RSS FeedNew Roadside Alcohol Suspensions: Bill 203 Explained
From Simon Says: Providing relevant information on policing and law
On May 1, 2009, amendments to the Highway Traffic Act (Sections 41-48) came into effect, as did three new Ontario Regulations (403/08, 405/08, and 407/08), as part of Bill 203, the Safer Roads for Safer Ontario Act.
Although we have just passed the one year anniversary of the legislation coming into force, there still seems to be a great deal of confusion about it. The purpose of this article is to dispel any remaining confusion over this legislation.
The purpose of this aspect of Bill 203 was to increase the penalty for drivers who blew in the “warn range” for blood alcohol concentration (B.A.C.), from what was then a 12 hour licence suspension to an escalating 3, 7, or 30 day suspension, with additional consequences.
These amendments did not change the B.A.C. level which qualifies as a “warn”, as some people have come to believe. This seems to be the most prominent misconception about Bill 203. The “warn” limit was, and is still, .05 to .08 B.A.C., or 50 to 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 milliliters of blood. Under .05 B.A.C. is legal, unless you have a graduated Class G or Class M licence (G1, G2, M1, M2). Over .08 B.A.C. is, of course, illegal and qualifies you to be arrested and charged with Over 80 under Section 253 of the Criminal Code.
I encountered this mistaken impression about the “warn” level a great deal when I was on patrol after Bill 203 was enacted. I believe that the confusion stemmed from the wording used to advertise the new penalties. In print and on television, advertisements warned of “New roadside suspension for people who blow a .05.” Many people took this to mean that the limit had been lowered and people would now have their licence suspended for blowing a .05, however, that was always the case and the only thing that was new was the length of the suspension.
Prior to Bill 203, when police administered a roadside screening device to a driver who blew a “warn”, that driver got their licence seized by the police for 12 hours, after which time they could attend the police station and get it back. These suspensions were not recorded on a person’s driving record and there were no additional penalties or consequences. If a person drove during this 12 hour window they were technically driving on a suspended licence. However, it is not likely that anyone would know, except the officer who seized their licence, since the suspension was not recorded to CPIC (the Canadian Police Information Center), which any police officer can and would check during a traffic stop.
Now, under the new amendments, a driver blowing a “warn” will automatically have their licence suspended for 3 days and there are escalating penalties for repeat offenders. If a driver blows a “warn” again within 5 years, their licence will automatically be suspended for 7 days. If a driver blows a “warn” a third time, within 5 years of the second time, their licence will be automatically suspended for 30 days.
Since these suspensions are more than 12 hours long, they are entered onto CPIC for their duration, which allows any officer encountering the person in that time frame to know that their licence is under suspension. These suspensions are issued on the authority of the police officer, at the roadside and the authority extends to international driving permits and licences of other jurisdictions, as well as Ontario licences. This new legislation notwithstanding, police can still suspend the licence of a novice driver who has a blood alcohol level under .05 using the old 12 hour procedure.
If caught driving during this time on a suspended licence, a person can be subject to a fine of up to $5,000 and 6 months in jail. In my experience, Justices of the Peace do not take kindly to people driving when they have been told not to and jail time is not uncommon for this offence, even though it is only quasi-criminal.
The additional consequences for blowing a “warn” are as follows. Upon the second suspension, the driver will be required to complete a remedial alcohol program with the Ministry of Transportation and their licence will automatically be suspended indefinitely if they fail to complete the program. Upon the third conviction, the driver will be subjected to the remedial program again as well as to an ignition interlock condition on their license for a minimum of 6 months after their license is reinstated. This means that they are required to have an ignition interlock device installed in their vehicle and they are prohibited from driving any vehicle not equipped with one. Fines for violating ignition interlock conditions can be up to $1,000.
Another new consequence for blowing a “warn” is that, once the suspension is lifted, the person is required to pay a $150 reinstatement fee to the MTO to get their licence reactivated. This was not the case with the 12 hour suspensions, since the licence was not officially suspended with the MTO, it was just held by police for 12 hours.
One interesting feature of Bill 203 is the addition of Section 48 (9) to the Highway Traffic Act, which explicitly states that, “There is no appeal from, or right to be heard before, the suspension of a driver’s licence under this section.” This section has been greatly contested by some, who feel that it violates the rights guaranteed under Section 11 (d) of the Charter, “to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.” Since there is no trial process for licence suspensions, and no right to appeal, the police officer is, in effect, judge, jury, and executioner, convicting and carrying out the sentence themselves.
I believe that the only reason this particular feature was permitted to be passed is because, unlike an actual charge, a licence suspension carries no direct punishment. Although there is a great deal of inconvenience associated with it, there is no fine or other consequence for receiving a roadside suspension.
There is no indirect punishment for it either, since, according to a Financial Services Commission of Ontario bulletin, insurance companies cannot use an Administrative Driver’s Licence Suspension (ADLS), which is less than one year in length, in their risk classification system, which is what primarily determines your premiums. An ADLS is any suspension not associated with a conviction in court for a driving related offence, thus all of these suspensions qualify.
Perhaps to balance out this somewhat restrictive feature, Bill 203 also included the addition of Section 48 (6) of the Highway Traffic Act, which states that a driver now has the right to demand an officer provide them with a second opportunity to provide a breath sample, with a different roadside screening device or a breathalyser machine at the police station, to verify the accuracy of the first reading. The inclusion of the breathalyser machine at the station is important for anyone who wants absolute verification that the police are being honest with them, since the breathalyser machine prints out a record of the breath sample showing the B.A.C.
This section does come with one caveat, however: the second reading stands. If the second reading is under .05, the driver does not receive a licence suspension. If the second reading is also a “warn” they do. But, if the second reading is a fail, the person is arrested for Over 80. It is good to know your rights if you are in this situation, but be wary if you are going to demand a second sample! Unlike breathalyser samples for people arrested for Impaired Driving or Over 80, there is no specified minimum or maximum time between samples, however the driver must make themselves readily available for a second sample. They cannot delay while they wait for the B.A.C. to drop.
The rationale behind this legislation is to denounce driving with a blood alcohol level which could affect a driver’s ability to operate their motor vehicle safely, putting themselves and the public at risk. It is up to you to decide whether you think it accomplishes this goal and whether there may be a better way of doing it. I invite you to post your thoughts in the comments section and, as always, please feel free to share the link to this article on your forums and other social media outlets.
Discretion, law, and Rahim Jaffer
When the Crown dropped drunk driving and cocaine charges against Rahim Jaffer, everyone seemed unhappy and suspicious. There was a lot more unity of opinion than when a Canadian woman was stuck in Africa because Canadian officials thought she didn’t look like her passport photo. Both cases involved our trust in government, and in both cases government officials had a lot of discretion in making their decisions. Our law gives Crown prosecutors discretion in laying charges. The only constraint is that they must act in public interest. The popular mindset that justifies giving this leeway to the Crown is crime control. A different philosophy is due process, which emphasizes the rights of the accused, but this approach doesn’t seem very popular politically. The actual system is hopefully something between the two. In the Jaffer case, the public wants some accountability from the Crown but it does not seem ready to swing in the due process direction. Can we hold Crown prosecutors accountable for their discretionary decisions such as laying charges? It is very, very difficult, and the only way is to bind the Crown with more rules reducing their discretion.
A cop pulled over Rahim Jaffer, a Canadian politician, because Jaffer was going 93 km/h in a 50 km/h zone. The officer ended up arresting Jaffer who failed a breathalizer test. Jaffer was charged with drunk driving, speeding, and possession of cocaine. But eventually the Crown dropped the most serious drunk driving and drug charges. The judge famously told Jaffer, “I’m sure you can recognize a break when you see one.” Search Google News for “Rahim Jaffer,” and you’ll see what firestorm this case started in Canada. The public wants accountability from the Crown for dropping the charges against an influential figure. But can it get it?
Accountability means giving reasons for decisions. It’s pretty simple. If you give reasons for your decision, we can have a competent third party review your reasons to see if you made any mistakes in facts or rules. The third party must have the power to reverse your decision or to make you reconsider. With government decisions, the third party is usually the courts. If there are no reasons for a decision, it is very hard to know if the decision is wrong. It must be so obviously wrong that no reasons can justify it. It must pretty much be an absurd decision for a court to quash it without seeing any reasons. So if a decision maker doesn’t have to give reasons, there is very little accountability.
Truly discretionary decisions never require giving of reasons. Discretion means freedom from rules. Broad principles may limit discretion but if you set rules for someone in their decision-making they don’t have discretion any more. For example, the Crown has discretion in laying charges, but they must make decisions in public interest. That’s a broad principle. But there are no rules such as “you must lay a possession charge if the cocaine was found in the car,” or “you must never refuse to lay a charge to protect a politician,” or “you must lay a drunk driving charge even if the police officer broke rules in obtaining evidence.” The Crown’s discretion in laying charges implies it doesn’t have rules like that. Discretion means we trust they will do the right thing because they are experts, or because we are scared, or because it’s the cheapest way. But that means the Crown doesn’t have to explain its decisions or they wouldn’t really have our trust. That’s why the Crown’s discretionary decisions do not require it to give reasons. If you ask, they will say that their decision was in the public interest—and they are legally right. But try to challenge a decision on the basis of a broad principle like that.
If you give someone discretion because you want to be tough on crime, don’t expect them to be accountable. It’s impossible to have your cake and eat it too. When all the law requires is that the state make decisions in the public interest, it will be very hard to prove to the courts that a particular decision is not in the public interest. The broader the standard, the heavier is the burden to prove that it was not followed. How is the Supreme Court to judge the government on what it purports to do for our common good in some secret international circles? So they decided they couldn’t in the Khadr case. And so the courts will decide they can’t interfere in the Crown’s discretion in the Jaffer case if some naive person will try to challenge the decision to drop charges. Once the law gives someone discretion, the courts will generally stay away from poking their nose. So if you want accountability from the government, you should bind it with rules instead of giving it blank checks. That’s the due process attitude, but it lasts only until the next scare when the crime control mindset takes over. Let’s hope the two will be in balance.
(Post sponsored by AdviceScene)
Bottums up!
This video, purportedly taken during a roadside sobriety check in Russia (though I’ve listened to it many times and can’t be definitively certain about the language), demonstrates what happens when an Alcotest has truly met it’s match.
Watch it. Dry your eyes from crying, and then watch it again. Pause. Then come back here…
…You done watching it now? Yes. You did just see a man try to DRINK THE BREATHALYZER MACHINE.
Problems with New Impaired Driving Legislation
As part of my series on the Tackling Violent Crime Act, I’d like to discuss the new changes to the drunk driving provisions of the Criminal Code.
The need for reform
To begin, the extent of the drunk driving problem is put into perspective when the latest statistics (from 2005) show that there have been over 1,200 impaired-driving related fatalities across Canada. According to Professor Robert Solomon, a law professor at the University of Western Ontario and a representative of MADD Canada, drunk driving is “the No. 1 criminal cause of death in this country.” And that’s to say nothing of non-fatal injuries and property damage caused by people deciding to get behind the wheel when they’ve had too many to drink.
Thus, a significant number of amendments in the new legislation deal with impaired driving. The perception (and indeed, probably the reality) was that a lot of drunk drivers were using legal loopholes to escape convictions. As one defence lawyer, a specialist in impaired driving cases (who shall remain nameless), once told me:
“drunk driving is one of the few offences in the Criminal Code where you really can just throw a lot of money at the problem and have it go away. A good lawyer can nearly always find some screw-up on the part of the cops in order to get their client off.”
Unlike most other crimes, drunk driving prosecutions typically rest on a single piece of evidence: the breathalyzer test results. The tests basically have to be perfect; they are challenged if the machine isn’t correctly calibrated, if the operator wasn’t specifically trained for them, and so on. The slightest irregularity can be fatal to the prosecution. These tests could also be challenged by other evidence tending to suggest that the machine’s results were wrong.
Acquittals were also often the result of Charter breaches on the part of the police. Breath test evidence has been routinely excluded if an accused was not properly informed of the reasons for their detention under section 10(a) of the Charter or their right to counsel under section 10(b), for example.
Paul Moreau, a criminal lawyer in Edmonton, explains that:
“impaired driving is a very technical type of offense. The police are required to do certain things in a certain order within a certain time frame. Certain documents are required and they have to be filled out correctly. Any part of the process that is done incorrectly may provide a defense to the person charged with that crime. So part of my function is to analyze what the police have done and see whether they have done it correctly. If they have not, then the person may very well have a good defense.”
The public perception is that these acquittals are based on trivial technicalities. Others argue that protection of our constitutional rights demands high scrutiny of police action. Recently, the Ontario Court of Appeal has said that:
“Once detained, an individual is at the mercy of state actors. Thus, in circumstances where the informational component of s. 10(a) of the Charter is easy to fulfill – as it was in this case – the breach of the obligation to provide that information cannot be considered a trivial matter. We say this because, as the jurisprudence illustrates, the right against self-incrimination is fundamental to the spirit of s. 10 of the Charter.”
(R. v. Nguyen, 2008 ONCA 49, at para. 21)
The government has the unenviable challenge of balancing the need to protect the public from drunk drivers and the need to defend civil liberties. Consistent with their purpose as the guardian of our rights, Canadian courts have been strictly interpreting our drunk driving legislation in favour of civil liberties, even when it has led to seemingly absurd outcomes.
In a high-profile case last month, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld Margaret Trudeau’s acquittal on a drunk driving charge. Ms. Trudeau was found to be driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.107. She was acquitted on the grounds that her rights were violated when she was told that no one answered the phone when the police placed a call to her lawyer. Instead, the police should have told her that an answering machine had picked up the call. Ultimately, Trudeau did manage to contact a lawyer, but it was not her first pick.
Trudeau later publicly stated that:
“I shouldn’t have got off. I was over the limit…”
Statements like this have done nothing to allay the public’s concerns about drunk driving in the criminal justice system.
The truth is that there is actually a high conviction rate for impaired driving. Statistics Canada’s numbers for 2005/06 show that of 43,444 decided impaired driving cases, 33,983 resulted in a conviction. That is a 78% conviction rate – the highest rate for any criminal offence category studied by StatsCan. However, the public perception does not accord with these figures. A poll of over 2000 Canadians found that:
“most respondents didn’t think our courts make drunk driving charges stick. One in four thought less than 25 per cent of charges result in convictions. Only one in 10 correctly answered that over 75 per cent of charges result in convictions.”
Regardless of the disparity between the public perception of conviction rates and the actual conviction rate, the reality is that many drivers, exemplified by Margaret Trudeau, who were most definitely drunk behind the wheel have been going free. This was a pressing problem and legal reform was necessary to address it.
I take issue, however, with the extent of those changes. I think the government has gone too far in abrogating civil rights in favour of cracking down on drunk driving. Indeed, I think that many of the new Criminal Code provisions will be successfully challenged under the constitution.
Why bother cautioning the accused?
Take the following example:
“the result of an analysis of a sample of the accused’s breath, blood, urine or other bodily substance – other than a sample taken under subsection 254(3), (3.3) or (3.4) – may be admitted in evidence even if the accused was not warned before they gave the sample that they need not give the sample or that the result of the analysis of the sample might be used in evidence;”
(Criminal Code, s. 258(1)(b), as amended)
Previously, an accused could argue that they were not properly cautioned before taking the breathalyzer test, and thereby have the evidence excluded. The correct solution to this problem was a simple one: train the officers to give a proper caution! Instead, the government seems to have decided that one’s rights are unimportant in the context of drunk driving. Since the police can now get away with not cautioning the accused, we can expect that they’ll simply never give an appropriate warning; why bother?
Expanding the scope of police powers
Another example of the Criminal Code amendments:
“If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that a person has alcohol or a drug in their body and that the person has, within the preceding three hours, operated a motor vehicle or vessel, operated or assisted in the operation of an aircraft or railway equipment or had the care or control of a motor vehicle, a vessel, an aircraft or railway equipment, whether it was in motion or not, the peace officer may, by demand, require the person to [accompany the officer for sobriety testing and/or breath testing].
(Criminal Code, s. 254(2), as amended)
The addition of the “preceding three hours” requirement now means that a police officer can basically detain you at random and require you to provide a breath sample. All the officer needs is a reasonable suspicion that you’ve sat in the driver’s seat of a car within the past three hours. Forget about whether you’ve actually driven the car. It doesn’t even matter if the engine was ever on.
If an officer believes that you sat in a driver’s seat while under the influence of drugs at any time within the last three hours, he/she now has the power compel you to undergo a breath test, a blood test, a urinalysis, or an oral swab as required to check for the presence of drugs in your system. Regardless of whether the charges would ultimately stand, the police have legal authority to engage in random detainment and drug testing. Whereas before, this power was probably practically limited to the roadside, the three hour requirement now means they can detain and test a suspect just about anywhere.
Mandatory minimums
Additionally, mandatory minimum incarceration periods for impaired driving have been increased (Criminal Code, s. 255(1)(a), as amended). For a second offence, the penalty is a guaranteed 30 days in jail, up from 14 days. For a third offence, it’s a minimum incarceration period of 120 days, up from 90. (Note: I will be discussing mandatory minimum sentences in greater depth at a later date, since I think I could devote an entire post to them.)
The all-knowing machine
As explained above, drunk driving prosecutions rest disproportionately on a single, fallible piece of evidence: a certificate of analysis from a breathalyzer test.
But even assuming the device is being used properly, the machine suffers from many documented problems. For example,
“The Intoxilyzer is designed to produce a breath alcohol result exactly corresponding to a simultaneous blood alcohol sample. The problem is the assumption that the partitioning of alcohol from the blood into the breath is 2100:1. Not all persons partition alcohol from their blood based upon this ratio. Studies show partition ratios as low as 834:1. The Intoxilyzer 5000 will overestimate the alcohol concentration of someone blowing with a partition ratio less than 2100:1.”
Despite having an established error rate of between 10% and 30%, courts have upheld the use of breathalyzers because their results must be considered in light of other evidence:
“In State v. McCarty 434 N.W.2d 67 (S.D. 1988), the court ruled that a statutory declaration that the partition ratio is 2100:1 did not create an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption. The defendant had a BAC of 0.14% based on a breath test. At the trial, the defendant raised issues concerning the reliability of using a partition ratio of 2100. At trial, the jury was instructed in language identical to statutory construction that BAC shall be based on either alcohol concentration in blood or breath. The court acknowledged that this ratio can vary from 1142 to 1 to 3478 to 1; it even quoted an expert on the artificial rigidity of mandating a partition ratio of 2100 to 1. While admitting that the jury instruction was improper, the court said that it was cured by another instruction which stated that presumptions created by statute are inconclusive, and must be considered a part of the total evidence presented at trial. Therefore, there was no irrebuttable presumption of guilt by the state.”
However, the government has now placed almost total faith in the all-knowing machine, which is hailed as an “objective” measure of an accused’s level of intoxication:
“evidence of the results of the analyses so made is conclusive proof that the concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood both at the time when the analyses were made and at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed was … the concentration determined by the analyses.”
(Criminal Code, s. 258(1)(c), as amended. Emphasis added.)
The only challenge to this “conclusive proof” is where the defence can show that the machine was malfunctioning or was operated improperly. Of course, it’s fairly difficult to demonstrate this where the machine is in the possession of the police and cannot be properly inspected.
Previously, defence counsel could bring “evidence to the contrary” to show that the breathalyzer reading must be wrong. For example, a witness could testify that he was at the bar with the accused all night, and that the accused only drank one beer. Now this defence has been severely curtailed by the legislature:
“for greater certainty, evidence tending to show that an approved instrument was malfunctioning or was operated improperly, or that an analysis of a sample of the accused’s blood was performed improperly, does not include evidence of
(i) the amount of alcohol that the accused consumed,
(ii) the rate at which the alcohol that the accused consumed would have been absorbed and eliminated by the accused’s body, or
(iii) a calculation based on that evidence of what the concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood would have been at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed;”
(Criminal Code, s. 258(1)(d.1), as amended.)
Professor Solomon has rightly complained that the evidence to the contrary defence has been used “completely inappropriately” by defence counsel. Nevertheless, section 258(1)(d.1) goes too far by completely nullifying the availability of the defence.
Yes, there will be unscrupulous defence lawyers. And yes, there will be witnesses who lie. But it is the role of the judge (or jury) to weigh the evidence and conclude whether it should be considered or not. This is a challenging job, but judges are relied on to do it every single day in this country. It should be up to a judge to decide whether a witness is lying or whether the defence’s argument is sound.
The statutory elimination of the evidence to the contrary defence represents a serious infringement of the presumption of innocence. The “conclusive” nature of breathalyzer evidence means that by the time the accused reaches trial on account of failing the breath test, their fate is predetermined. In essence, the judge in impaired driving cases is being replaced by a machine that is “objectively” deciding who is guilty and who is not. By depriving the accused of the ability to introduce relevant and non-prejudicial evidence at trial, the legislature is seriously curtailing that accused’s fundamental right to make full answer and defence to the charges:
“This common law right has acquired new vigour by virtue of its inclusion in s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as one of the principles of fundamental justice … The right to make full answer and defence is one of the pillars of criminal justice on which we heavily depend to ensure that the innocent are not convicted.”
(R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, at p. 336.)
Legitimately innocent people will be caught in this new net. No matter how severe the problem of drunk driving, depriving an accused of the right to make full answer and defence simply cannot be justified.
