RSS FeedHelena Guergis Sues Harper, CPC, and Cassels
When former Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) Member of Parliament, Helena Guergis, filed a claim yesterday against Prime Minister Harper and the CPC at the Ontario Superior Court, the story made headlines.
What didn’t attract as much attention is that the claim also included as defendants Arthur Hamilton and his law firm, Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP,
2. The Plaintiffclaims as against the Defendant, Arthur Hamilton (“Hamilton”), for conspiracy, defamation, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of duty of good faith, breach of confidence, and negligence.
3. The Plaintiff claims as against the Defendant, Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP (“Cassels Brock”), for conspiracy, defamation, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of duty of good faith, breach of confidence, and negligence…14. Hamilton is an individual and a lawyer with the Toronto office of the Cassels Brock law firm who, at all material times, was the lawyer for CPC and Harper.
IS. Cassels Brock is a limited liability partnership and law firm with offices in several major Canadian cities that, at all material times, was acting as legal counsel for CPC and Harper.
The allegations against Hamilton include a claim that he received defamatory statements from Derrick Snowdy, a private investigator who appears to have played a role in the fiasco involving Guergis’ husband, Rahim Jaffer. The allegations then state that Hamilton conveyed this information to Prime Minister Harper and others named in the claim (or alternatively did not make these statements, as the claim indicates).
It’s difficult to see how this function, operating in the capacity as a lawyer, could not attach some form of privilege. Absolute privilege may be available to some of the other defendants (see New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly)) and the defence of qualified privilege may attach to statements made by others. Lewis N. Klar stated in the Ottawa Law Review ((1991) 23 Ottawa Law Review 177-26),
The right of politicians to communicate information to the public has been protected by the defence of qualified privilege in recent defamation cases. In Parlett v. Robinson393, and Loos v. Robbins394, Courts of Appeal have upheld the right of a Member of Parliament in the former case, and a Cabinet Minister in the latter, to make statements to the public through the media, which although defamatory were made in furtherance of their public duties. These decisions demonstrate a greater latitude to the types of statements which will be protected, particularly with regard to the breadth of their publication, than had been the case in earlier Canadian law395.
In Leverman v. Campbell Sharp396, Lambert J.A. held that the defence of qualified privilege will be defeated if the defendant publishes a statement which is not his honest belief. Although carelessness in forming the belief will not defeat the defence, carelessness in publishing it, so that the statement does not represent one’s views, will.
In order to overcome qualified privilege there must be an element of malice, as explained in Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto,
144 The legal effect of the defence of qualified privilege is to rebut the inference, which normally arises from the publication of defamatory words, that they were spoken with malice. Where the occasion is shown to be privileged, the bona fides of the defendant is presumed and the defendant is free to publish, with impunity, remarks which may be defamatory and untrue about the plaintiff. However, the privilege is not absolute and can be defeated if the dominant motive for publishing the statement is actual or express malice. See Horrocks v. Lowe, [1975] A.C. 135 (H.L.), at p. 149.
145 Malice is commonly understood, in the popular sense, as spite or ill-will. However, it also includes, as Dickson J. (as he then was) pointed out in dissent in Cherneskey, supra, at p. 1099, “any indirect motive or ulterior purpose” that conflicts with the sense of duty or the mutual interest which the occasion created. See, also, Taylor v. Despard, [1956] O.R. 963 (C.A.). Malice may also be established by showing that the defendant spoke dishonestly, or in knowing or reckless disregard for the truth. See McLoughlin, supra, at pp. 323-24, and Netupsky v. Craig, [1973] S.C.R. 55, at pp. 61-62.
146 Qualified privilege may also be defeated when the limits of the duty or interest have been exceeded. See The Law of Defamation in Canada, supra, at pp. 13-193 and 13-194; Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts (20th ed. 1992), at pp. 166-67. As Loreburn E. stated at pp. 320-21 in Adam v. Ward, supra:
- . . . the fact that an occasion is privileged does not necessarily protect all that is said or written on that occasion. Anything that is not relevant and pertinent to the discharge of the duty or the exercise of the right or the safeguarding of the interest which creates the privilege will not be protected.
147 In other words, the information communicated must be reasonably appropriate in the context of the circumstances existing on the occasion when that information was given. For example, in Douglas v. Tucker, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 275, the defendant, during an election campaign, stated that the plaintiff, who was the officer of an investment company, had charged a farmer and his wife an exorbitant rate of interest causing them to lose their property. The plaintiff maintained that the allegation was without foundation. In response, the defendant asserted that the plaintiff was facing a charge of fraud which had been adjourned until after the election. This Court held that the defendant had an interest in responding to the plaintiff’s denial, thereby giving rise to an occasion of qualified privilege. However, it ruled that the occasion was exceeded because the defendant’s comments went beyond what was “germane and reasonably appropriate” (p. 286).
The other claims against Hamilton are also worth highlighting because it involves his firm,
45. On April 8 and 9, 2010, and all material times, Hamilton and Cassels Brock owed a fiduciary duty and duty of good faith to the Plaintiff, and were obligated to act with regard to the Plaintiffs interests and keep and protect the Plaintiffs confidences as a result of the relationship that existed as between the Plaintiff, Hamilton and Cassels Brock, including as a result of the legal advice that had been provided by Hamilton and Cassels Brock to the Plaintiff on or about April 7, 2010 at a time when the Plaintiff was vulnerable and dependent upon Hamilton and Cassels Brock and relying upon their professional advice.
If Cassels was indeed representing both Guergis and Harper/CPC at the same time, and was providing advice to Harper/CPC that was detrimental to Guergis, it is difficult to see how there could not be a conflict of interest,
48. In addition, Hamilton and Cassels Brock failed to avoid a conflict of interest whereby the interests of their other client(s) were promoted at the expense of the Plaintiffs interests, resulting in breaches of their fiduciary duties and duties of good faith owed to the Plaintiff.
Of course the nature of the advice, and whether they attempted to remove themselves from the record, are other factors that may come into play, especially since Harper made a statement soon after,
72. Also on or about April 9, 2010, Harper made the following public statement: Last night, my office became aware of serious allegations regarding the conduct of the Honourable Helena Guergis. These allegations relate to the conduct of Ms. Guergis and do not involve any other minister, MP, senator or federal government employee. I’ve referred the allegations to the Conflict ofInterest and Ethics Commissioner and to the RCMP. Under the circumstances, I will not comment on them further.
At the very least the lawsuit will finally provide information about the inner workings of Harper’s Conservative Party, which has been the target of general accusations of unilateralism and squashing any dissent. The lawsuit may eventually demonstrate that not unlike the Liberal Party before them, infighting is an unfortunate reality of Canadian political parties once established in power. While this revelation might be refreshing to those who mistakenly believed it to be a problem plaguing Liberal dynamics, it may be less than inspiring to a generation who has been largely apathetic and removed entirely from public political discourse.
The Statement of Claim is below.
Guergis v Novak et al Statement of Claim
The End of 2-for-1 Credit & the Fallacy of ‘Getting Tough’
The March 8th 2010 issue of Maclean’s, “Canada’s magazine”, has this to say about the Conservative government’s elimination of two-for-one credit for pre-sentence custody:
Do the time
“It seems like a no-brainer: convicted criminals shouldn’t get a break for prison time served prior to court dates. And yet, it’s taken four years for the federal government to enact legislation ending two-for-one jail credits. As the old saying goes: you do the crime, you do the time—the whole time, not just half. Convicted criminals have been gifted shorter sentences by the justice system for too long. It’s time to get tough.”
Fortunately, old sayings do not figure among our sentencing principles. The objectives of our sentencing regime are enumerated at section 718 of the Criminal Code, and they are as follows:
(a) to denounce unlawful conduct;
(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;
(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;
(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;
(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and
(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and to the community.
Parliament enacted those objectives to guide the courts in fashioning sentences that are just and appropriate to the circumstances of each case. By looking beyond the obtuse imperative to “get tough”, a judge can craft a sentence that neither threatens the safety and security of the public nor condemns the offender to a lifelong cycle of recidivism.
Equitable and progressive though they might be, however, Parliament’s sentencing principles do not take into account the backlog that plagues the criminal justice system. Too often, prisoners languish in dangerous, dirty, overcrowded jails for weeks and months before their cases can be heard.
It was this dubious “gift” that the two-for-one sentencing regime was meant to address: the policy acknowledged that outrageous pre-sentence delays, coupled with deplorable conditions in some Canadian prisons, resulted in suffering that our sentencing provisions did not countenance. Moreover, this hardship is utterly preventable, but for a lack of public or political will. (As ever, “get tough” is a politically unassailable stance.)
To be sure, giving double credit was a bandage on the problem, not a curative. Jail conditions remain execrable, and the Attorney General’s “Justice on Target” initiative has only just begun to rein in administrative delay. But instead of curing these ills, the government has decided to rip off the bandage.
In that respect, Maclean’s was right: it’s a no-brainer.
Court Injunction Against Axel Kuhn in Etobicoke Centre
Incumbent Liberal candidate Borys Wrzesnewskyj didn’t enjoy his turkey last night. At least not the Conservative turkey he’s fighting, and claims has defamed his name based on attendance records.
Wrzesnewskyj said,
The Conservative candidate and the Conservative Party of Canada have made blatantly false statements about my voting record and attendance in the House of Commons and at committee meetings.
He’s dropping flyers with these statements on Thanksgiving weekend just before the election knowing that there’s a virtual impossibility to respond.
Justice George Strathy of the Ontario Superior Court Justice ruled that Kuhn must cease publishing and distributing the brochures.
In his decision Strathy J. said,
They imply that the plaintiff has been derelict in his duties as a member of Parliament and that he does not deserve to be paid his salary. Based upon the sworn evidence of the plaintiff, the words cannot be justified.
