RSS FeedIslamophobia in Canada: A Primer
by Fathima Cader and Sumayya Kassamali
Ten years after September 11, 2001, the term “Islamophobia,” once largely obscure, has become all but inevitable when discussing contemporary politics. As Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden became household names, Western fear of the world’s 1.5 billion Muslims has also grown. Canada has been no stranger to this phenomenon. Despite its reputation as a haven of multicultural tolerance, one 2011 poll showed that 56% of Canadians believe Western societies are in “irreconcilable conflict” with Muslim societies. 40% of the 1500 respondents approved the profiling of airplane passengers who appear Muslim. As Canada enters its seventh year of Conservative rule, how are progressives to understand and respond to this trend?
Islamophobia relies on characterizations of Islam and its adherents as uniquely prone to certain things, such as violence and sexism, and uniquely hostile to others, such as democracy and secular government. It includes discrimination based on perceived religious identity, such that non-Muslims, including Sikhs and Arab Christians, have also been targets of anti-Muslim violence in cases of “mistaken identity.” Meanwhile, Muslims in North America who do not appear to come from the Middle East or South Asia, such as Muslims of European or East Asian descent, have been less centrally targeted in this blurry overlap of religious and racial discrimination.
In this primer, we do not attempt to cover every instance of Islamophobia in Canada in the past decade. Rather, we provide an overview of its broad assumptions, particularly focusing on two themes that have proven central to discussions about Muslims: sexism and violence.
In offering this analysis, we stress that responses to Islamophobia must be placed within the context of Canada’s ongoing conservative political shift — from its increased military engagements around the world to its anti-immigrant policies at home, and from its vast cuts in social service funding to its ever-increasing levels of state surveillance. While numerous civil liberties and human rights organizations have reported on the rise of anti-Muslim hate crimes in Canada, we emphasize that Islamophobia is not just interpersonal: it is systemic. In fighting it, therefore, we must engage with the many other forms of oppression that also organize Canadian society.
Keep it in Perspective
Trigger-Happy Plaintiff Feels the Blowback for Initiating Legal Action
A recent decision by the Supreme Court of British Columbia in relation to a costs application provides a cautionary tale for eager plaintiffs that hope to use the courtroom to wage their own private war on citizens exercising their right to free speech. In Scory v. Krannitz, 2011 BCSC 1344 , Bruce J. awarded special costs and double costs against a trigger-happy plaintiff that sued an environmental society and some of its members individually for merely speaking out against his application for a permit, even though his application had not yet been denied by the relevant municipality.
Although Bruce J. was hesitant to characterize the plaintiff’s actions as a SLAPP, her decision reflects the courts’ capacity to appropriately address meritless litigation that abuses the court system and harasses citizens exercising their lawful right to free speech. After acknowledging that free speech is essential to democracy, Bruce J. stated that special costs can be used as a “deterrent to litigants whose purpose is to interfere with the democratic process.” In comparison, the courts have traditionally been reluctant to use the existing tools at their disposal (e.g. the Rules of Civil Procedure) to deal with plaintiffs that commence SLAPP actions on the basis that such an application of those tools would be unprecedented or outside the purpose that the legislature intended for them. Given the provincial legislatures’ slow pace in developing anti-SLAPP legislation, it is necessary for judges to use the tools at their disposal to compensate the legislative vacuum. Read more
On democratic legitimacy of the courts
My last post talked about how judges work with each other’s decisions. Today, I’d like to take a bird’s eye look at the relationship between the judiciary and Parliament. Unelected judges handle laws passed by elected legislatures such as Parliament of Canada or provincial parliaments. How they do it helps understand why it’s ok for judges to be unelected and why we need an independent judiciary.
In Canada, judges do really only two things with laws legislatures pass (also known as acts of legislature or statutes). They apply them or strike them down as unconstitutional.
When judges apply statutes, they interpret them. Legislatures often cannot or do not want to spell out every detail in rules of law they include in statutes. But the only way a law can work is by affecting conduct of specific people in a myriad specific life situations. If somebody believes you violated their legal rights or broke the law, they can sue you or charge you with a crime. You can quickly give in if you know you have nothing going for you. In that case, you will apply the law yourself. You will adjudicate your own case in favour of the other side. You can also dispute the other side’s reading of the law. You will claim that in that particular situation, the law means something different, and you neither broke it nor violated anyone’s rights. Now a judge will have to adjudicate this dispute and impose his or her reading of the law on both sides.
For example, Parliament of Canada defines “invention” as “any new and useful art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter” in a statute called Patent Act. Harvard University created a gene making mice susceptible to cancer. A mouse with a gene like that can help identify carcinogens. Harvard University tried to patent the mouse in Canada, failed, and sued the government. Harvard believed that its cancer mouse was an “invention” under Patent Act, but the patent office didn’t. So it was up to a federal court judge to adjudicate this dispute, which basically came down to interpreting the language of the statute.
One reason it was ok for an unelected judge to impose his reading of the law is because the elected legislature implicitly allowed him to do so. Our Parliament chooses broad language for its statutes in full knowledge that some disputes over their interpretation will end up in the courts. The elected Parliament accepts that unelected judges will interpret its acts. If our elected politicians didn’t want the courts to interpret legislative acts, they would use more specific language or create special tribunals to interpret statutes. It happens all the time and is also known as ousting the courts’ jurisdiction. Basically, our elected politicians can shield entire areas of law from the courts, and when they choose not to they essentially delegate some of their democratic mandate and legitimacy to the courts.
Even when the courts do have the power to interpret a democratically created statute, provincial legislatures and Parliament always have an option of overriding the courts’ reading by clarifying or changing the statute. The term “dialogue” is used to describe this relationship between the courts and the legislators. When the courts ultimately decided that the cancer mouse was not an invention, they did their best, very democratically, to divine the will and intention of Parliament. They did not try to make their own ethical or political judgment, and they knew perfectly well that if they got it wrong, Parliament can always correct them by clarifying the Patent Act. Parliament didn’t.
So one huge responsibility of the courts—interpreting legislative will—is far more democratic and legitimate than some think. Of course, the courts’ other responsibility—striking down laws as unconstitutional—is a lot more controversial, but this topic is better left for its own blog post.
Pulat Yunusov is a Toronto litigation lawyer.
(Post sponsored by AdviceScene)
What can judges really do?
Judges are powerful people. Sometimes, misconceptions about their power lead to calls for an elected judiciary or some other form of outside intervention in our courts. These are all bad ideas. Our judiciary must be independent from all potential litigants (including the state). It is also sufficiently self-regulated yet flexible.
The most important principle of our judicial system is that it is passive. It never goes out and forces anyone to do anything unless someone asks it to resolve a dispute. An aggrieved person or organization (or the state) must bring a valid cause of grievance to the courts’ attention. The courts will generally give the party blamed for the grievance a chance to dispute the accusation. After reviewing the dispute, the courts will resolve it by granting or denying a requested remedy to whoever brought the dispute to the courts. Courts’ decisions are always about a specific dispute before them, and you must be somehow connected to this dispute for the courts to be able to force you to do anything. (There are important exceptions such as references by governments to provincial appellate courts or to the Supreme Court of Canada.)
For example, if someone wants to stop a neighbour from smoking because it harms their child, they would go to the Superior Court. A judge will hear from both sides and make a decision in this particular dispute. But that judge cannot outlaw smoking near children for everyone everywhere.
If another judge refuses to enforce an anti-prostitution law because she finds it unconstitutional, her decision applies only to the specific person who was charged with a criminal offence under that law and who alleged to this judge that the law was unconstitutional. The judge cannot force the police from arresting the next john.
A judge’s decision can be binding only on those who have something to do with the specific dispute before that judge. If a judge finds a law under which Mr. X was arrested unconstitutional and as a remedy orders whoever has custody of Mr. X to release him, he must be released as contempt of court is a criminal offence in itself. But if Mr. X is arrested again for doing the same thing later on, a different judge doesn’t have to order the police to release him. The original judge’s decision is not binding on a fellow judge. Even the original judge can strangely change his or her mind and deem the law constitutional.
But judges respect each other’s decisions. This respect is also called deference, and it comes in different sizes. Fellow Superior Court judges often find each other’s decisions persuasive but they defer to each other much less than they do to judges of the Court of Appeal. A losing party can ask an appellate court to review the decision of the judge who first heard the case. An appellate decision in that case will enjoy greater deference from Superior Court judges when a similar case come before them. They will simply know that if they don’t defer, their decision will probably be overturned on appeal because a panel of appellate judges will probably decide similarly to the previous panel if the facts of the case are similar.
In criminal cases, this motivates the police to respect appellate court’s decisions in similar situations because the police would be wasting its resources by arresting people the courts will likely release. On the flip side, a crack-down decision even by a Superior Court’s judge will probably encourage the police to arrest more people in similar cases, even if to force the issue to an appellate court.
But one panel of the Court of Appeal cannot really force another panel to do anything. That creates a certain intrigue in our judiciary. In theory, even an appellate court’s decisions are not binding on lower courts because the next appellate panel can agree with a lower court’s judge going against the previous appellate panel. Rinse and repeat for the Supreme Court of Canada. Basically, the idea is that judges have a great amount of respect for each others’ decisions, and the respect grows exponentially with the level of the court making the decision, but no judge can really force another judge to do anything.
Yet this is a very simple, literal view of the judges’ power over each other. In reality, lower court judges pay so much deference to appellate court judges that higher court decisions are effectively binding on lower courts. Also, a more accurate way to see the hierarchy of judges is not through hard power but through learning, evolution, and respect. It is a soft power structure that binds lower courts judges rather predictably but still leaves room for revolutionary decisions defying existing norms.
Pulat Yunusov is a Toronto litigation lawyer.
(Post sponsored by AdviceScene)
The purpose of blawgs
More than a year ago I wrote a post entitled “How lawyers think.” Its basic idea is that a lawyer’s job is to maximize legal protection of his client’s rights. Protecting rights means either of two things: one, letting the world know what your rights and their legal basis are, and, two, getting a court or tribunal to change the mind of someone who disagrees. Lawyers predict what kind of rights the courts will find that you have if it comes to litigation. That’s called giving legal advice, and that’s why lawyers think by imaging what would happen if this issue gets to court and how courts have decided similar issues in the past. All lawyers think about courts whether they are in litigation or not, and the courts is where the law becomes the law.
The previous sentence means that an act of Parliament is not really the law until the courts have adjudicated a dispute about what the specific legislative act or its provision means in a specific case. If all people understood the same text and applied it to the same facts the same way, we wouldn’t need courts. Lawyers predict what the courts will say the law is for the given facts, and litigators, in addition to that, offer judges their theories of what the law is in a given dispute. So advocacy in court is trying to influence the judge’s vision of what the law is and of how to apply it in this particular case. Without impartial and binding adjudication of disputes by the courts, the law is only what the strongest party (the police, the employer, the rich, and so on) says it is.
So if lawyering is predicting how the courts or tribunals will apply the law to a particular situation, blawging, in my opinion, is the same thing but by way of informal and accessible writing in a blog. A blawg should predict what the law is in some interesting case of current interest. A blawg is always a legal opinion, but it’s almost never legal advice, because it is addressed to a broad audience rather than a client. If I write about telephone number portability, the blog post should give a basic idea about what enforceable rights you will have if your telephone company decides to take your phone number from you. A blawg is not about what will happen, but rather about what you can reasonably accomplish by taking your case to a court or tribunal, if you have the time, the money, and the expertise.
In this sense, blawgs can be a little removed from reality because most people don’t have the time, the money, and the expertise to go to court. In fact, of those who do begin litigation, most never sustain it all the way to trial, which would be the first chance a judge will get to decide the case. That’s why lawyers, of course, must give practical advice in addition to pure legal advice, and it’s hard, and that’s why there is a disconnect between the public and lawyers. The client expects a solution and doesn’t care about the method, and the lawyer often must think in terms of courts because that’s all he or she may be qualified to do.
Perhaps blawgs can bridge this gap by educating the public about the law and teaching the public to self-regulate due to better knowledge of legal consequences. But unless we make access to the courts cheaper and easier so judges can hear and decide more cases that deserve to be heard and decided, blawgs alone will face an uphill struggle.
Pulat Yunusov is a Toronto litigation lawyer.
(Post sponsored by AdviceScene)
The monarchy in Canada
The recent royal visit offers a good chance to talk about monarchy in Canada. Besides just being nice Canadians, the people who greeted the newly married royal couple were often ecstatic, filled with genuine love for the two people, one of which has done nothing of significance while the other has never been heard of until recently. Despite a minimal role in Canada, the monarchy seems to enjoy support here, and the republican groups occupy the margins of our political discourse. But the history of the Canadian democracy is the history of overcoming the monarchy. All the good things we are proud of: the rule of law, democratic elections, and civil rights—emerged despite the monarchy and often out of conflict with the monarchy. Today, Canada’s democracy is the fruit of the monarchy’s defeat. The royals have zero power in this country. The Queen is Canada’s head of state only on paper, and many people don’t know or remember that this is the finale of a centuries-long fight between the people and the monarchy. But besides the remaining formal royal footprints on our political system, there are other, more substantial remnants of monarchy in the Canadian government and legal system.
The less monarchy we had in Canada, the more democracy we had. The history of Canada’s democracy is the history of pushing back the monarchy until it was reduced to a rubber stamp for our democratically elected legislators. It is the triumph of the Canadian democracy that the Royal Assent is a formality. Monarchs have not always been as likable as the young couple from London, UK. In 1776, the US Declaration of Independence called the British rule “absolute Despotism.” Five centuries earlier, English nobles forced their king into signing
Magna Carta—a historic document that granted civil liberties and limited the royal power. Magna Carta, a blueprint for modern democratic constitutions, came about in spite of the monarch. The barons basically fought with the king for their rights. That’s the role of the monarch in our democratic tradition: give up more and more power to the people as the royal vigour increasingly declines.
The era of the strong monarchy also represents the backward times of racism and religious discrimination. The monarchy itself remains discriminatory: no Catholics and no bloodline outsiders. If any Canadian institution used the rules of succession to the British throne, the public would ostracize that institution and the courts would probably stop the practice. But the Ontario Superior Court of Justice refused to apply anti-discrimination provisions of the Charter to the rules of succession to the British throne. In 2003, Justice Rouleau of the Superior Court essentially recognized the British throne and the Queen as a foreign institution governed by foreign rules inherited by our constitution (O’Donohue v. Canada, 2003 CanLII 41404 (ON SC)). Since we can’t change the foreign rules and we can’t change our constitution, we are stuck with the discriminatory foreign monarchy.
Some of the best things about Canada are the rule of law, civil liberties, and a democratically elected legislature. The view that the monarchy somehow links us to the English legal and political tradition that gave us all those things is quite absurd. We owe much of our legal and democratic tradition to England, but that tradition emerged in England despite the monarchy. Democratic rights and the independent judiciary were a concession by the monarchy in favour of powerful land owners, first, and the general public, later. Besides, much of our Canadian democratic tradition is completely domestic, and some was borrowed from the US. While we have two Constitution Acts, the UK doesn’t even have a written constitution.
When we see the royal couple on TV, we should remember that they symbolize an institution that fought long and hard against civil liberties, the rule of law, and a democratic legislature. That institution has completely lost its power as a result of this conflict. The people and the democracy have won. For some reason, we still allow the royals to live in palaces and act out a fairy tale at our expense.
But there are other dangers in the monarchy fetish, especially in its recent revival. Our government still retains some qualities of the monarchy. Generally, these powers of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet are called the royal prerogative. These are the powers that the monarchy has always enjoyed but that do not come from the constitution, an act of parliament, or the common law. These are basically the powers that the government has not surrendered to Parliament or to provincial legislatures. This is, for example, the power to have foreign relations. When the courts reviewed the Prime Minister’s decision not to request the repatriation of Omar Khadr, government lawyers argued that his decision was an exercise of the royal prerogative and not subject to Charter scrutiny. The courts have rejected this position (Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, 2010 SCC 3).
Besides the royal prerogative, the government has a wide array of powers that give it discretion in making decisions. Discretion means the government is less accountable about the rules and reasons it follows in making a decision. Often we want to give the government discretion for the sake of efficiency, but the courts must be able to control the limits of discretion and to overturn obviously unreasonable decisions. This is how the rule of law works.
Fascination with the monarchy can produce or can be a symptom of a lower expectation of accountability from the government. We may defer to the government more and more. The danger is when we start treating the government as a benevolent ruler. Governments are made of people, and people are corrupted by unaccountable power. The history of democracy in the UK and in Canada was a history of people taking the power back from the ruler.
The ceremonial formality of the Queen also breeds constitutional uncertainty, for example, when the Prime Minister prorogues Parliament so often that some parts of the public genuinely expect the figurehead governor-general to refuse to cooperate. She of course, did cooperate and that was the right thing to do from the legal standpoint, but the potential for a crisis exists.
Do we even need a head of state? It is an inheritance from the Middle Ages, when every nation had a powerful ruler. Modern democracies have leaders but they should be professional officials hired for a limited term, and nothing more. Prime ministers should not generate patriotic fervor. They must be professional politicians who embody certain popular political platforms. Let’s hope that prime ministers cannot mess up too much, and fortunately we have the ballot and the independent judiciary to hold them and their ministers to account. A foreign figurehead doesn’t really figure in this equation.
Pulat Yunusov is a Toronto litigation lawyer.
(Post sponsored by AdviceScene)
From 3 Kilometres to 3 Clicks Away
Most law students are not strangers to the limitless potential of the internet. The internet has been tamed for us to apply to write the LSAT(s), apply to law schools, receive our acceptance(s), select our courses, pay our tuition, download slides for some classes (which offer them), networking, blogging, applying for jobs, et cetera.
However, that list is currently missing an important use of the internet that law students should (arguably) have access to: online lectures of law school classes (in audio, video, or both).
If law students had the option of physically attending class or virtually attending class, which do you think they would prefer? Think both. Why should law students be “falsely imprisoned” into choosing how to attend class. The real issue here is that law students should have the CHOICE of attending class either virtually or physically.
The technology to enable this important choice is prevalent throughout our society. Podcasts, YouTube videos, and even online universities have allowed online learning and education to become reality – just three clicks away – instead of three kilometres away.
But who would benefit? Many mature students have revealed to me that law school is like an insatiable hunger that ravishes their time. I would even assert that the same comment applies to traditional students straight out of university. Law school undoubtedly sprints by and the pace can approach the speed of sound; hence, online lectures would allow students (mature or traditional) to choose the pace at which they can run (or walk) through the lectures. How I wish I could pause the professors in some of my classes and press rewind! Moreover, online lectures would offer students the flexibility to “attend” class according to their preferred time. Many nocturnal students would agree. Even the law school administration would potentially benefit from admitting more students, albeit some law students currently looking for jobs would raise an eyebrow to this.
While there is a plethora of advantages and disadvantages to carving out this choice for law students, the discussion should begin to take place and not be left to future law school administrations or students to tackle.
In essence, why not allow law students the freedom to choose how they want to attend lectures (virtually or physically) and learn the curriculum in law school? Just because something has been engraved in the past for centuries, logic (appeal to tradition) dictates that old is not always gold.
SCC on Funding Orders
Funding orders must be exceptional, says the Supreme Court:
‘For the first time the Supreme Court has ruled that superior courts are empowered to order governments to fund public interest litigation before statutory courts and tribunals. [...]
Brodsky suggested that “if governments don’t want the courts to attempt to deal with the problems that have been created by cuts to access-to-justice programs, then governments need to address the gaps themselves.”
She told The Lawyers Weekly “the possibility of obtaining an interim cost award can never replace the Court Challenges Program, or civil legal aid programs, that have been decimated in places like B.C. The limitations of the case-by-case cost-seeking approach are underscored by the decision in Caron in that the court confirmed that interim cost awards must be ‘highly exceptional.’ However, in reality, the circumstances in which the absence of public funding works a serious injustice are not highly exceptional. Such circumstances have become very ordinary in Canada.”’
Access Copyright: Outrageous and Unnecessary
As a UWO student (and at many other Canadian universities,) you automatically pay an annual fee to an organization called Access Copyright. An item is included in your student activity fee, and it used to be $3.38 per student per year, plus an amount based on the number of photocopies made at library photocopy machines. However, when the licence agreement expired last year, Access Copyright did not seek to renegotiate with UWO. Instead, it applied to the Copyright Board for a massive restructuring of the agreement. If the Board approves the request, Access Copyright would receive $45 per student per year. With 30,000 full-time students, this amounts to $1.35 million annually. But that’s not all. Access Copyright would also have the right to surveillance: Section 14 (4) of the proposed licence agreement states that:
The Educational Institution shall give Access Copyright, on reasonable notice, right of access through-out the Educational Institution’s premises in order to organize and carry out an audit, including full access to the Secure Network and all Course Collections.
This would include access to university email accounts.
There are a number of problems with the Access Copyright regime. First of all, every university student is presumed to be infringing copyright and this seems very unlikely given the Fair Dealing rights in the Canadian Copyright Act that expressly permit the copying of non-substantial portions of a work for the purpose of private study. As well, the university is presumed to be responsible for the presumed copyright infringement by students. This is contrary to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in CCH Canadian Limited v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339.CCD, which held that a library is NOT responsible for copyright infringement merely by providing access to photocopiers.
What is more troubling, though, is that by paying Access Copyright, our fair dealing rights become meaningless.
National Listserv for Social Justice Law Students
Are you a progressive law student in Canada? Join the Justice League!
Justice League-Canada is a nationwide listserv for progressive law students, articling students, and new calls. Its purpose is to create a national grassroots network, in which we can foster a supportive community of like-minded peers. One anticipated outcome of this is that by sharing resources and energy, we can do sustained cross-national work in our capacities as law students, advocates, and lawyers. Additionally, this space can be used to highlight job opportunities outside the usual big firm market, as well as to hone academic interests and assist local community organisations and campaigns.
If you’d like to join, please email justiceleaguecanada@gmail.com with your name and affiliation.
We’re also looking for help with French translation, so apologies for how heavily Anglo this callout currently is, but do email us/join the group if you can assist with addressing that bias.
Bringing Animal Rights to the Forefront of Correctional Services Reform
“Until we have the courage to recognize cruelty for what it is; whether its victim is human or animal, we cannot expect things to be much better in this world…we cannot have peace among men whose hearts delight in killing any living creature. By every act that glorifies or even tolerates such moronic delight in killing we set back the progress of humanity.”
-Rachel Carson
The sentencing of Anjalo Abeywickrema is an interesting one: he will have to go to jail for 4 months for his crimes and a 5 year ban on owning a pet.
But should if at all an individual go to jail for harming other creatures? Perhaps it is because people sense that an injustice has taken a place. A defenceless creature has lost its freedom and liberty to life.
I used to ask myself, “Why do some groups like PETA put resources towards better treatment of animals when there are millions of their fellow humankind suffering from poverty, environmental catastrophes, and war?”
My dad one day explained to me, “Son, when any creature suffers in this world, all of us suffer the consequences of that injustice.” I think his statement was a criticism to insensitivity towards injustice in any form that may take place.
I would argue that all social justice issues are inter-linked. In fact, I am optimistic that many sources of injustice can be solved with the same tools. In order to avoid the suffering of an animal we must investigate the sources of injustice. Are we as human beings genetically engineered to cause harm onto other creatures, or are we socialized? If we area socialized, then perhaps we can change that socialization in order to have better animal owners in the future.
When a human goes to jail for causing harm to his animal, people start to speak of the action of unnecessary pain. This increases sensitivity. When we start to talk about causing pain, we may even formulate solutions such as access to education and prevention instead of prosecution. Should we just put people in jail and throw the key away?
Historically, Canadian Criminal Law has functioned retroactively. In other words, someone like Abeywickrema acts with the intention of harming others in a way that is prohibited. Consequently he was punished by the Legal system. My question is, what proactive role if any should the Law and Legla professionals played in the past in educating the public regarding what is acceptable and what will send them to jail. Why not identifying the sources of sadistic behaviour?
I can tell you that as an immigrant, my family and I know no greater treasure than freedom. We travelled the planet to find a place where we can be free to speak our mind, wear the clothes we want, and many other freedoms that people take for granted. Perhaps it is time for the Law to teach people why we should not take our freedoms for granted. When an individual goes to jail to be “corrected” as the name of the government department foreshadows he/she does that at the cost of freedom and liberty: to my family and I, this is a heart breaking punishments because we come from a place where their Law has made the whole country feel like a jail most of the time!
I want to ask what deep failures in society have helped create an individual like Anjalo Abeywickrema. What kind of parenting; what kind of social and financial context; who educated this individual regarding his rights and how he can protect his liberties. Perhaps the kinds of behaviours that is acceptable for an animal owner? Despite the fact that people do have a choice in how they behave, this choice I would argue is always affected by social context, physiological stability, and many other variables and that is why the Law and Legal professionals need to be proactively involved in educating our communities.
My suggestion for the reform of “Correctional Services” comes from the Middle East. An interesting interpretation of Islamic Sharia Law is that people can only be punished harshly when they live in an almost perfect community without considerable social disparity. The Islamic community would have a role in socialization and identification of individuals who are in need of guidance.
In conclusion, when we are sensitized to the pain of an individual dog, we can no doubt become more sensitized to the deep social roots for the criminal’s actus reus and mens rea in the crime that he has committed. I would add to the famous saying by Ghandi “An eye for an eye makes the world go blind;” if someone has weak eyesight, let’s give him/her glasses before he falls into the ditch.
