RSS FeedGeorgian Luger Dies as Olympics Commence…
I am going to start this off by saying it is with a sense of sadness that I write this piece.
Twenty-one year old Georgian luger, Nodar Kumaritashvili, died in a training run today at the Whistler Sliding Centre in Whister, B.C. It has been reported that he was travelling in excess of 140 km/h before the incident occurred.
A report by the Toronto Star said “he didn’t have a chance.”
I have seen the video (after doing some hunting around), and the impact was horrifying to put it mildly.
However, since this is a law site. Perhaps this may be too soon, but this incident is definitely going to need some analyzation. The Toronto Star also reports that this specific luge course has a particularly “nasty reputation.”
CTV luge analyst Chris Wightman said experienced lugers aren’t having problems on the course but that less experienced riders are finding it hugely challenging.
Had Vancouver Olympic Committee (VANOC) and the International Luge Federation ensured that this was a safe course? Was the fact that he had previously crashed on Wednesday play a factor into whether an action is brought against the committee?
Questions like these will reveal themselves in the coming days, but for the time being, our thoughts here (and I’m sure I speak for everyone) are with the family, friends, and luging community.
RIP Nodar.
Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants – Redux
Aimee Green of The Oregonian reports,
An attorney for Aurora Hill filed suit in Multnomah County Circuit Court Wednesday afternoon — stirring memories of a controversial 1994 suit in which a jury awarded $2.86 million to an Albuquerque, New Mexico woman who spilled scalding-hot coffee on herself, suffering severe burns that required hospitalization. Upon appeal, the parties settled for an undisclosed amount.
…She went into “nervous shock,” endured pain and has scarring. She seeks $7,182 for her pain and suffering, plus another $318 for lost wages and medical expenses.
See our previous posts:
- Driving While Under the Influence of Texting
- Defending Liebeck v. McDonald’s
- Liebeck v. Starbucks – The New Chapter of Hot Torts
Grant v. Torstar and the defence of responsible communication: implications for bloggers and users of other online media
In the recent decision of Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61 (“Grant”) and its companion case, Quan v. Cusson, 2009 SCC 62 (“Quan”), the Supreme Court of Canada sought to strike a more appropriate balance between freedom of expression and the protection of reputation by creating the new defence of “responsible communication on matters of public interest” (the “Defence”). The Defence allows defendants in libel cases where statements of fact are at issue to evade liability if they can show that they acted responsibly in reporting on a matter of public interest, even if the statements of fact are untrue. Prior to the decision, defendants could not avoid liability in these cases unless they showed that the statement was substantially true (the defence of justification), or that the statement was made in a protected context (the defence of privilege).
Importantly, the Defence applies not only to journalists and print-based publishers – the types of defendants in Grant and Quan – but also to non-journalist bloggers and users of other online media:
[T]he traditional media are rapidly being complemented by new ways of communicating on matters of public interest, many of them online, which do not involve journalists. These new disseminators of news and information should, absent good reasons for exclusion, be subject to the same laws as established media outlets. I agree … that the new defence is “available to anyone who publishes material of public interest in any medium”. [Grant, at para. 96]
[Emphasis added]
Although the extension of the Defence to non-journalist bloggers and users of other online media is an important recognition of the growing relevance and legitimacy of these groups, the Defence is – at least currently – unlikely to protect most members of these groups. To gain the protection of the Defence, the defendant must establish two elements: (1) that the publication is on a matter of public interest; and (2) that the publication was responsible, in that the defendant was diligent in trying to verify the allegation. The trial judge will determine the first element. If the judge concludes that the first element is met, the jury will determine the second element, having regard to several factors:
- the seriousness of the allegation;
- the public importance of the matter;
- the urgency of the matter;
- the status and reliability of the source;
- whether the plaintiff’s side of the story was sought and accurately reported;
- whether the inclusion of the defamatory statement was justifiable;
- whether the defamatory statement’s public interest lay in the fact that it was made rather than its truth; and
- any other relevant circumstances
In assessing whether the defendant was diligent, the jury will be guided by “established journalistic standards”:
[M]any actions now concern blog postings and other online media which are potentially both more ephemeral and more ubiquitous than traditional print media. While established journalistic standards provide a useful guide by which to evaluate the conduct of journalists and non-journalists alike, the applicable standards will necessarily evolve to keep pace with the norms of new communications media. [Grant, at para. 97]
[Emphasis added]
This indicates that the same journalistic standard must be applied to every defendant irrespective of whether or not they are journalists. As a result, the Defence will likely not apply to non-journalist bloggers and users of other online media unless they perform the due diligence expected of a journalist in the circumstances.
The problem for many members of these groups is that they are generally not guided by established journalistic norms. Although they may approach online publishing in good faith and with a level of diligence reasonably expected of non-journalists, this level of diligence is unlikely to meet the required journalistic standard. For example, although journalists will generally make a point of seeking the plaintiff’s side of the story and speaking directly to witnesses and experts, non-journalist bloggers – who are generally unpaid for their efforts – will rarely have the time, resources, training, or willingness to do so. As one American commentator argues,
blogging and journalism clearly differ. The former ‘implies that a disinterested third party is reporting facts fairly’ (Andrews, 2003: 64). Blogs are ‘unedited, unabashedly opinionated, sporadic and personal’ (Palser, 2002) – in many ways, the antithesis of traditional US journalism. Some say that is the best thing about them. ‘Journalism is done a certain way, by a certain kind of people,’ but bloggers “are oblivious to such traditions” (Welsh, 2003). [Jane B. Singer, “The political j-blogger: ‘normalizing’ a new media form to fit old norms” (2005) 6(2) Journalism 173 at 176]
[Emphasis added]
Even if a non-journalist blogger or user of other online media does engage in the level of diligence required to meet the journalistic standard, they may unknowingly fail to do so in a way that produces a strong record of evidence from which a court can conclude that they did act diligently. As a result, many of these defendants may simply not have access to the protection of the Defence.
Nonetheless, Grant does not foreclose the possibility that courts will apply a different diligence standard to non-journalist bloggers and users of other online media as the “norms of new communications media” evolve. Although the court isn’t clear on this point, these groups might be able to gain the protection of the Defence in future cases even if they haven’t performed their diligence in the same way that a traditional journalist would have:
While established journalistic standards provide a useful guide by which to evaluate the conduct of journalists and non-journalists alike, the applicable standards will necessarily evolve to keep pace with the norms of new communications media. [Grant, at para. 97]
[Emphasis added]
Even if the standard applicable to these groups does not shift to allow them to gain the protection of the Defence, juries – who have been tasked with the responsibility for assessing whether the defendant was diligent – may be sympathetic to these groups and apply the journalistic standard less rigidly.
In summary, although the Defence extends to non-journalist bloggers and users of other online media, many members of these groups are unlikely to be protected by the Defence because it requires that they performed the due diligence expected of a journalist. Nonetheless, the law does not necessarily foreclose the possibility that courts will apply a different diligence standard to these groups in future cases, or that juries will less rigidly apply the existing journalistic standard.
Originally posted on Defamation Law Blog
Law Suits and Public Relations
According to an article by Canadian Press, Loblaws has seen the light and will no longer sue the man ‘deemed to be at fault’ for a collision involving a Loblaws truck that caused the death of the man’s wife and 6 teenage boys. The legal action had been a lingering PR disaster that motivated outraged communities to push for a boycott.
Having spent all of 4 minutes considering the matter, I am struck by the lack of circumspect. This accident was a highly publicized tragedy that made front-page national news. Prime Minister Harper sent a letter of condolence to the school that the teenagers attended, according to CBC news, and no where in the coverage was the driver blamed.
This man was a basketball coach. He was driving a van that carried the basketball team plus his wife and daughter. It was winter and the road conditions were not good when the van fish-tailed on a highway and unspeakable tragedy ensued. This man might have been driving too fast, and his negligence might have caused damage to a Loblaws truck, however, from where I sit, public backlash seems a likely outcome of litigation. He made a horrible mistake and paid very dearly for it: He lost his wife, he could have lost his daughter. Many families in the community lost a son. Meanwhile, amidst all of this loss of life, Loblaws wants to recover for a damaged truck and lost inventory. This looks cold-hearted to say the least.
There is lesson to be learned here. As we graduate from law school and become involved in that financial bloodsport called litigation, we should remember that law suits do not occur in a vacuum. Even though the law says you can, and even if you’re impervious to emotional reactions to sympathetic defendants, you should consider the potential for public outcry. The client likely values his or her public profile more than money, and this applies whether the matter is civil, family or criminal.
From where I sit this seems so obvious … but maybe things look different after swimming in shark-infested water for a few years. Perhaps the real lesson is to remember what things look like from the outside when your on the inside.
Exclusive school accused of coverup
A lawsuit accuses an exclusive Ottawa prep school of refusing to make a sexual assault complaint to police after a 16-year-old boy was allegedly attacked by fellow students during a Grade 11 trip to Boston.
Protecting internet anonymity: the case for providing notice to anonymous defendants in defamation cases
An open issue in Canadian internet defamation law is whether courts should require that anonymous defendants be given notice of, and an opportunity to oppose, applications to compel the disclosure of their identities by third parties such as websites and internet service providers (“ISPs”). Because applications to compel disclosure are generally left unchallenged by third parties who would rather evade the costly cross-fire of litigation, courts have tended to review such applications ex parte. The concern in these cases is that anonymous defendants may be stripped of their anonymity – and thereby subjected to embarrassment, social stigma, or harm to their career prospects – all without an initial opportunity to anonymously submit a written response or retain counsel to oppose the application. This post discusses the status of a notice requirement in Canadian, American, and English law and evaluates the different approaches.
1. Canadian Law
Only one Canadian case has commented on the appropriateness of a notice requirement. In York University v. Bell Canada Enterprises, [2009] O.J. No. 3689 (S.C.J.) (“York University”) a plaintiff sought pre-action discovery by way of an equitable bill of discovery known as a Norwich Order. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice granted the Norwich Order, which required ISPs to disclose information necessary for the plaintiff to obtain the identity of the anonymous author of allegedly defamatory emails and web postings. Justice G.R. Strathy noted that it might be appropriate to impose a notice requirement, but declined to do so without providing reasons:
[I]t may be appropriate, in a given case, to require that the unknown publisher of the offending material be given notice of the proceedings. It does not appear to have been done as a matter of course in other Norwich order cases and I did not consider it necessary to do so in this case.
York University was discussed by other commentators in two excellent blog posts on Slaw: the first generally outlining the case, and the second commenting on specific points including the notice issue.
2. English law
The appropriateness of a notice requirement has received more attention in English law. In Totalise plc v The Motley Fool, [2001] E.M.L.R. 29 (H.C.), [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1233 (C.A.) (“Totalise”), the English Court of Appeal described the rationale for a notice requirement. In that case, Justice Owen of the English High Court first granted a Norwich Order that compelled a website operator to reveal the identifying information of an anonymous defendant that posted allegedly defamatory statements about the plaintiff. When the case was appealed on the issue of costs, Justice Aldous noted in obiter that it would have been desirable to require the third party to give the anonymous defendant notice of the application and then allow the anonymous defendant to make written submissions through the third party in order to better inform the court’s decision:
It is difficult to see how the court can carry out this task [i.e. whether to grant the requested order] if what it is refereeing is a contest between two parties, neither of whom is the person most concerned, the data subject; one of whom is the data subject’s prospective antagonist; and the other of whom knows the data subject’s identity, has undertaken to keep it confidential so far as the law permits, and would like to get out of the cross-fire as rapidly and as cheaply as possible. However the website operator can, where appropriate, tell the user what is going on and to offer to pass on in writing to the claimant and the court any worthwhile reason the user wants to put forward for not having his or her identity disclosed. Further, the court could require that to be done before making an order. Doing so will enable the court to do what is required of it with slightly more confidence that it is respecting the law laid down in more than one statute by Parliament and doing no injustice to a third party, in particular not violating his convention rights.
Although the obiter from Totalise is compelling, English courts have yet to impose a notice requirement. In the recent case of Sheffield Wednesday Football Club Ltd v. Hargreaves, [2007] EWHC 2375 (Q.B.) a justice of the English High Court dealt with a similar case and, after considering Totalise, concluded in the absence of reasons that
It did not seem to me that this was a case where I should require that the website users [i.e. the anonymous defendants] be contacted before making an order.
3. American law
American law, by contrast, strongly supports a notice requirement. In the leading case of Dendrite International, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. App. Div. 2001) (“Dendrite”), a New Jersey appellate court articulated a series of requirements for plaintiffs to meet before a court would order disclosure. The first of these requires that the plaintiff make efforts to notify the anonymous defendant that they are the subject of an application for an order to disclose their identities so that the defendants have a reasonable opportunity to respond:
We hold that when such an application is made, the trial court should first require the plaintiff to undertake efforts to notify the anonymous posters that they are the subject of a subpoena or application for an order of disclosure, and withhold action to afford the fictitiously-named defendants a reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition to the application. These notification efforts should include posting a message of notification of the identity discovery request to the anonymous user on the ISP’s pertinent message board.
Several notable American cases have adopted the same or similar notice requirements post-Dendrite: Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005); Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231 (Ct. App. 2008) (“Krinsky”); Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941 (D.C. 2009) and Swartz v. Does (“Swartz“) (Swartz, the most recent of these cases, was discussed in a previous post).
4. Analysis
Although both English and American jurisprudence supports a notice requirement, the approaches differ: while Totalise advocates imposing the requirement on third parties, Dendrite and subsequent American cases have consistently imposed the burden on plaintiffs. The problem with the later approach is that plaintiffs are generally in a relatively poor position to give reliable notice because, unlike third parties, they lack access to the defendant’s contact information. As a result, Dendrite and subsequent American cases have merely required plaintiffs to provide indirect notice by posting on the ISP’s pertinent message board, by posting on the same website or medium used by the anonymous defendant to publish the statements at issue, or, if the statements originated in an email, by sending notice to the anonymous defendant’s email address. The concern with these types of notice is their unreliability. There is no guarantee that a defendant will check these sources, or that the website or medium will still exist by the time the plaintiff commences action. And, in the case of email, a similar concern still exists due to the increasingly common use of disposable email accounts that defendants may abandon after sending allegedly defamatory statements.
Yet, imposing the burden of notice on plaintiffs may have some notable benefits. Unlike the approach advocated in Totalise wherein third parties would directly notify anonymous defendants, plaintiffs under the Dendrite approach generally have no choice but to provide indirect notice by posting in a publicly accessible forum. The public nature of a plaintiff’s notice will expose the matter to the oxygen of publicity and may affect the extent of the plaintiff’s reputational harm, depending on the context. In some cases, public scrutiny might result in further reputational harm if the public perceives the plaintiff to be unjustifiably attempting to silence the anonymous defendant. In other cases, however, public scrutiny might serve to alleviate the existing reputational harm by calling into question the veracity of the statements. Third parties might even be persuaded to mount a defence against a plaintiff’s application in cases where there is significant public support in favour of an anonymous defendant but they lack the resources to defend their anonymity.
Another option is to require both the plaintiff and the third party to provide notice. Although this approach would increase the reliability of notice and preserve the beneficial qualities of plaintiff-based notice, the approach seems redundant in the absence of evidence to suggest that the benefits of dual notification outweigh the costs. This is likely one of the reasons why the California appellate court in Krinsky rejected the notion of requiring a plaintiff to provide notice where a third party had already voluntarily done so:
When ISPs and message-board sponsors (such as Yahoo!) themselves notify the defendant that disclosure of his or her identity is sought, notification by the plaintiff should not be necessary.
In summary, a notification requirement imposes a relatively light burden on plaintiffs or third parties while providing defendants with the valuable opportunity to defend their anonymity and better inform the courts’ decision. Although a plaintiff-based approach may have some ancillary benefits, a third party approach provides more reliable notice and should be preferred because it best furthers the primary rationale underlying notice requirements.
Originally posted on Defamation Law Blog
Google Offers Free Ambulance Chasing Devices
Just like Google’s Street View feature, which followed a Canadian launch after being tested in the American market, Google introduced this month traffic levels for major Canadian cities after almost three years of use in the U.S. In the past week the service was extended from mobile devices to web browsing as well.
Toronto.com has offered much more limited traffic features for several years, but nothing even close to the level of detail or interactivity provided by Google.
Late this summer Google had expanded the service to include arterial roads, which was a major complaint among American users. They also rolled-out a crowdsourcing feature that would track the speed of vehicles using Google Maps on mobile devices to help determine best alternative routes during congestion times.
One bulletin-board user asks,
If I am walking down the street with Google Maps open on my BB, I wonder if this skews the data?
The response he gets from another user appears at first quite simple,
They average out the data… so unless you have a marathon of people all having google maps on for some reason, one or two people walking down a major street most likely won’t affect the traffic readings.
That assumes, like financial markets often do, that people always behave rationally. People do not always behave in rational ways.
Interruption of Question Period this week to raise the issue of climate change is just one of a growing phenomenon of flash mobs that could easily affect crowdsourcing data in the aggregate. Just look at the many flash mobs in tribute to Michael Jackson alone in past months.
Google also launched a mobile service providing GPS with features like 3D views, turn-by-turn voice guidance and automatic rerouting. The last feature would be especially useful in light of traffic conditions, and alternate destinations can be plotted by voice to comply with hands-free legislation in Ontario and similar laws in Saskatchewan, Alberta, and B.C. Users can also search by voice for services and landmarks along the way. Devices will be able to use the service in the U.S. starting Nov. 6.
In one of those more common moments of more predictable behaviour, the shares for GPS navigation systems fell by 9.5% for Tom Tom and 18% for Garmin on Tuesday alone, dropping further during the rest of the week. Still, many analysts point out that the mobile services available from Google aren’t comparable to GSP systems. Signals often cut out, and don’t reliably provide directions when they are needed. But Google can address this by caching information on devices instead of streaming, and in the long-term this will likely replace the GPS systems entirely.
Given the association between car accidents and traffic jams, litigators may be able to replace their police radio scanners with Google Maps and arrive on the scene before first-responders to offer their services.
They can find alternative routes to the scene through hands-free instruction and use Street View to get an idea of the physical layout before they arrive. They can even do it walking down the street if the traffic is really backed up. And barring a re-enactment of “Beat It!” en route to the accident, it doesn’t seem like anything can stop them.
Defence counsel, be forewarned.
Beware the libel
Simon Singh, a British journalist and a popularizer of science, is fighting a lawsuit. In his article for the Guardian, Singh wrote that the British Chiropractic Association (BCA) promoted bogus treatments. The BCA sued him for libel. Is it right that our words can cost us dearly? What about the freedom of speech? First of all, let’s find out what the freedom of speech really is all about. Then, let’s see why we have libel laws and what we can learn from the Singh case. The Internet gives everyone a potential audience, so watch what you say if you have libel laws in your country.
The Western culture loves the freedom of expression. In Canada, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms calls it a “fundamental” freedom that “everyone” has. In the US, the First Amendment prohibits Congress from “abridging the freedom of speech.” We value our right to speak freely, and we believe it is essential for democracy. It’s not surprising then that libel suits ruffle a few feathers. But constitutional laws like the Charter and the Bill of Rights protect our speech from the government, not from our neighbours.
Flu shots can give a different kind of immunity
Swine flu vaccine makers may get a special gift from the federal government: immunity from civil negligence suits. You may not have heard about it because other swine flu news recently got much more spotlight. First, Ottawa spent five times as much on stimulus plan ads as on H1N1 awareness. And the federal Health Ministry shipped body bags to aboriginal communities to help them prepare for the epidemic. But the story about legal immunity for vaccine makers is equally deserving of national attention. Taxpayers will foot any bill for the government’s protection of pharmaceuticals, and vaccine users may bear an excessive risk of death or injury. Although the US already offers immunity to vaccine makers, Canada is different enough to require careful study and discussion of this issue.
Immunity from legal suits in this case means if the vaccine is a suspected cause of death or injury, the law will not allow victims to sue the vaccine manufacturer. They may have no recourse at all, or the government may compensate them from a special fund. The immunity shifts the risk of mistakes in vaccine making from the pharmaceutical industry to victims or to taxpayers. Under the common law, negligent companies are liable for injury or death caused by their products. But the government can protect a company from the common law liability by statute or executive decision. The main reason is to bring vital products to as many people as possible faster and at a lower cost. The government may need as many vaccine doses as possible sooner to prepare for a coming pandemic. Protecting themselves from legal liabilities can slow vaccine makers down or make the vaccine too expensive. To get a lot of vaccine fast, the government shifts the risk from pharmaceutical companies to taxpayers or vaccine users.
Unless the government compensates victims, the vaccine makers’ immunity shifts the whole burden and risk of injury or death to vaccine users. The US government has granted immunity to vaccine makers after the 1976 swine flu outbreak, but it has set up a fund to compensate victims. This is essentially a specialized public health insurance fund. For a victim to take advantage of it, a special federal court must approve the claim. It’s also an insurance fund for pharmaceuticals because taxpayers pay for their negligence. It’s not clear if vaccine makers have to pay any premiums to get the protection. And no immunity is available for wilful acts, such as intentional tainting of the vaccine.
What about Canada? Are we at the moment of truth before the epidemic hits? Are the demand for the vaccine and the threat of legal liability so high that they are bogging down pharmaceutical companies? Or are vaccine makers trying to maximize their profits at the expense of Canadian taxpayers? The federal government refuses to tell if it will shield pharmaceutical companies from liability. GlaxoSmithKline, which has already signed a contract to make 50.4 million vaccine doses at its plant in Quebec, says only that it’s talking to Ottawa. It’s already much more difficult to sue for medical or pharmaceutical malpractice in Canada than in the US. Any immunity will lower the incentive to make vaccines safer, although they will not necessarily be less safe. We don’t know if the Quebec facility can simply conveyor doses out, or if more R&D and testing are required. Neither do we know if the vaccine will be mandatory taking away our choice between the risks of the swine flu and vaccine side effects. But even if the shot is voluntary, the government should require warnings before the vaccine is administered—that is, of course, if it makes us bear the risk of vaccine makers’ negligence by offering them immunity.
Crown liability for negligent release from jail
Father seeks compensation for son killed by pedophile
Bastien was out on an extended pass from a detention centre where he was serving time for several unrelated offences.
Three weeks after the slaying, then-public security minister Serge Ménard said Bastien shouldn’t have been let out.
Driving While Under the Influence of Texting
The use of cell phones while driving has become increasingly controversial, with some studies suggesting that the practice costs thousands of lives by slowing the reaction time of drivers.
As many Canadians have already heard, Ontario is passing Bill 118, a special piece of legislation that bans the use of cell phones and texting devices while driving.
There has even been recent fuss online of a man observed shaving his head while driving, but nobody is suggesting that electric shavers should be banned too. It’s possible that Liebeck v McDonald’s would be decided differently today – with drinking coffee while driving reducing the punitive damages even further under a more recognized state of contributory negligence.
Yesterday the New York Times provided driving game that readers can use to see how texting would reduce their own reaction time. Just don’t expect to use this test as a defence for a subjective test for impairment under the new legislation.
Oil Companies Murdering Activists in Nigeria
Catherine Boyle of the TimesOnline reports:
Shell, one of the world’s biggest oil companies, will go on trial over allegations that it was complicit in the execution of a well-known Nigerian environmental activist and author…
If the action is successful, the trial will be a landmark case on how global companies can be held accountable for human rights abuses in countries in which they operate. It is a test for the Alien Torts Statute, which allows non-US citizens to file suits in US courts for alleged international human rights violations.
h/t Daniel Ho
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