in the details. See, for example, the right against “unreasonable search” (s. 8), the right to be tried within a “reasonable time” (s. 11(b)), etc. When the police breach our Charter rights to obtain evidence against us in a criminal investigation, we have a right to have it excluded from our trial—but only if “the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute” (s. 24(2)). Again, the courts decide what that means by applying factors laid down by the Supreme Court.
Finally, if the government breaches your Charter rights, the courts decide what compensation you get if any. It is little comfort to you and little deterrent to the government if the courts merely declare government action unconstitutional. Denied or insufficient remedies gut Charter rights and freedoms. As the recent case of Omar Khadr has shown, the Supreme Court can deny a meaningful remedy even for breaches of the most basic rights such as a right to fundamental justice in s. 7. Most Canadians don’t seem to like Omar Khadr or his family, so the majority is clearly not on his side. The Supreme Court didn’t say that it let the government off the legal hook because of the views of the majority of Canadians. But these views possibly encouraged the government when it violated Khadr’s Charter rights or denied him the requested remedy. What is the value of rights that depend on politics?
One can argue that these cases are extreme and that limits on our Charter rights are fine because we trust our government. After all we elect it. But consider this. First, majorities elect the government, and how certain are you what the majority will be like 20 years from now? Are you going to be in that majority? Do you want to entrust your most basic human rights to a majority? Second, even election rights in the Charter are not inalienable. Mix a national emergency with the right people on the Supreme Court (appointed by the Prime Minister; no Parliament’s consent required), and the words “reasonable,” “free,” and “democratic” in section 1 of the Canadian Charter can have a very different meaning.
The word “inalienable” expresses the idea of rights that the law can never let anyone take. An inalienable right is yours by the fact of your membership in the human species. No government or person gave you this right, so they can never take it away. It is yours by birth. It recognizes your inherent value as a human being regardless of who you are, what you did, or what you think. Very few rights can be inalienable but those that can are truly fundamental: a right to a fair trial, freedom of speech, habeas corpus. The US Declaration of Independence speaks of “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness” as inalienable rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes “the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.”
Our Charter does not have the word “inalienable,” neither in letter nor in spirit. It uses other words. But social conditions change, and what’s not “reasonable,” “free,” or “democratic” today can become such in the future. There is a fully legal path to breaches of any rights in Canada. It doesn’t necessarily mean it’s possible politically, socially, or economically, but legally our rights are uncertain. A constitution that fails to protect minorities from the majority’s changing moods does not guarantee rights. The loopholes in the Charter show that we have rights and freedoms only as long as the government and the Supreme Court let us. Rights and freedoms in Canada do not inherently belong to us as human beings but are revocable gifts from the government and the courts. And if we can’t change our Charter, we must at least hold our government to account especially strictly when it comes to human rights.
Pay Equity: Did the Ignatieff Liberals Vote Against “a basic human right”?
Yesterday, Michael Ignatieff stated that pay equity is “a basic human right” and blasted the Conservatives who “[...] very clearly used their 2009 budget to impose their ideological opposition to pay equity for Canadian women.” I have to agree with Ignatieff on both counts.
Last year, I wrote a research paper for my Poverty Law class at Robson Hall (“Canadian Pay Equity Regimes in Context: Evaluating the effectiveness of pay equity dispute resolution mechanisms and remedies”) in which I compared the pay equity regimes of every jurisdiction in Canada. In particular, I was interested in access to effective remedies for women being paid less than men for work of equal value. In general, pay equity legislation only protects public sector workers, not workers in the private sector (although Ontario and Quebec also extend pay equity protection to some private sector employees). Most provinces and the federal government employ a legislative regime in which women may file a pay equity complaint either through a human rights commission or a dedicated pay equity commission.
The only exceptions to this type of legislative framework are the three western provinces: British Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan. Saskatchewan and British Columbia have both adopted equity frameworks – essentially government policies that require public sector employers to implement some form of pay equity through the collective bargaining process. Alberta is the only jurisdiction in Canada that has no pay equity protections whatsoever. Alberta, like British Columbia, does require that workers receive the same pay for “the same or substantially similar work” (the wording of the legislation in British Columbia is “similar or substantially similar work”). However, this does not constitute pay equity, as such. Pay equity requires equal pay for work of equal value, even if the specific job classes are substantially different. In other words, pay equity looks at the value of the work being performed, not the similarity of job descriptions.
The budgetary measure to which Ignatieff is referring in his statement is a provision of Federal Budget 2009, which promises to eliminate the role of the Canadian Human Rights Commission and Canadian Human Rights Tribunal in the federal pay equity regime. Instead, the government promises to integrate pay equity more closely with the collective bargaining process in order to “ensure that the employer and bargaining agents are jointly responsible and accountable for negotiating salaries that are fair and equitable to all employees.” Ostensibly, the government’s rationale is that the current system is “a lengthy, costly and adversarial process”; however, as Ignatieff indicated in his statement, there is reason to believe that the Conservatives’ real motivation is an ideological opposition to pay equity as such.
It is first of all worth pointing out that the government’s characterization of the current complaint-based regime is not altogether inaccurate. In fact, many of the early pay equity cases involving large public sector employers took years or even decades to resolve (see e.g. Bell Canada v. C.E.P., [1998] F.C.J. No. 1609 (Fed. C.A.), rev’g (1998), 143 F.T.R. 81 (Fed. Ct. TD), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, 27063 (July 8, 1999)). However, it would be wrong to conclude that a complaint-based mechanism for pay equity can’t work in practice, as I argued in my paper:
One of the lessons thus far has been that many of the delays in the current regimes relate to difficulty in understanding and implementing the complex technical requirements of job comparison. This issue can and should be addressed in a number of different ways. First, the highly technical and specialized nature of pay equity befits a specialized administrative apparatus including a binding tribunal that is institutionally separate from other human rights and labour bodies. The Pay Equity Office, Commission, and Tribunal model championed in Ontario and Québec is promising in that it recognizes and affirms the sui generis nature of pay equity within the corpus of human rights and labour laws. Decision makers within that apparatus will therefore be better equipped to apply the technical requirements of pay equity in a more expedient manner. The second (and related) point is that pay equity commissions should be sufficiently staffed and resourced so as to better assist non-unionized workers in bringing a complaint against their employer.
In any event, even if we were to conclude that a complaint-based model in unworkable, the collective bargaining alternative is even worse. Again, quoting from my paper:
The most glaring gap in pay equity law is the jurisdictional gap. While most jurisdictions in this country have implemented some form of pay equity legislation, scores of Canadian women enjoy no pay equity protection at law. This includes those provinces in which internal government policy affords only remote administrative law challenges to women in segregated jobs. Female workers in Alberta have no legal recourse to obtain a remedy for violations of their human rights in respect of equal pay for work of equal value.
The complete lack of legal protection for workers in these jurisdictions does not sit well with the characterization of pay equity as a human right. Indeed, the complete omission of any protection for pay equity in Alberta undermines the universality of human rights. Yet even among jurisdictions that have enacted legally-enforceable pay equity laws, the scope of the legislation has generally been limited to the public sector. Ontario and Québec stand alone in providing any pay equity protection to women in the private sector. Again, this limitation in scope to is a curious departure from the characterization of equal pay for work of equal value as a human right rather than as a policy decision.
The ultimate shortcoming of current pay equity regimes is not the principle of equal pay for work of equal value, but the lack of access to effective and timely remedies. While the complaint-based tribunal system suffers from many glaring flaws, the relegation of pay equity away from tribunals and into the collective bargaining process represents a major retrenchment of women’s legal right to a pay equity remedy. In this sense, I would argue that Ignatieff’s position against the measures outlined in Budget 2009 is the correct one. I would go even further, though, by establishing a dedicated pay equity commission and extending the legislation to cover federally-regulated private sector workers.
My one and only criticism of Ignatieff here is that the Liberals voted in favour of Budget 2009! Clearly, voting in favour of a federal budget does not imply endorsement or consent to each and every line of the budget. For example, the NDP‘s support of a ways and means motion in September does not imply that party’s support for every line of the motion, so much as their desire for trade-offs in respect of employment insurance. For every vote in the House of Commons, politicians must engage in a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the good parts of a bill outweigh the bad parts. A great deal of horse trading goes on between all of the political parties, and this is not necessarily a bad thing.
However, a major point of contrast between the NDP and the Liberals is that the NDP has consistently maintained the position that human rights are non-negotiable. That is, while the New Democrats will make policy concessions within the legitimate set of options available to government, they will not endorse any bill that undermines fundamental human rights. This explains, for example, the difference between how the New Democrats and Liberals have voted on same-sex marriage legislation in the past (the New Democrats voted unanimously for same-sex marriage, save for one MP who was ousted from the party in consequence; several Liberal MPs voted against same-sex marriage).
To the extent that equal pay for work of equal value is a human right (and Michael Ignatieff seems to think that it is), doesn’t it follow that the Liberals voted in favour of against, in Ignatieff’s words, “a basic human right”? If so, what does this say about the Liberals’ attitude in respect of the universality of human rights? It seems to me that the undermining basic human rights appears to be a deal-breaker for New Democrats, whereas the Liberals are willing to vote in against human rights where it suits their purposes.
On the other hand, maybe I’m just grumpy from studying too much for my exams. In any event, Ignatieff’s change of heart on the federal pay equity regime is a welcome change.
Indefeasibility of title? Not that indefeasible in Kenya?
First posted on Commercial Law International on Oct 15, 2009.
By Charles Wanguhu
The caveat emptor rule dictates that an individual seeking to purchase land should ensure that he is dealing with the rightful owner. Therefore upon inspection of the register kept at the ministry of lands, an individual seeking to ensure the ownership of land would request the registrar for an official confirmation of search, the advantage of the official search is that it is given priority registration over all other transactions for a period of 14 days from the issue of the search.
However in the Mau forest in Kenya the government aims to evict thousands of families who are said to be on forest land. This is despite the fact that some of the settlers have valid title for the property which was a result of excision of forest land by the previous administration. A similar operation in 2005 resulted in thousands of people being displaced and claims of human rights violations by the evicting forces.
The new administration however views the issuance of the titles as void as in their view they were illegally obtained from the former administration. However, under the Principle of Indefeasibility the title of an innocent Purchaser cannot be set aside, even by the claims of a previous rightful owner. This is so, because the Register of Titles is conclusive evidence of the Purchaser’s rightful ownership of the land.
In the case of Maathai & 2 others v City Council of Nairobi & 2 other 1994 a case in which the Nobela laureate Waangari Maathai sought to stop the sale of a piece of land by the city council the court in its deliberations held that:
Registration of Titles Act Cap 201 of the laws of Kenya which provides inter alia, that the certificate of Title issued by the Registrar to a purchaser of land upon a transfer shall be taken by all courts as conclusive evidence that the person named therein as proprietor of the land is the indefeasible owner thereof …. and the title to that proprietor shall not be subject to challenge.”
The Kenyan government while well intentioned in conservation of forests has opened a pandoras box and thereby creating uncertainty in dealings in land. By ignoring the indefeasibility of first registration land transactions have become a gamble. A commission of inquiry into illegal/irregular allocation of public land revealed that a number of foreign embassy and consulates are actually built on former public land. It would be interesting to see whether the government would take similar measures against these missions as they are attempting to do with the families in the Mau forest.
An AFRICOG report available here looks at some of the recommendations of the Commission of inquiry and looks at the possibility or impossibility in implementing the recommendations.
AG Ont. Chris Bentley Speaks on Human Rights
The Attorney-General of Ontario, Hon. Chris Bentley, spoke to students at the University of Toronto on the issue of human rights.
Min. Bentley did a podcast interview with us previously on a similar subject. Human rights tribunals are likely to become a hot issue in the next provincial election, given that Tim Hudak has suggested he will campaign on having them scrapped.
Min. Bentley cites the Dresden case, and explains how human rights are the foundation of our society, even for those citizens we have neglected and abandoned abroad.
Video of his talk at UofT below, with an intro from Omar Alghabra:
The Case of Derek Twyman: A Punishment of Unusual Cruelty
From time to time we read or hear about sentences for startling amounts of time to be served by those convicted of serious crimes south of the border. Hundreds of years in prison or multiple life sentences are examples of some of the extreme punishments ordered by U.S. judges in cases where society is expected to agree that the crime committed is simply so heinous that the offender should never be free again.
Could burglary be such a crime?
Derek Twyman was 14-years-old when he and his family moved from the province of Ontario to the state of North Carolina. His father, Donald, had plans to start a furniture business there, and the family was going to build a future for themselves in the south. Unfortunately, shortly after moving to the U.S., Derek fell in with the wrong crowd and got caught up in a lifestyle that included a tendency to participate in acts of juvenile delinquency.
In 1989 he was on parole when he was picked up by the police in connection with a series of break-and-enters of homes belonging to affluent residents in North Carolina. Derek plead guilty to the offences he was accused of, but was shown little mercy by Judge Thomas W. Ross, who sentenced him to four consecutive 40-year sentences in prison – an astonishing total of 160 years behind bars for non-violent property offences. His projected release date is the year 2055, when he will be approximately 90-years-old.
The law that provided for such an excessive sentence was the misnamed Fair Sentencing Act, which was replaced in 1994 by the Structured Sentencing Act in an attempt to restore credibility and appropriateness to sentencing. Under the new law, someone who is facing the same groups of charges that Derek did in 1989 would only serve a maximum of 7 ½ years upon conviction, as opposed to the unthinkable century and a half given to Derek.
Putting aside for a moment the well-founded allegations that the original sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, many would think that the new law would at least apply retroactively in order to halt the continuation of unjust sentences set down under the old law. Unfortunately, the Structured Sentencing Act does not apply to offences committed before October 1994, undeterred by the fact that a comparison between the old and new legislation clearly depicts a gross disproportionality between the sentences that raises serious constitutional concerns.
And given that Canada is the only country to which Derek holds citizenship, where might the political forces of Ottawa enter into this mess? Nowhere it seems. Despite Canada being a signatory to the International Prisoner Transfer Program with the U.S., Derek says that to date the Canadian government has not yet attempted to help him in any way, instead choosing to ignore such inhumane treatment of a Canadian citizen imprisoned abroad. If one looks to the requirements a prisoner must meet in order to be considered for a transfer, he is a perfect candidate with the exception of one thing: restitution.
The presiding judge who sentenced Derek to prison also ordered that he pay over $60,000 in restitution to the affluent residents whose homes he was convicted of burglarizing, even though insurance policies likely covered most (if not all) of the losses. The restitution order states that this amount must be paid before Derek can even be considered for deportation to Canada. Apparently it wasn’t considered at sentencing that the convicted person going to prison for 160 years eliminates any realistic possibility of the restitution ever being paid.
Nor did it appear to dawn on the court that by the time Derek is eligible for his next parole review (on merely the second of the four 40-year sentences) the total cost of incarcerating him will be approximately $675,000. In the unlikely event that the intended recipients of the restitution were not covered by insurance, and actually needed it as compensation, the potential fulfillment of that opportunity was most definitely quashed in the most ironic of ways.
Even through the desperate arguments that the prison sentence and accompanying restitution were attempts at promoting deterrence, this entire fiasco reeks of a typical “tough on crime” attitude gone terribly wrong. Word of this travesty is spreading, but at the present time Derek’s liberty is the price being paid for the complete and ignominious failure that was the Fair Sentencing Act.
Derek hasn’t lost hope though. Having now spent over 19 years behind bars for this crime, he still manages to keep his spirit up and remains confident that people will take notice of this injustice. No human being should have to endure the kind of wrongful treatment that he has been subjected to. Now is the time for all of us to add our voices to the growing call for Derek Twyman’s long overdue release.
To help Derek gain the justice and freedom he deserves, please take a moment to sign this online petition:
www.petitiononline.com/dtwyman
Housing discrimination
Landlords trample on tenants’ human rights
(post sponsored by advicescene.com)
Mau Mau to sue the British Government
First Posted on Commercial Law International on June 24, 2009.
Concentration Camps
By Charles Wanguhu
The above move by the Kenyan freedom fighters to sue the British government has elicited some very interesting responses from some readers of the times online paper:
This is all about money and bashing the UK. Africa does not want to take responsibility for its current problems
Also if this happened in the 50’s so why have they waited till now?
Lawyers and Money again: A poisonous mix. Why after so long drag up these horrors. The Mau Mau allegedly used to drink the blood of the white farmers they killed. The British allegedly tortured Mau Mau. What good can come of this knowledge now? Time to put these things back in the box of history
While the above sentiments may be of a few it may be worth placing their arguments in a context. Firstly during the emergency in Kenya loads of kikuyu men were rounded up and accused of being Mau Mau based on accusations by guards who were collaboratoring with the british. We can therefore not claim that all those held in prison camps tortured and killed were indeed Mau Mau fighters.
Secondly what is more at stake is the recognition by the UK government that it was official colonial policy to run concentration camps and that it was sanctioned at the top.
In the article :
Professor Anderson states that is doubtful the lawsuit in its current form — targeting the state rather than those surviving individuals who allegedly carried out the abuse — will succeed.
“There can be no doubt that torture was used by British Forces . . . but the question remains ‘who is responsible?’,” he said.
Whoever this notion is flawed in that when a criminal offence occurs it is not the role of the victim to seek evidence against the offender and then bring in criminal charges against them. When a state decides to open up institutions of incarceration it is the states responsibility to ensure that the inmates are treated in a humane way and not subjected to torture. In this instance the British colonial state failed in their duty and they should therefore be brought to account for their inaction when it was clear what is happening. The Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya by Caroline Elkins is an account of the atrocities carried out on the Kikuyu population in Kenya and is worth a read for any individual prior to defending the british actions.
The Mau Mau atrocities cannot be denied and were definitely atrocious. It is however pretentious to claim that they were on a similar scale as the colonial state with their better equipped and organised forces. In addition the fact that they used Machetes and not guns is akin to declaring that the British killings were undertaken in a humane way.
The question is should it be placed in history and forgotten about? Well while seeming to take a leaf from its predecessors the Kenyan Government extra judicially killed up to 400 Kikuyu young men accusing them of being Mungiki (a group not too dissimilar to the Mau Mau if not claiming their inspiration from the Mau Mau) should we forget about them as well.
While it is in the interest of majority of British people to be forward looking, the victims of atrocities still seek justice. History appears to be relative as the World Cup win in 1966 is considered fresh enough to be brought up at every opportunity but atrocities committed six years earlier than the win are too far to be worth remembering.
The issue is not so much monetary compensation but recognition that it was official British Gvt policy to carry out such atrocities and that indeed the victims of these actions were in some instances innocent people who happened to be members of the wrong ethnic community at the time.
Shell & The Elephant In The Room
First posted on Commercial Law International on June 9, 2009.
By Charles Wanguhu
A report by the Economist Intelligence Unit indicates that protecting a firm’s reputation is the most important and difficult task facing corporations. With the development of global media and communication channels, managing reputational damage is seen as crucial with events undertaken in even the remotest areas affecting the international brand of a corporation.
For Shell the stark reality of reputational damage is all too clear. After years and years of denial and expressing its innocence of the Ogoni affair (it still maintains its innocence), Shell has decided to settle a case brought against it out of court for a sum of 15.5 Million US $. The lawsuit had accused the company of colluding with Nigeria’s former military regime over the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and other peaceful anti-oil protesters.
Like Nike before it Shell remains in many minds as the poster child of a lack of corporate responsibility especially in big multinationals. The Saro Wiwa case is largely sited not only in commercial classrooms but across NGO conferences worldwide. Multinationals are viewed as bulldozing their way with the help of corrupt and dictatorial regimes to fulfill their interests with complete disregard to vulnerable communities.
The perception of Shell as the irresponsible corporate persists despite the fact that it has invested millions in engaging communities in areas that it works in and has increasingly taken on human rights in its business models and stakeholder engagement strategies.
In response to the case filed Malcolm Brinded, Shell’s executive director for exploration and production, was quoted,
“While we were prepared to go to court to clear our name, we believe the right way forward is to focus on the future for Ogoni people, which is important for peace and stability in the region.”
The settlement could be seen as a magnanimous move by Shell in some quarters with some already hailing the move as groundbreaking in terms of holding corporations accountable. However when looked at broadly the settlement will be seen as a coup for Shells PR team: instead of having weeks, months or even years of a contested trial where Shells actions or lack of thereof would be once again stirred up in everyone’s mind globally, a quick settlement offers a quick escape route.
All in all $15.5Million may well be considered a bargain when factoring in legal costs, reputation risks and lost revenue. There could well have been some champagne popped at Shell HQs but am sure downstairs in the legal department the wait is on with baited breath to see whether the floodgates have been open.
