Anti-Anti-Olympic Bylaw in BC Unconstitutional?

By: Fathima Cader · October 10, 2009 · Filed Under Constitutional Law · 3 Comments

The CBC reports: Anti-Olympic signs could mean jail: rights group (Oct 9):

A proposed B.C. law would allow municipal officials to enter homes to seize unauthorized and possibly anti-Olympic signs on short notice, civil libertarians say.

Violators could be fined up to $10,000 a day and jailed up to six months, the B.C. Civil Liberties Association said Friday.

The BC Civil Liberties Association has launched a court challenge:

Earlier this week, the association helped two anti-Olympics activists launch a legal challenge of Vancouver’s 2010 Olympics bylaw in B.C. Supreme Court, claiming it was an unconstitutional restriction on free speech.

[...]

The association is suspicious of the timing of the provincial bill’s introduction so close to the Olympic games, which have been planned for years.

“We’ve seen them timing things so that they don’t put in place laws that are special to the Olympics until the last minute,” Holmes said. “And part of that leads to the suspicion that they’ve done it in a calculated and deliberate way, to remove the ability of the courts, and people who might want to take it to court, to have their rights protected.”

The BCCLA has their statement of claim up on their website:

“Going to Court on a clear-cut free expression issue is a waste of time and money,” said Westergard-Thorpe. “We’ve all got better things to do, but if the City insists on passing bad bylaws, people who value free speech have no choice but to stand up and challenge them.”

Post tags: british columbia, bylaws, freedom of expression, freedom of expresso, olympics, vancouver 2010

Beware the libel

By: Pulat Yunusov · September 28, 2009 · Filed Under Torts · Add Comment

Simon Singh, a British journalist and a popularizer of science, is fighting a lawsuit. In his article for the Guardian, Singh wrote that the British Chiropractic Association (BCA) promoted bogus treatments. The BCA sued him for libel. Is it right that our words can cost us dearly? What about the freedom of speech? First of all, let’s find out what the freedom of speech really is all about. Then, let’s see why we have libel laws and what we can learn from the Singh case. The Internet gives everyone a potential audience, so watch what you say if you have libel laws in your country.

The Western culture loves the freedom of expression. In Canada, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms calls it a “fundamental” freedom that “everyone” has. In the US, the First Amendment prohibits Congress from “abridging the freedom of speech.” We value our right to speak freely, and we believe it is essential for democracy. It’s not surprising then that libel suits ruffle a few feathers. But constitutional laws like the Charter and the Bill of Rights protect our speech from the government, not from our neighbours.

Post tags: Bill of Rights, British Chiropractic Association, charter of rights and freedoms, defamation, First Amendment, freedom of expression, freedom of speech, libel, Pulat Yunusov, reputation, Simon Singh, slander, the Guardian

Copyright Law, Freedom of Expression and Canwest v. Horizon

By: John Magyar · June 26, 2009 · Filed Under Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Intellectual Property, Legal Reform, Media Law · Add Comment

In a previous post I erroneously stated that the appeal of Canwest Mediaworks Publications v. Horizon Publications had been dropped. As it turns out, the appeal is pending; the game is on. Those who wish to know more should visit the Seriously Free Speech Committee website where there is a wealth of information including the trial court decision and the Notice of Appeal. While browsing the site, I noticed that within some of the articles there are calls for Canwest to drop the suit. Although I completely understand why the appellants would want to be freed from the onerous burden of legal action, I am hoping that the case proceeds for the benefit of society.

Copyright law occupies an unusual place in the legal landscape. It is an extraordinarily complicated regime that affects our daily lives in hundreds of ways, yet it is rarely litigated. There are only a handful of appellate court decisions pertaining to copyright law; opportunities to move the law in a positive direction are infrequent and questionable decisions like Michelin can linger for decades.

While many cases of infringement involve activities that could reasonably be described as unjust enrichment, the wording of the statute is such that a black letter interpretation renders a number of practices unlawful that are in fact beneficial to society and do not involve usurping the gains of a copyright-holder. A prime example is the artistic practice of appropriation, i.e. using culturally recognized symbols (for which copyright usually subsists) to express a unique idea. In the Michelin case, a cartoon was distributed to promote a union drive which depicted a large smiling “Michelin Man” about to trample on a Michelin factory worker.

Although appropriation is an old artistic technique, it is becoming much more common in our media-rich culture, and I would suggest that the growing importance of appropriation is a natural evolution in a society where we are constantly bombarded with images and sound bites. No individual alive today created the English language. We were “bombarded” with it when we grew up, and we appropriated the words and phrases as tools for our own expression. This is a reasonable and indeed productive activity. It is for this reason that copyright protection is not permitted for words and ideas; they are the building blocks of expression that are part of our cultural heritage and rightly belong in the public domain.

In a media-saturated society, the same elements are at work with the many images and sound bites that we are exposed to. With the growing variety of tools to manipulate them, it is only natural that artists would incorporate some of these images and sound bites into their own unique works, and often as a means of social commentary. This is what artists do. They have never been satisfied with painting pretty pictures, but prefer to shine a harsh light on the society in which they live through the innovative use of symbols. This is an important part of the social dialogue and free exchange of ideas that underpin our culturally rich society.

The law of copyright, in its current form, depends upon the concepts of originality and substantiality to protect the building blocks of expression, and therefore only permits appropriation that is not substantial (with narrow exceptions for fair dealing as explained by David Fewer — thank you for your comment). This test is too simple to ‘get it right’. As a result, it has the incidental effect of stifling the vast majority of appropriative forms of artistic expression and social commentary, regardless of the social import and regardless of how creative a work is.

There can be no doubt that copyright law protects legitimate interests, and it must continue to do so. However, I respectfully submit that the current statute, as applied by the courts, does not adequately serve the dual objectives of “promoting the public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator” (Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336, 2002 SCC 34 at para 30.). To the contrary, the law actually discourages the creation and distribution of new works.

In a society where copyright cases are rarely litigated, the Canwest case is an invaluable opportunity. It is my hope (and apparently I am not alone) that the Canwest case results in a more nuanced enunciation of copyright law in Canada: one that allows appropriation in circumstances where it does not interfere with the legitimate interests of a copyright holder.

Post tags: charter, constitution, copyright, freedom of expression

The Charter Does Not Apply to Copyright Law

By: John Magyar · June 24, 2009 · Filed Under Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Intellectual Property, Media Law · 1 Comment

Despite the public attention that has been directed at copyright law recently, the issues surrounding the Charter right to freedom of expression have been absent from the public discourse. The matter was litigated last fall when the Supreme Court of British Columbia cited the Federal Court’s dubious Michelin decision to summarily cast aside any Charter defences to copyright infringement. I’m talking about the decision in Canwest Mediaworks Publications v. Horizon Publications, 2008 BCSC 1609, and I am surprised that it drew so little public attention.

In this case, political activists created and distributed free of charge a satire of the Vancouver Sun newspaper in an attempt to draw attention to the alleged editorial bias of the Sun’s parent company, Canwest Mediaworks. Canwest is responsible for 80% of the newspapers sold in B.C., and the freedom of expression issues are fairly obvious with respect to truth-seeking and the marketplace for ideas that a democratic society requires to function properly. Meanwhile, from a policy standpoint, it is difficult to see any benefits that accrue to society by protecting Canwest’s copyright interests in this context, let alone any benefits that would trump the value of the Charter. However the Court saw no merit in the Charter issues.

The decision was appealed but Canwest decided not to pursue the matter. While some civil liberty supporters cheered this outcome, the fact that the Canwest decision was not reevaluated means that both Michelin and Canwest represent the current state of copyright law in Canada with respect to the Charter.

Canadian legal scholars have yet to weigh in on Canwest, but they have been unanimous in their criticism of Michelin. According to Vaver, “the … view in the Michelin case, with its disturbing assertion that the freedom of expression guarantee in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms can never override copyright ‘property’ should be rejected.” (David Vaver, Copyright Law ( Toronto: Irwin Law, 2000) at 195). Similar sentiments have been expressed by David Fewer, Jane Baley and Karen Lowe.

I respectfully agree. Copyright law is necessary to facilitate a business model that is widely accepted in our society but it affects the ability of various parties to communicate and is therefore likely to affect Charter rights from time to time. How absurd to suggest that copyright law is immune to Charter scrutiny.

Yet, there are two concurring cases as precedents, and typically the loser pays the winner’s costs, so it is unlikely that these decisions will be overruled in the foreseeable future.

Those who are interested are encouraged to read the following:
David Fewer, “ Constitutionalizing Copyright: Freedom of Expression and the Limits of Copyright in Canada” (1997) 55 U. Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 175.
Jane Bailey “Deflating the Michelin Man: Protecting Users’ Rights in the Canadian Copyright Reform Process” in Michael Geist, Ed., In The Public Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright Law (Toronto, Irwin Law 2005).
Karen Lowe “Shushing The New Aesthetic Vocabulary: Appropriation Art Under the Canadian Copyright Regime” (2008) 17 Dalhousie J. Leg. Stud. 99.
The Michelin case makes for interesting reading as well: Compagnie Générale des Établissements Michelin-Michelin & Cie v. National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (T.D.) (1996), [1997] 2 F.C. 306.

NOTE: Shortly after publishing this note I learned that the appeal was not dropped. Bloggers beware: there are a lot of news articles on-line and many are not current. Some have the facts wrong. It is easy to be misinformed. As well, due to a computer glitch, the original post was deleted so this post is a ‘resurrection’ of sorts. Unfortunately the insightful comments by Pulat Yunusov and David Fewer were lost in the process. I am very disappointed … but life goes on.

Post tags: charter, constitution, copyright, freedom of expression

In Defense of Free Speech…

By: Contributor · July 28, 2008 · Filed Under Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Diversity in Law, Legal Reform, Politics, Privacy · 5 Comments

On June 28 2008, the Canadian Human Rights commission dismissed the complaint against Maclean’s magazine (Rogers Media) concerning an article by Mark Steyn, and rightly so. (The complainants held that the article, among others, established a pattern of discrimination, and following repeatedly rebuffed attempts to respond in Maclean’s magazine, felt compelled to bring further action).

As many of you are aware, one article, “The Future Belongs to Islam”, is an opinion piece in which Steyn employs demographic information to support his opinion that the future of the Western world is in peril/doubt because of the spread of Islam.

While I am not a fan of Mark Steyn’s “neoconservative” ideology, as a self-described left-of-center civil libertarian I am certainly a fan of freedom of expression. Even if you do not agree with his arguments, he should have the right to express them without remaining worryingly susceptible to the retributive power of the state.

In fact, if it is held necessary that a body is to rule on the acceptability of certain speech, in order to protect vulnerable groups, the bar should be set exceedingly high. And according to previous rulings, the Supreme Court agrees. From the recent Maclean’s decision:

“The Supreme Court of Canada ruled in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 that this legally prescribed limitation of fundamental Charter rights [Section 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act] was reasonable and justifiable, but warned that caution and restraint would be required in the application of the section so that the limitation on free speech would be minimized to the greatest possible extent.”

From Taylor:

“The guarantee of freedom of expression is not unduly impaired by s. 13(1). The section is not overbroad or excessively vague. Its terms, in particular the phrase “hatred or contempt”, are sufficiently precise and narrow to limit its impact to those expressive activities which are repugnant to Parliament’s objective. The phrase “hatred or contempt” in the context of s. 13(1) refers only to unusually strong and deep‑felt emotions of detestation, calumny and vilification…”

The test was whether Steyn’s writings were so extreme and malicious in nature as to elicit hatred or contempt against the subjects:

“The court interpreted ‘hatred’ to mean a feeling of extreme ill-will that allows for no redeeming qualities in the person towards whom it is directed while ‘contempt’ “encompassed looking down upon or treating as inferior the object of one’s feelings.”

In an earlier related case referred to in the decision, Warman v. Kouba, it is made clear as to what type of material is considered to warrant intervention and censorship. Steyn’s writings certainly do not meet this benchmark. Hence, the commission concluded that the views expressed in the article: