New Bob Marley Brand “House of Marley,” Heirs Take Steps To Protect Father’s Legacy
First posted on Commercial Law International on Jan 7, 2010.
“Old pirates, yes they rob I.”
The opening words to Redemption Song are as hard hitting now as they were when first bellowed by the iconic musical legend – Bob Marley - years ago. These words however may be taking on a new meaning in this era digitization and globalization where information is king. This era is all about IP – Intellectual Property – and the right to access, control and exploit for ones own benefit the concepts encapsulated within creativity.
As a matter of course the Brand – how you package and sell your IP, in fact branding itself becomes a form of IP – in this era becomes of great import. In fact one could argue that brand is not the everything but is the only thing. Consumers no longer simply buy a product or service – no, no – rather they are buying a brand.
Now this brings me to the House of Marley. The heirs of Bob Marley – the holders of the exclusive rights to the reggae superstar’s image – are drawing clear battle lines in the IP war on whom can access, control and exploit Marley’s iconic status. They have enlisted the aid of Canadian private equity firm Hilco Consumer Capital to package, manage, market, sell, monitor and protect the IP that is Bob Marley through the products sold under the new House of Marley brand.
Rather than attack the hawkers of existing wears, which would result in a multiplicity of protracted legal battles spread-out across the globe, Hilco and the House of Marley have instead embarked on a branding campaign. It is quite simple, the House of Marley will be authentic and all other comers will only be imitators – a potentially very lucrative strategy, if it can be pulled off.
According to reports, the Marley brand – name, sound and image – are estimated to generate $USD 600 million in a year and this is on the bootleg side alone. On the legal side, the brand generates a profitable but substantially smaller $USD 4 million a year.
With numbers like those no wonder the Marley heirs sought out and gained a partner like Hilco with a proven reputation in IP generally and branding specifically?
While I applauded this new venture, I can’t help but how long will it be before we see a court case or two? Maybe a few Anton Piller orders – best described but somewhat inaccurately as a civil search warrant, that feature so prominently in IP cases – or maybe the odd Mareva injunction – a court order freezing assets -?
The reason why I am thinking this is that it is impossible to escape the fact that branding – intellectual propertization – eventually means not only the allocation of exclusive rights but also the enforcement of those rights.
August 1: A Day Of Remembrance
This is part of the Middle Passage Law Series and is cross posted on Commercial Law International.
Why am I wearing all black today?
Am I in mourning? No, not exactly. Then why?
Well it is August 1: Emancipation Day. 
I am wearing black today not to so much mourn but to remember. To remember that it was today 175 years ago that the British set my ancestors free – well in a manner, they still had six years of apprenticeship to look forward to. Why? Because being free people made them some how forget all the skills acquired during a lifetime of toil.
The Slavery Abolition Act 1833 took effect one year after passage this day 1834 and outlawed slavery in the British empire – including British North America aka Canada – with the exception of all but a hand fully of territories.
So I remember – let’s remember together.
Does The Future Of The Revised US-Swiss Double Taxation Treaty Depend On The Outcome Of The UBS Case?
First posted on Commercial Law International on July 13, 2009.
UBS, the world´s largest wealth manager, has found itself embroiled in a diplomatic row between Washington and Bern. At issue is the interpretation of the current US-Swiss double taxation treaty and at stake is the newly inked, yet to be ratified, revised US-Swiss double taxation treaty.
Does the future of the revised US-Swiss double taxation treaty depend on the outcome of the UBS case?
As much was indicated by Doris Leuthard, the Swiss Economy Minister, as she called for a speedy resolution of the case. What the Minister is expressing in her pronouncements is simply the reality of the situation. Swiss maintain that the issues in the case are diplomatic and ought to be resolved in forum more appropriate to friendly relations between nations – face-to-face closed door negotiations – rather an the public spectacle of a courtroom. Secondly, while the treaty has been finalized it has yet to be ratified by the Swiss Parliament, a parliament that will be slow to give its blessing if it is dissatisfied with the outcome of the case.
So what exactly is going on in this case? This is a very good question for I myself was a bit confused for two reasons. The first is that UBS already plead guilty to assisting thousands of Americans to evade US taxes in a case brought by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in February of this year. In the same case it also paid fines of $750 million and disclosed 250 names of its US clients. So the case ought to be over, right? Well, yes and no. This was the criminal leg of the – and I am going to substitute strategy here for case to avoid any legal confusion – US authorities strategy to gain the names of as many as 52,000 believed to be evading US taxes.
The current case before the courts is the civil leg of the strategy brought by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). They have served on UBS a John Doe subpoena in an effort to force UBS to reveal the names, so those people can in turn answer to the authorities.
While I know that criminal and civil matters are wholly different creatures, this smacks of double prosecution – persecution if you will. Or is it?
The second thing that was puzzling me was this IRS case seems to have stepped outside the four corners of the existing double taxation treaty. The treaty only requires UBS, through Swiss authorities, to co-operate with US tax evasion investigations if the IRS can provide the specific names of the holders of secret offshore accounts. It is clear from the IRS´s actions, issuing a John Doe subpoena, that it clearly does not know the names of the suspected tax evaders. So that should be the end of it, right. Well, clearly not.
Now, what the IRS is doing is clearly is not only not double prosecution/persecution, it is well within, I believe, the scope of the treaty. In fact I would go as far as saying that it is share genius. This was revealed to me in a brief filed by the IRS in response to one filed by UBS. To see what I mean just take a look at section 2 of the brief, the head tells it all: ¨Nothing in the Tax Treaty Limits the IRS´s Authority to Enforce a Duly Authorized Summons Issued to a Third-Third Party Witness within the United States, or Requires the IRS to Exhaust its Treaty Rights With a Foreign Government Before Seeking to that Summons.¨
Unfortunate for UBS, and as rightly pointed out by the IRS ¨the existence of a treaty….does not limit the rights granted to the United States under the laws of this country¨ (the bold being original). Well, that is in part, it should read doesn’t limit those laws so limited by treaty obligation.
What the IRS has done is not too circumvent the treaty but simply not to bring it into the equation at all. It has kept the issue entirely domestic. As I said, share genius.
In any event the prospects are dim for UBS if a negotiated settlement is not reach soon. If UBS loses, which it looks increasingly probable, it will be faced with either defying US law by refusing to reveal the names or reveal the names and be in violation of Swiss banking law which carries with criminal sanction.
Now that a Floridia judge has agreed to postone the case the excutives at UBS will surely be working over time to reach an amecible resolution of the case.
L´Oreal Found Guilty Of Racial Discrimination
This is part of the Middle Passage Law Series and is cross posted on Commercial Law International.
Now I know I have not posted a piece in this series in quite some time and for that I apologize – I have no excuse.
It may seem that I am either picking on L´Oreal, as I have tracked their recent legal battles with eBay on Commercial Law International, either that or I have an obsession with makeup. Let me assure you that neither in the case. With that over, let´s go to the story.
The La Cour de Cassation, the highest court in France, upheld the ruling by the Paris Court of Appeal, finding L´Oreal guilty of racial discrimination. The court also found Adecco, a temp-employment agency, involved through its Districom division, guilty and fined both it and L´Oreal €30,000. The court however, sent back to the Court of Appeal for its reconsideration the €30,000 each in damages payable to SOS Racisme, an anti-racism public interest group that brought the case.
The ruling ends three years of legal wrangling and is no doubt a huge blemish for L´Oreal.
The main issue of fact in the case was BBR. Yes, BBR. What in the world is BBR, you ask?
BBR or blue, blanc, rouge – the colors of the French flag. Now if you were to ask me I would have simply thought that this was a general patriotic gesture, however, it hides a much more sinister meaning. It, as the Times reports is an expression ¨widely recognized in the French recruitment world as code for white French people born to white French parents.¨ This would of course exclude not only the 4 million ethnic minorities current living in France but also any whites not born of pure French stock, including presumably none other than the French President himself Nicolas Sarkozy whose father is Hungarian.
It would seem that word got out that L´Oreal did not want any black, Asian or Arab sales staff to promote Fructis Style, a hair care product made by its Garnier division. Only BBR would do, I guess – because they are worth it – to play on L´Oreal´s because you are worth it ads. But, why?
And this for me is the most troubling aspect of this case. The BBR move by L´Oreal hints at a much larger and disquieting issue in French society. Yes, racism, this is very obvious but much more than that it is brand of racism that operates not just on the fringes of society but at its heart – in the labour and retail markets – while at the same time managing to remain in the shadows .
How is it that this BBR policy that so pervades the French employment and retail markets is only now seeing the light of day?
Like I said, very troubling indeed.
However, a silver lining to all of this is that BBR has now been fully exposed in a court of law. From now on the racial prejudice that operates in the French labour and retail markets can no longer be subject to denials of anecdote or conjecture. The court record stands as an official record by the state that BBR does exist and is a proven fact.
As for L´Oreal, this cannot be good for its brand management. For a company that so fiercely defends its brands, just take a look at its battles with eBay, this was not only a poorly conceived recruitment drive but also incorrectly defended case – this is not to be read as a dig at L´Oreal´s lawyers, not at all, I am sure they represented their client the best way they could, however, I am unreservedly criticizing L´Oreal.
L´Oreal forgot that it´s all about the brand. What they sell is much more than simply a product, it is a lifestyle, it is instant gratification, it is control and it is improved self-confidence through a line of beauty products designed for one thing – to improve the true beauty that is you. Nothing can be allowed tarnish the brand less they lose sales and market share.
If this is the basic market reality of the L´Oreal brand, and for that matter any brand, why would you maintain the spectacle of a public trial for three years with a case that even if it comes out in your favor could still blemish the brand?
There is no doubt that L´Oreal´s PR team is hard at work trying to figure out how to either make this go away or finding an angle on how to spin this. A word to the wise, L´Oreal, you have already been found guilty, it would be an exercise in futility to deny any part of this. In fact such a denial, in whole or in part, direct or indirect, could result in a backlash against the brand. It would be better to fully accept culpability, say sorry and take positive and no doubt public steps in order to combat BBR or other forms of discrimination. That my friend is your angle.
Australian Securities Regulators In Policy Quandary
First posted on Commercial Law international on July 1, 2009.
The question that faces Australian securities regulators is what to do about two or more Chinese state owned enterprises together owing substantial shareholdings in an Australian company?
At first blush it would appear that this is a case of China take over fear, however there is much more to the story than this. Indeed, there is a legal/regulatory story here as well. Now I am not trying to say there is or isn’t a China phobia here, it is a given that all nations have their own xenophobic tendency, however I cannot speak on this as I know very little about Australia and what I do know comes from watching Rugby, Crocodile Dundee and Steve Irwin (may he rest in peace). Moreover, while I am not versed in Australian law, I believe that my legal training and experience thus far permits me an insightful comment or two.
This question has come to the fore because of the increased interest of Chinese companies in Australia´s mineral wealth – this is in fact a global trend and not one peculiar to Australia – just take a look at the recent attempt by Chinalco to increase its stake in Rio Tinto to see my point.
In Australia it isn’t that two or more state entities is per say barred from investing in the same company, as the law currently is, not at all. Then what is the problem, you might ask? The issues here are the concepts of associated entities and substantial shareholdings.
You see in Australia, under their securities regime, two or more entities that are associated – related in some way, namely through ownership and control – that combined own more than 5% of a listed company must declare a substantial shareholding. However, due to a lack of clarity in the law and the absence of a clear policy position the question remains open if two or more Chinese state owned companies would be considered associated and required to declare a substantial shareholding?
The securities regulators face several related sub-problems and they must approach this issue with some degree of sensitively to the political nature of dealing with entities belong to another state. With that in mind regulators have to be cognizant of the fact that they are not dealing with subsidiaries here but foreign state owed companies; state ownership is not equal in all these enterprises; state control is not equal in all these enterprises; and these enterprises while having the same state owner might indeed be fierce competitors with opposing interests.
I do not envy the regulators their task but it will be interesting to watch what if any policy position is developed or if the law is changed to address this issue.
The Swiss Banking Business Model Faces Realignment
First posted on Commercial Law International on June 29, 2009.
The world economic down turn has had many knock on effects, many of which unexpected. It seems that bad times has the uncanny effect of making the once unthinkable, unsayable and undoable all very much possible.
The Swiss banking model can be best characterized with one word: Secrecy.
This don’t ask, don’t tell attitude is more than just a business model – it is enshrined in Swiss law. The high protection that client confidentiality receives in Switzerland has made it a favorable destination for the money of my high net worth individuals wishing to shield their money. Also it doesn’t hurt that it also has a very favorable tax policy as well.
This Swiss shield unfortunately is not very discriminating – it basically protects all comers. It makes no distinction between those who wish to shield their money for legitimate or illegitimate purposes. Moreover, it doesn’t even a make a distinction between rightfully and ill gotten gains. This hands off approach while very profitable has lead to some very tragic and embarrassing incidents for Switzerland. Specifically, I am mainly speaking of Nazi accounts filled with plunder during their rise and fall but generally I am also referring to Swiss banks being the preferred destination for the money of certain criminal elements and many a dictator.
Please don’t get me wrong, I am not trying to say that the Swiss actively seek out ill gotten gains – to my knowledge they do not – nor am I saying that they have done nothing to try and rectify ill gotten gains ending up in their banks, I am not trying to say that at all. Then what am I trying to say?
What I am trying to say is simply this: any system predicated on secrecy will have its limits on how well it can tackle the twin issues of legitimacy and source of funds.
However, times they are a changing.
This change is evidenced by four things. The first is a long and as yet to be resolved battle between UBS and US authorities over the names and identities of some of the banks US clients and with it opposing interpretations of the US-Swiss Tax Treaty. The second is the OECD´s tax haven black list, talk of G20 nations developing a sanctions regime aimed at tax heavens and the drive by OECD countries and in particular the US to conclude double taxation agreements. The third is the revised US-Swiss double taxation treaty. And lastly is the current economic climate.
All of this has forced the Swiss into re-think mode. As reported in the Financial Times: leading members of the Swiss Private Bankers Association have recognized they may have to raise tax compliance with clients and, if necessary encourage them to declare previously hidden assets.
Does this mean an end to secrecy as the cornerstone of the Swiss banking model?
Highly unlikely. However, it does mean a few rays of light into the otherwise dark room of secrecy called the Swiss banking model.
GreenTech War: Japan, China, Lithium, Batteries and Bolivia
First Posted on Commercial Law International on July 6, 2009

Bolivia: The Saudi Arabia of Lithium
A potential GreenTech war is brewing between Japan and China, location Bolivia.
The salt flats of Bolivia´s Salar De Uyuni, where most recent James Bond movie was shot (Quantum of Solace) seems like the most unlikely place for a green technology war, much less one between Japan and China. However, it very much is. Both countries through official diplomatic overtures and through its multi-nationals have sought to secure stable supplies of lithium.
Why lithium?
Well, given current technology, lithium is the key to battery power. And while batteries power all kinds of devices, it is the key to the electric car – I think you are seeing where I am going with this. Whoever control´s the lithium, controls the electric car.
Currently Chile is the world largest producer of the metal; however Bolivia has half the world´s proven reserves. According to the Times, ¨Bolivia is to lithium what Saudi Arabia is to oil.¨
It looks like the Salar De Uyuni could soon become much more than just a 007 film location, to being a linchpin in the world´s effort to curve carbon emissions. Let´s hope along with this the people of Bolivia see some true developmental benefits and the reduction of poverty from this greentech war.
The Cozy Bank-Law Firm Relationship May Not Be So Cozy After All…These days Anyway, Part II.
First posted on Commercial Law International on June 17, 2009.
This is case that has the potential to redefine the very cozy relationship law firms have with their banker clients. No longer will bankers be given blanket coverage under conflict of interest rules to prevent law firms from being representatives in claims brought against them.
The operative word here being potential, as you shall will see.
The relevant facts of the case in brief are as follows: the defendants in the case included the underwriting syndicate of Gammon Gold´s public share offering. Two member of the syndicate included BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc. and TD Securities Inc., both subsidiaries of BMO and TD respectively. It just so happens that Siskinds, who represented the representative plaintiff, McKenna, in the class action, was concurrently retained by BMO and TD to undertake debt enforcement and personal bankruptcy matters. As a result the defendants raised the issue of conflict of interest, seeking to get Siskinds removed from the case.
The judge in the case, Madame Justice Lax, was having none of it; holding that there was no conflict. In her ruling Justice Lax made it clear that ¨the underwriters and banks are separate and sophisticated business and legal entities that are individually governed and autonomous. She went on to say further that ¨the banks had no reasonable expectation that their subsidiaries would be treated as clients.¨
And rightly so. While I fully agree with the judgment, it still remains unclear how it will be received by banks but more importantly, law firms. This is why I said it has the potential to redefine the bank-law firm relationship. It will all depends on how it is read. If the case is read very narrowly and confined to the particular facts of the case, that is where there is a parent and subsidiary relationship and they are separate, sophisticated business and legal entities, individually governed and autonomous, then there is no conflict. This is the extreme and I don’t believe that it will be this narrowly read. However, I do believe that there is the strong potential for it to be read narrowly enough as to preserve largely if not totally the existing regime. It will all depend on the mood (i.e. economic conditions) of the law firms I guess.
On the other hand, if the decision is read more globally, it could usher in a new era of freedom to act o the part of law firms. I hope it is the latter; however, I would not be surprised if it is some form of the former.
In a passing note in Part I of this post I referred to lawyers as attack dogs, this was meant as no offence – I even referred to myself as an attack dog in training. However it was said to provoke some self examination and self evaluation on the part of myself and those more senior in the profession. All too often clients see us in that role and we sometimes do little or nothing to disprove this perception. While I know that I have a long way to go in the profession, I am after all only an articling student, for me; a lawyer is an advocate, a professional that aggressively safeguards the interest s of their clients, however, this dusty must be balance against other professional and personal considerations.
Am I wrong or just being naive?
The Cozy Bank-Law Firm Relationship May Not Be So Cozy After All…These Days Anyway, Part I
First posted on Commercial Law International on Jun 5, 2009.
In Canada an Ontario Superior Court of Justice ruling (McKenna v. Gammon Gold Inc.) has the potential to go viral like the latest YouTube sensation and challenge what can only be called one of the most incestuous relationships in the commercial world.
What am I talking about?
Well I am referring to the relationship, the very close relationship, between banks and law firms.
Ever wonder why, if and when, a bank or other financial institution is being sued it is very rare to find a big name law firm representing the plaintiff but they are very much present to represent the defendant bank? This my friends is no coincidence, it is a deliberate strategy on the part of the banks and other financial institutions. They set out to exploit the conflict of interest rules that lawyers are bound by – a lawyer may not generally represent two clients on opposite sides on the same matter – and they do a very good job of it. This is evidenced by the fact that banks and other financial instructions will spread the legal work they have around to as many international, national, regional and local based (powerhouse) law firms as they can in any market they operate.
The strategy is simple but effective: tie up the biggest, the brightest, the best and if need be the most belligerent legal talent out there. The benefits of this strategy accrue to banks in two significant and interconnect ways. The first is that they have the best legal talent working for them on ordinary transactions while at the same time having them in reserve ready to be unleashed like a pack of attack dogs. The second, which flows from the first, is that having such well trained and impressive attack dogs – oh sorry, I mean lawyers – at the ready will and does inspire fear in not only prospective claimants but other lawyers as well (though most would not admit it).
The law firms are not entirely innocent here, in fact not at all. They are willing subjects or is that objects of the strategy to exploit the conflict of interest rules. They enter this relationship; in fact they actively seek to forge these links, with their eyes, arms and billable hour’s dockets´ all wide open. Law firms know that the work from the banks is not only constant but very lucrative as well, so they are more than happy to be attack dogs for hire.
However, we now live in different times, as this once cozy relationship is being undone or at least it has hit a rocky patch called the current global recession. Whoever first said: it´s all about the money was so right. It is indeed all about the money for both banks and law firms. The former having less work to spread around now is also lacking a commercial rational that would satisfy shareholder costs´ accountability of having such high paid attack dogs in reserve. Consequently, the banks are now looking to cut costs and have aggressively gone after external legal costs reducing the number of attack dogs – sorry, I mean lawyers – it holds in reserve and how much it pays them.
The law firms for their part, seeing the writing on the wall have, have begun to seek out other clients. In fact this has resulted in the once impossible, law firms, well at least in this case, have begun to represent claimants against the banks.
The conflict of interest rules once untested and applied broadly, I would say too broadly, to the bank-law firm relationship is now set for realignment. No longer will law firms simply refuse or not actively seek out work, simply because a suit might be brought against one of their clients. I know I am only an attack dog in training- pardon me, I should say student at law – but my reading of the conflicts section of the Ontario Rules of Professional Conduct does not support such a broad application. Provided the issues are not related, the clients’ information in possession of the lawyer bares no relevance to each other and the lawyers that handle each client´s matter are different, it is difficult to see where a conflict of interest would be created.
Thankfully I don’t have to stand alone in my opinion. I now have Justice Lax in McKenna v. Gammon Gold Inc. to back me up when she ruled that Siskinds should not be disqualified for a conflict of interest from prosecuting a class action against an underwriting subsidiary of a client bank that it acts for in separate matters.
And how so? Well you are just going to have to stay tuned for part two.
Privy Council In Bank Ruling Wraps Jamaican Judiciary On the Knuckles, Part III
First posted on Commercial Law International on May 19, 2009.
Injunction, injunction, what´s your function?
Sorry I just could not resist. Despite my lame attempts at a joke, it is a very valid question.
What is the function of an injunction?
It is a power whereby the court may order positive action be taken or an order to refrain from acts being currently done. It may be granted at the interlocutory (that is to say at any stage before the end of a trial) or it could form part of a judge´s final judgment. In either case it is a very powerful tool of the courts and one that is not exercised lightly. Special attention, however, should be paid to the interlocutory injunction as it is a pre-trial determination, it is also a subject on which the Privy Council had a few choice words for both the Jamaican judiciary and Jamaican Bar in National Commercial Bank Jamaica Limited vs. Olint Corporation Limited.
The interlocutory injunction is best thought of as a pause button. It is designed to freeze in place the item that is in dispute by ideally preserving the status quo. However, we do not live in a static world and there are going to be winners and there are going to be losers with such an order – you could go as far as saying such an order creates only losers and worse losers. This is why judges are or ought to be extremely cautious in the exercise of this discretion. It should not be that the making of such an order – one that is done without the full rigors of a trial – be determinative of the (main) issue or issues in dispute. This is why judges look to what is called balance of convenience (American Cyanamid Co v. Ethicon Ltd) or more accurately the balance of inconvenience. As Lord Hoffman explains in the NCB case, ¨the basic principle is that the court should take whichever course seems likely to cause the least prejudice to one party or the other.¨
Having decided that Mr. Justice Jones was correct in the first instance to dismiss the case, holding that there was no triable issue, their Lordships had no need to go any further. However (a favorite word of a lawyer), their Lordships went on to deliver a dicta that wrapped the knuckles of the Jamaican judiciary and Bar – as would a school master a disobedient pupil in days of old. As many a current and former law student come to learn, while the ratio of a case deals with the issues at hand, it is often the dicta though said by the way, that is the most significant aspect of a judgment. And this I believe is the case here.
Their Lordships wanted to point out, provide some guidance and in a display of judicial politics, gave the Jamaican legal establishment scolding – that was at times not so well veiled.
There were two features of this case that troubled the Privy Council. The first was that, ¨there appears to have been no reason why the application for an injunction should have been made ex parte, or at any rate, without some notice to the bank.¨ An injunction applied for and given without presence or notice to the other party ought to be a very rare thing, ¨although the matter is in the end one for the discretion of the judge, audi alterem partem is a salutary and important principle.¨ Audi alterem partem – sorry for the Latin but it had to be done - is a fundamental tenet and a cornerstone of justice and cannot be trotted on lightly. It is the right for the other side in a dispute to be heard – like I said a cornerstone of our justice system.
Given the facts of the case, especially the nature of what was in dispute, there should have been no reason why the application for the injunction should not have been inter partes but at a minimum with there should have been some notice to the bank. As their Lordships pointed out, ¨any notice is better than none.¨ The guidance provided to judges considering such applications was made by Lord Hoffmann in no uncertain terms. He lays down the law (literally), ¨that a judge should not entertain an application of which no notice has been given unless either giving notice would enable the defendant to take steps to defeat the purpose of the injunction…or there has been literally no time to give notice before the injunction is required to prevent the threatened wrongful act.¨ The italics are Lord Hoffmann´s. Lord Hoffmann further went on to point out these two conditions are enshrined in the Section 17.4 (4) of the Jamaican Civil Procedure Rules 2002.
What characterizes both these alternatives is a sense of urgency. Olint it would seem feared that the immediate closure of its accounts would prejudice it in its main action against the bank. However such fears are not substantiated by the facts of the case. Not only was Olint given ample notice, they were given an extension. Moreover, the closure of a bank account, with or without extensive notice, is not sufficient grounds on which to say that there was no time to give notice. Their Lordships wondered why, ¨no explanation has been given for why it was not possible for the bank to be given notice of the application.¨
However, it was later explained to their Lordships that such last minute ex parte applications had become common practice in Jamaica. The recent cases of World Wise Partners Ltd v RBTT (2008) and Smith v NCB (2008) were cited as examples.
The Privy Council, expectedly, took exception to such blatant disregard for the law and the Civil Procedure Rules by both the judiciary for granting such injunctions and the Bar for applying for them. They went on to say, ¨these cases appear to show a disregard of rule 17.4 (4) for which no justification is offered. If the rule is not generally enforced, plaintiffs will be encouraged to make a tactical use of the legal process which should not be allowed.¨
Like I said a wrap on the knuckles – actually in legal terms a wrap is highly understating things.
The second feature that troubled the Privy Council was the way in which both Smith J and the Court of Appeal applied the balance of convenience test in the refusal, in the case of the former, and the granting, in the case of the latter of the interlocutory injunction. The basic principle that both had to be mindful of, ¨is that the court should take whichever course seems likely to cause the least irremediable prejudice to one party or the other.¨ Moreover, ¨what is required in each case is to examine what on the particular facts of the case the consequences of granting or withholding of the injunction is likely to be¨
It appears that what the Jamaican courts did was first to characterize the injunction as either mandatory (requiring positive action) or prohibitory while applying the balance of convenience test. Each requires different factors to be taken into account. A mandatory interlocutory injunction would require a ¨high degree of assurance¨ that the applicant would be prejudiced by its refusal, while a prohibitory interlocutory injunction required a ¨serious issue to be tried.¨ At first instance Mr. Justice Jones characterized it has mandatory and refused to grant it while the Court of Appeal characterized it as prohibitory and granted it.
As it turns out the judge at fist instance was correct in result but not in his reasoning. Because what matters is what the practical consequences of the injunction are, ¨arguments over whether the injunction should be classified as prohibitive or mandatory are barren (Films Rover International Ltd v Cannon Films Sales Ltd). Their Lordships made it clear that they ¨consider that this type of box-ticking approach does not do justice to the complexity of a decision as to whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction.¨
Yet another wrap on the knuckles….Ouch.
It will be very interesting to see what that reaction of the judiciary and Bar will be in Jamaica. This may be a bitter pill to swallow; however, to my mind their Lordships are wholly correct in fact and in law.
Privy Council In Bank Ruling Wraps Jamaican Judiciary On the Knuckles, Part II
By: Ainsley Brown
The claims advanced by Olint, though ultimately would proven to be groundless is very important because it, gave us a brief glimpse into the subtleties of judicial politics. Before I go any further some context by way of an example I believe would be useful. The words with all due respect, seem quite mundane or you could even say respectful, however, not so in a court room – it is quite disrespectful. The respect for a judge and his or her court room flow naturally from their position and there is no need to remind the judge that you are being respectful. This is something that lawyers and judges know alike, so whenever such words are uttered it is code for hey, judge I am right and you are just full of it – like I said disrespectful.
Though totally unrelated to the case, this example illustrate the point nicely, that words matter and that in the politics of the courtroom they often have much greater meaning than they seem at first glance. Now back to the case.
Olint´s first argument would provide the ground for strongest rebuke by their Lordships of the Jamaican Court of Appeal. Lord Hoffmann even went as far as calling out the reasoning or better yet lack thereof of one of the judges of the Court of Appeal – a one Morrison JA. In the Court of Appeal Morrison JA criticized Mr. Justice Jones, at first instance for disposing of the matter by way of mini-rail, holding that the matter gave rise to a serious issue and ought to be tried. However, Lord Hoffmann goes on to point out, saying of Morrison JA that ¨ he did not explain what the issue would be and their Lordships consider that one has only to read section 4(3) (c) to see that it is irrelevant to any issue in this case.¨
This is Lord Hoffmann´s way of saying: your work is sloppy and you don’t know what you are talking about. Like I said a strong rebuke.
The claim, by the way, was that s. 4(3)(c) of the Banking Act had modified the bank´s contractual right to terminate the banking relationship by giving reasonable notice. Unfortunate for Olint s. 4(3)(c) of the Banking Act is part of the general fit and proper licensing provisions of s.4, under which the Bank of Jamaica grants licenses. It therefore does not take a legally trained mind to see that Olint is simply fishing and that there is not only no serious issue here but no issue at all – no wonder the strong rebuke.
The second argument advanced by Olint was that NCB by closing its accounts was abusing its market position. As I like to call it, and to put it in the Jamaican vernacular: dem a fight gainst man (translated: they are opposed to us) argument. This argument while it has great cultural resonance, and it could be argued reflects a commercial reality; it however has no basis in law.
Firstly, no evidence was furnished that NCB did indeed have a dominant position in the commercial banking sector in Jamaica. However, their Lordships did take judicial notice that NCB was ¨the second largest in Jamaica, with 34-37% of total loans and 30-35% of total deposits, but the Bank of Nova Scotia is larger and there are four other commercial banks in Jamaica, to say nothing of the foreign banks. They are all in competition with each other. It is not easy to acquire dominant position in the banking market.¨ Secondly, even if NCB had a dominant market position the refusal to continue be Olint´s banker does not procure for NCB some market advantage. If anything it does quite the opposite by enabling ¨competitors to pick up another customer if they felt inclined to do so.¨
The third claim by Olint, was that NCB was attempting to induce breaches of contract between itself and its club members. Inducement of breaches of contract is a tort (a civil wrong) that would require not only that NCB knew that it would cause the breach of contract but that it intended to so ( OBG Ltd v Allan 2008). This by far was Olint´s strongest argument I think. However, their Lordships described it as a ¨hopeless proposition.¨ It will be remember from Part I that it was the refusal of Olint to furnish its audited books that kicked off this sequence of events. NCB could not without proper knowledge of the relationship of Olint and its members know or set out to cause breaches of contracts. What Olint was in fact saying was that NCB knew its actions would cause the breach and with this certain knowledge set out to cause the said breach of contractual arrangements. But how can you set out to cause or much less know that a breach would be caused in a contract that you haven’t even seen?
Stay tuned for Part III as it will deal with the injunction issue.
Privy Council In Bank Ruling Wraps Jamaican Judiciary On the Knuckles, Part I
First posted on Commercial Law International on May 12, 2009.
The House of Lords, with its Judicial Committee of the Privy Council hat on, as Jamaica’s court of final appeal, handed down a judgment that is set to have repercussions well beyond the interests of the parties involved. In fact the consequences of this judgment go beyond just banking or investing but engages commercial dispute resolution, specifically commercial litigation.
The injunction is a very important – that should read indispensable – tool in the commercial lawyer’s arsenal. It is a power that is highly discretionary and exercised with sensitivity to the peculiarities of the case which by the way includes the idiosyncrasies judge. It is a power jealously guarded by the judiciary and as a matter of judicial comity and judicial politics the power to exercise this discretion is largely left unquestioned, with limited exception, to a judge at first instance. Therefore, whenever a court, much less the highest one in the land, is critical of the way in which this discretion is or has been exercised by other courts all involved in the legal process have right to take pause.
However before I get into what I believe to be the more important aspect of the ruling I should deal with the ratio of the case – for the non lawyers/ non Latin speakers the ratio or ratio decidendi are the reasons or rational for a decision. It will provide not only context for the more important dissuasion on injunctions but will also bring to the fore the importance of this ruling to the banking sector n Jamaica.
National Commercial Bank Jamaica Limited vs. Olint Corporation Limited, is a case that exemplifies why commercial awareness is global.
The question that their Lordships had to focus their minds on was whether a bank, by giving reasonable notice, could lawfully close an account that was not n debit, where there was no evidence of the account being used for unlawful purposes? In the judgment delivered by Lord Hoffmann, ¨their Lordships have no doubt that in the absence of express contrary agreement or statutory impediment, a contract by a bank to provide banking services to a customer is terminable upon reasonable notice.¨
The facts of the case, in brief are: Olint provided administrative and other services to an investment club. The club allegedly derived its profits from foreign exchange trading which was proffered as an explanation for its high rate of returns to its member. It opened two accounts with National Commercial Bank (NCB) in 2005 and a third in 2007. Near the end of 2006 Olint, along with other investment clubs, began to attract very unfavorable coverage in the press . They faced allegations that they were operating a Ponzi scheme where returns to older investors were being paid out of money from newer investors.
It is interesting to note that Olint and other investment clubs sprouted up as a specific market response to the lack of investment alternatives, especially for the lower and middle strata of Jamaican society. In this respect they were in direct competition with the financial establishment - the commercial banks and other financial institutions.
In August of 2007 NCB as per its anti-money laundering and terrorist financing legal obligations – but no doubt also motivated by its concerns over the fraud allegations – asked to see the audited accounts of Olint. None was forthcoming. NCB being apprehensive that the allegations could turn out to be true, opening it up for reputational damage and or claims for negligent or dishonest assistance, decided to end is relationship with Olint. It wrote to Olint in November informing them of the decision to close their accounts on December 17 – a notice period of 32 days.
This action by NCB only added to the atmosphere at the time that NCB and the financial establishment were using at best the strictures of the law or at worst under handed tactics in order to remove the competition that Olint and the other investment clubs offered. To put it in the Jamaican vernacular: dem a fight gainst man (translated: they are opposed to us) . Unfortunately, even if this is a commercial reality and I offer no opinion pro or con, it finds no basis in law.
In response on November 21st Olint asked NCB for an extension to March 14 2008, NCB believing that this period was too long agreed to extend until January 14 2008. On January 1, days before the extension period was going to expire Olint without any notice successfully applied ex parte (from (by or for) one party) injunction preventing NCB from closing its accounts until January 15th. An application inter parties (between the parties) came before Mr. Justice Jones on the 17th and 18th of March. He dismissed the application because he did not find that it gave rise to a serious issue. Olint appealed and on July 18th 2008 the Court of Appeal grated the injunction until trail.
Based on the allegations in the particulars of claim served by Olint, it did not claim that the extended period was too short, ¨instead , it is alleged that the bank was acting maliciously, contrary to its statutory obligations under the banking Act and Fair Competition Act and with the intent of inducing breaches of contract between the company and members of the investment club.¨ their Lordship review each of these agreements and had no problem dismissed each in turn as being baseless.
Stay tuned for Part II.

RSS Feed





































