The Infamous Box #4

By: Contributor · February 14, 2010 · Filed Under Criminal Law, Labour & Employment Law · 1 Comment 

Criminal record checks are increasingly being used to screen job applicants, and can hurt  your prospects of getting a job.

But should a recent speeding ticket (not a criminal offence) that puts you in the database allow an officer to check an ambiguous box that neither confirms nor denies the presence of a criminal record?

The Times Colonist reports,

The “may or may not exist” category — box No. 4 — is ticked when an applicant’s name turns up in police records for a wide range of reasons. Perhaps it was last year’s speeding ticket. It could be for being questioned by police about your barking dog or the fact someone noted your car’s plates while it was in the area of a crime being committed.

The B.C. Civil Liberties Association has long-standing concerns about criminal-record checks, said spokeswoman Micheal Vonn.

“We hear various stories about the infamous ‘box No. 4,’ and we are increasingly concerned, because not only has the amount of criminal-record checks increased but so has the amount of data that police are collecting.

“We understand there are very, very few guidelines and there are inconsistencies,” said Vonn, adding that what gets noted on a police database is often not verifiable.

“In the [fourth] box I have found, in assisting complainants, things that are so shocking and detrimental and prejudicial to their employment, such as police conjecture as to their mental health.”

The Life and Times of Ivan C. Rand

From Volume III, Issue II of Amicus Curiae, Western Law’s Student Paper

Canada was a different place before Trudeaumania swept the nation, and the man we know as Ivan Rand, founding Dean of this law school and former Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, was a product of his times.  It would be easy to dismiss Dean Rand as an intolerant bigot, but as William Kaplan explained to an audience at Western Law on Nov. 11, [2009,] Rand was complicated character.

“Canadian judicial biography has been, with a few exceptions, mostly uncritical and largely celebratory, written by unabashed admirers,” Kaplan writes in his new book, Canadian Maverick – The Life and Times of Ivan C. Rand. “To my great surprise, this book turned out to be different.”

Ivan Rand was born and raised in the Maritimes and graduated from Harvard Law in 1912. It was his exposure to the American Bill of Rights that, according to Kaplan, differentiated Rand from other Canadian lawyers. And it’s Justice Rand’s decisions as a Justice of the Supreme Court that make his legal legacy so difficult to reconcile with his private views, which have been largely hidden until now.

By 1951, the court in Noble v. Alley assessed a restrictive covenant against selling property in the Grand Bend area to Jews, blacks, or those with “coloured race or blood.” It was Justice Rand who interrupted oral submissions by the respondent saying,“If Albert Einstein and Arthur Rubinstein purchased cottages there, the property values would increase, and the association should be honoured to have them as neighbours.”

Despite his position on restrictive covenants in this case, he was a member of two restrictive clubs that excluded Jews. He defended the right of Communists to hold elected positions, and famously opposed the internment of Japanese citizens, all the while refusing to meet his sister’s Acadian husband for 30 years because of his background.

“It’s this hypocrisy – because he did know better – that ultimately leads me to conclude: first-rate mind, third rate temperament,” said Kaplan, noting that the most influential judges are rarely collegial consensus builders. “Not such a bad combination.”

What, if anything, changed during his lifetime?

Kaplan suggests that Rand’s exposure to Jews in the Palestine Mandate may have led him to develop a more favourable impression of Jews. Rand was impressed by the largely secular, often highly educated and industrious, and was sometimes even disdainful of the religious establishment of the Holy Land. He believed that rational law could resolve all human conflict, and was a social engineer at heart.

Robert Mackay, one of Rand’s colleagues at Western who would eventually succeed him as Dean, recalls Rand’s rants against Jews and people with ethnic names that ended with a vowel: “Rand would declare he had enough of them.”

Yet he continued to donate to Hebrew University in Jerusalem for the rest of his life. A forest in Israel was named after him, and he would tour the country receiving awards.

So what is Rand’s legacy for this school?

Kaplan tellingly notes, “Almost all of his great civil libertarian decisions reversed the actions of state authorities in Quebec.” Mackay explained, “Rand had to decide who he hated more – the French-Canadian Roman Catholics, or Jehovah’s Witnesses.”

Rand believed that ethics could not be taught – either you had them or you didn’t. Western is now known as a pioneer in legal ethics education.

The Ivan Rand window in the Moot Court Room looms menacingly above all those who dare try their hand at advocacy. Rand himself believed that mock trials courts were entertaining, but not educational. He preferred his old 1909 Harvard law texts for the students.

Rand felt that women were good as solicitors but did not have the fortitude for criminal law, a notion that would not bode well for our classes in which women outnumber men , the legal aid clinic, or our struggling criminal law program.

Dean Rand defied utilitarian economics by taking surplus budgets and returning them to the university, much to the chagrin of his staff. He abandoned the administration of the law school only months after its opening to attend to a coal crisis in Cape Breton.

Yet the students loved him.

The Rand formula, where workers pay union dues irrespective of membership, is still one of the hallmark characteristics of Canadian labour law. One of Rand’s recommendations (which was never adopted) was that unions be recognized as legal entities that could sue and be sued [directly, and not through agents]. Another was abolishing picketing altogether.

Overall, Kaplan describes Rand’s own hand at labour relations as nothing less than “disastrous,” with nearly every stakeholder and political party expressing strong criticism. “Reforming labour law,” Kaplan said, “is best done incrementally.”

As our own Dean Holloway acknowledges, “it’s difficult to write fairly about Ivan Rand… What emerges is a picture of a principled man, who thought deeply about the best way to enhance the standards of this profession.”

Kaplan suggests that what makes Rand impressive is his ability to draw bright lines between his public and private life, especially when on the Court. And for a man whose vision in many ways may have been ahead of his time, perhaps that is the most we can ask for.

Cross-posted from Slaw

Union Rights for Agricultural Workers in Ontario

By: Fathima Cader · December 15, 2009 · Filed Under Constitutional Law, Immigration Law, Labour & Employment Law, Legal Reform · 2 Comments 

Justicia for Migrant Workers and the Industrial Accidents Victims Group of Ontario Receive Intervener Status at Supreme Court of Canada:

For the first time in Canadian legal history, arguments relating to the plight of Canada’s migrant workers will be heard at the Supreme Court of Canada on December 17th, 2009. The Intervention brought jointly by Justicia for Migrant Workers (J4MW) and the Industrial Accidents Victims Group of Ontario (IAVGO) will be heard as part of Fraser v Attorney General of Ontario, which relates to the right to organize and bargain collectively for Ontario’s 100,000 agricultural workers.

J4MW and IAVGO will highlight the particular experiences of migrant workers and how their rights are being violated under the following sections of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms:
Section 1 (The Right to Guaranteed Freedoms)
Section 2.d (The Right to Freedom of Association)
Section 15 (The Right to Equality under the Charter)

From their factum [para 9-11]:

The Respondents have identified the social, political and economic profile of agricultural workers in Ontario. Specifically, they are described as “a large foreign migrant work force that is legally restricted to working in agriculture;” many of whom are “non-white immigrants who have recently arrived in Canada;” and who perform the “fourth most dangerous job in Ontario.”

The Interveners further submit that this Court must recognize the intersecting enumerated and analogous grounds of race, gender, disability and citizenship that underlie the occupational status of many agricultural workers – a status that supports conditions for their continued marginalization in Canada, and restrains their enjoyment of essential freedoms. That is, “agricultural workers” are not solely identified as a group because they work in a particular sector in the Canadian economy; they are also identified by immutable characteristics, that is, by the persons they are.

The Interveners further submit that “agricultural worker,” itself, is an immutable characteristic because of its roots in, and proliferation of, indentured servitude. Such proliferation is seen in the structures of the federal Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP) and other Temporary Foreign Worker Programs (TFWP) and, by extension, the agricultural industry. The essential dignity interests of migrant agricultural workers are undermined by the severe inequality and exploitation perpetuated by these structures. They are subject to stereotyping that limit the kind of work they are permitted to do in Canada.

Pay Equity: Did the Ignatieff Liberals Vote Against “a basic human right”?

By: Devin Johnston · December 10, 2009 · Filed Under Labour & Employment Law, Politics · 3 Comments 

Yesterday, Michael Ignatieff stated that pay equity is “a basic human right” and blasted the Conservatives who “[...] very clearly used their 2009 budget to impose their ideological opposition to pay equity for Canadian women.” I have to agree with Ignatieff on both counts.

Last year, I wrote a research paper for my Poverty Law class at Robson Hall (“Canadian Pay Equity Regimes in Context: Evaluating the effectiveness of pay equity dispute resolution mechanisms and remedies”) in which I compared the pay equity regimes of every jurisdiction in Canada. In particular, I was interested in access to effective remedies for women being paid less than men for work of equal value. In general, pay equity legislation only protects public sector workers, not workers in the private sector (although Ontario and Quebec also extend pay equity protection to some private sector employees). Most provinces and the federal government employ a legislative regime in which women may file a pay equity complaint either through a human rights commission or a dedicated pay equity commission.

The only exceptions to this type of legislative framework are the three western provinces: British Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan. Saskatchewan and British Columbia have both adopted equity frameworks – essentially government policies that require public sector employers to implement some form of pay equity through the collective bargaining process. Alberta is the only jurisdiction in Canada that has no pay equity protections whatsoever. Alberta, like British Columbia, does require that workers receive the same pay for “the same or substantially similar work” (the wording of the legislation in British Columbia is “similar or substantially similar work”). However, this does not constitute pay equity, as such. Pay equity requires equal pay for work of equal value, even if the specific job classes are substantially different. In other words, pay equity looks at the value of the work being performed, not the similarity of job descriptions.

The budgetary measure to which Ignatieff is referring in his statement is a provision of Federal Budget 2009, which promises to eliminate the role of the Canadian Human Rights Commission and Canadian Human Rights Tribunal in the federal pay equity regime. Instead, the government promises to integrate pay equity more closely with the collective bargaining process in order to “ensure that the employer and bargaining agents are jointly responsible and accountable for negotiating salaries that are fair and equitable to all employees.” Ostensibly, the government’s rationale is that the current system is “a lengthy, costly and adversarial process”; however, as Ignatieff indicated in his statement, there is reason to believe that the Conservatives’ real motivation is an ideological opposition to pay equity as such.

It is first of all worth pointing out that the government’s characterization of the current complaint-based regime is not altogether inaccurate. In fact, many of the early pay equity cases involving large public sector employers took years or even decades to resolve (see e.g. Bell Canada v. C.E.P., [1998] F.C.J. No. 1609 (Fed. C.A.), rev’g (1998), 143 F.T.R. 81 (Fed. Ct. TD), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, 27063 (July 8, 1999)). However, it would be wrong to conclude that a complaint-based mechanism for pay equity can’t work in practice, as I argued in my paper:

One of the lessons thus far has been that many of the delays in the current regimes relate to difficulty in understanding and implementing the complex technical requirements of job comparison. This issue can and should be addressed in a number of different ways. First, the highly technical and specialized nature of pay equity befits a specialized administrative apparatus including a binding tribunal that is institutionally separate from other human rights and labour bodies. The Pay Equity Office, Commission, and Tribunal model championed in Ontario and Québec is promising in that it recognizes and affirms the sui generis nature of pay equity within the corpus of human rights and labour laws. Decision makers within that apparatus will therefore be better equipped to apply the technical requirements of pay equity in a more expedient manner. The second (and related) point is that pay equity commissions should be sufficiently staffed and resourced so as to better assist non-unionized workers in bringing a complaint against their employer.

In any event, even if we were to conclude that a complaint-based model in unworkable, the collective bargaining alternative is even worse. Again, quoting from my paper:

The most glaring gap in pay equity law is the jurisdictional gap. While most jurisdictions in this country have implemented some form of pay equity legislation, scores of Canadian women enjoy no pay equity protection at law. This includes those provinces in which internal government policy affords only remote administrative law challenges to women in segregated jobs. Female workers in Alberta have no legal recourse to obtain a remedy for violations of their human rights in respect of equal pay for work of equal value.

The complete lack of legal protection for workers in these jurisdictions does not sit well with the characterization of pay equity as a human right. Indeed, the complete omission of any protection for pay equity in Alberta undermines the universality of human rights. Yet even among jurisdictions that have enacted legally-enforceable pay equity laws, the scope of the legislation has generally been limited to the public sector. Ontario and Québec stand alone in providing any pay equity protection to women in the private sector. Again, this limitation in scope to is a curious departure from the characterization of equal pay for work of equal value as a human right rather than as a policy decision.

The ultimate shortcoming of current pay equity regimes is not the principle of equal pay for work of equal value, but the lack of access to effective and timely remedies. While the complaint-based tribunal system suffers from many glaring flaws, the relegation of pay equity away from tribunals and into the collective bargaining process represents a major retrenchment of women’s legal right to a pay equity remedy. In this sense, I would argue that Ignatieff’s position against the measures outlined in Budget 2009 is the correct one. I would go even further, though, by establishing a dedicated pay equity commission and extending the legislation to cover federally-regulated private sector workers.

My one and only criticism of Ignatieff here is that the Liberals voted in favour of Budget 2009! Clearly, voting in favour of a federal budget does not imply endorsement or consent to each and every line of the budget. For example, the NDP’s support of a ways and means motion in September does not imply that party’s support for every line of the motion, so much as their desire for trade-offs in respect of employment insurance. For every vote in the House of Commons, politicians must engage in a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the good parts of a bill outweigh the bad parts. A great deal of horse trading goes on between all of the political parties, and this is not necessarily a bad thing.

However, a major point of contrast between the NDP and the Liberals is that the NDP has consistently maintained the position that human rights are non-negotiable. That is, while the New Democrats will make policy concessions within the legitimate set of options available to government, they will not endorse any bill that undermines fundamental human rights. This explains, for example, the difference between how the New Democrats and Liberals have voted on same-sex marriage legislation in the past (the New Democrats voted unanimously for same-sex marriage, save for one MP who was ousted from the party in consequence; several Liberal MPs voted against same-sex marriage).

To the extent that equal pay for work of equal value is a human right (and Michael Ignatieff seems to think that it is), doesn’t it follow that the Liberals voted in favour of against, in Ignatieff’s words, “a basic human right”? If so, what does this say about the Liberals’ attitude in respect of the universality of human rights? It seems to me that the undermining basic human rights appears to be a deal-breaker for New Democrats, whereas the Liberals are willing to vote in against human rights where it suits their purposes.

On the other hand, maybe I’m just grumpy from studying too much for my exams. In any event, Ignatieff’s change of heart on the federal pay equity regime is a welcome change.

Live-in caregivers

By: Law is Cool · November 25, 2009 · Filed Under Immigration Law, Labour & Employment Law · Comment 

Nanny wins landmark suit after Star investigation

A foreign caregiver brought to Canada with a job offer from a “ghost employer” has been awarded $10,000 in damages in what is believed to be the first court victory against a nanny recruiter.

AdviceScene

Labour Dispute May Still Affect Olympics

By: Law is Cool · November 23, 2009 · Filed Under Labour & Employment Law · Comment 

Even though B.C. passed back-to-work legislation for paramedics and dispatches in Nov., the ongoing dispute with the labour could still affect the Vancouver Olympics.

The Canadian Press reports:

Ambulance Paramedics of B.C. president John Strohmaier said the union is encouraging colleagues across North America not to volunteer at the Games until the dispute is over.

He said the issue could have been resolved if the province had appointed an independent, third-party commissioner to review the union’s concerns.

Instead, the provincial government has appointed an industrial inquiry commissioner who is a former deputy finance minister.

Don’t Smile when Depressed and Dancing with Strippers

By: Omar Ha-Redeye · November 22, 2009 · Filed Under Evidence, Health Law, Labour & Employment Law · 3 Comments 

Nathalie Blanchard of Bromont, Quebec, has been on sick leave for a year and a half for long-term chronic depression.

The 29-year-old woman had her benefits cut by IBM after she posted pictures on Facebook at a male stripper show,  her own birthday party and on holidays.  Her Manulife representative told her that,

I’m available to work, because of Facebook.

Ironically, most of these events were recommended by her physician as part of her treatment.

Depression is not like other disabilities where Facebook has been used to demonstrate lack of impairment.  The complex parameters of a psychosocial condition like depression is entirely distinct from factors such as range-of-motion, flexibility, and strength that are more commonly assessed in physical disabilities.

Thomas Lavin, Blanchard’s counsel, expressed similar reservations,

I don’t think for judging a mental state that Facebook is a very good tool.  It’s not as if somebody had a broken back and there was a picture of them carrying …a load of bricks.  My client was diagnosed with a major depression. And there were pictures of her on Facebook, in a party or having a good time. It could be that she was just trying to escape.

We don’t know if Blanchard was bipolar, or has a chronic pain condition that may affect the presentation of her depression disorder.  Although the inability to smile can lead to depression, those that do smile and possibly appear happy are not necessarily without depression.

And if we think about it for a second, Blanchard is not likely to select the photos of her sulking in the corner onto her profile.  Facebook photos go through a screening process, essentially attempting to put the “best face forward.”  What each person considers best, whether it’s attractiveness, professionalism, interesting, provocative, or wacky, does vary from person to person.  In Blanchard’s case, where family and friends likely know about her prolonged bout with the blues, it is not unreasonable to expect her to at least try to look happy.

Here are some more established methods of evaluating depression, that long precede the use of Facebook photos:

As persuasive as Facebook photos might be to a jury, it lacks scientific reliability and validity.  Insurance adjusters know this, and without corresponding clinical data to confirm any impressions, they should be reluctant to reject or terminate claims on the basis of photos alone without any context.

Cross-posted from Slaw

Strikers To Target Students…

By: Ryan Venables · November 17, 2009 · Filed Under Labour & Employment Law, Law School · 3 Comments 

No_through_traffic_sign2

Yesterday at 00:01, the London Transit Commission went on strike for the first time in almost 30 years.  The local 741 Amalgamated Transit Union and the City of London are, depending on who you talk to, either close or far from a deal.

As I am fortunate enough to own a vehicle and I have offered my spare seats to pick up other law students.  As I was driving in to pick up a friend, I was listening to the radio and I was glad to hear that UWO had decided to assist students by renting upward of 50 vans to drive students who live more than a 30 minute walk from campus to and from school.

The conversation quickly changed when in the hosts next breath he reported that Pat Hunniford, president of the local transit union, had declared that if UWO goes ahead with trying to provide transportation to its students, that his union would setup a picket line at UWO!

But, he warned, if the University of Western Ontario goes ahead with volunteer drivers using vans to move students, the union will put up picket lines at the campus.

Western’s unions have agreed not to cross those lines, he said.

“The students may get to classes, but they may not have anybody teaching them.”

The longer the strike goes on, the longer it will take for service to resume once a deal is signed, Hunniford added.

Although I understand the importance of unions, I feel that the potential of UWO’s unions holding a sympathy strike would do nothing more than hurt the students.  However, I digress.

Back to the LTC picketing UWO’s attempt to provide an reasonable alternative for its students.  I immediately thought of the legality of this.  In my two months of law school, we have covered cases like this, where the court held that it was illegal to strike on private property (see: Harrison v. Carswell (1975), [1976] 2 S.C.R. 200).

The next thing I thought, is whether the property flowing through UWO’s “boundaries” is actually considered private.  For this we can refer back to Harrison v. Carswell where in that case the picketing was occurring on a shopping mall’s property.  UWO much like a shopping mall has a direct invitation for people to come on its property to enjoy its use.  The dissent in Harrison v. Carswell argued the mall was a public place and as such could be used as such “revocable only upon misbehaviour (and I need not spell out here what this embraces) or by reason of unlawful activity”

However, public and private property in Ontario are also included in Trespass to Property Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. T.21 defines what property (aka premises) is:

“premises” means land and structures, or either of them, and includes,

(a) water,

(b) ships and vessels,

(c) trailers and portable structures designed or used for residence, business or shelter,

(d) trains, railway cars, vehicles and aircraft, except while in operation. (“lieux”) R.S.O. 1990, c. T.21, s. 1 (1).

As with this definition, it would be fully within the power of the UWO administration to prevent LTC picketers from setting up and preventing the transit of students to and from class.  Although I am probably missing something under various Ontario labour laws, I am not really prepared to undertake a full research project into the legality of roaming strikes.  Should my simple research turn out to be the law regarding this and should the LTC setup picket lines surrounding UWO, I would encourage the administration to take all necessary steps to ensure that students are not only able to have rides to school, but that classes will still occur.

Should the LTC begin to picket UWO and prevent students from obtaining a ride by UWO, any support held by students toward the union will quickly fall.

I applaud the university’s effort in assisting the students, and I, like many Londoners, hope the strike ends soon without holding the students or rest of London hostage in the time being.

If there is more by way of legality that you can add, please do so in the comments section… Thanks.

Belief in global warming protected from discrimination in UK labour law

By: Amelio The · November 7, 2009 · Filed Under Administrative Law, Environmental Law, Labour & Employment Law · Comment 

saint_goreImage From National Post via WattUpWithThat?

In the public policy debates over climate change, critics of strong action to mitigate global warming have often described proponents as “religious zealots”, and vice-versa. Moreover, since the concern over global warming has entered the mainstream consciousness, religious groups have been increasingly drawn to the discussion. Now, in the UK, a recent decision by an employment tribunal has actually equivocated belief in global warming with religious belief, for the purposes of workplace discrimination.

The case centers around Tim Nicholson, whose position as Head of Sustainability at Grainger, plc was terminated over what he claims was “contempt” for his beliefs about anthropogenic global warming. Nicholson alleged that his termination was due to his beliefs – which he argued should be protected from discrimination by the UK’s Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations of 2003.

In its decision this week, the employment tribunal ruled Nicholson would be allowed to bring his discrimination claim because Nicholson’s beliefs in global warming passed the tests formulated for “philosophical belief” for the purposes of the regulations:

From the tribunal’s ruling:

• The belief must be genuinely held.
• It must be a belief and not an opinion or view based on the present state of information available.
• It must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life.
• It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance.
• It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, not incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others.

Grainger Plc & Ors v. Nicholson [2009] UKEAT 0219_09_0311 (3 November 2009)

In no way could this ever be taken out of context by anybody on either side of the larger debate…

Reputation Management Law is the Next Big Thing

By: Omar Ha-Redeye · October 13, 2009 · Filed Under Civil Procedure, Evidence, Labour & Employment Law, Law School, Privacy Law, Technology · 1 Comment 

Tony Wilson, of Boughton in Vancouver, wrote in this week’s issue of Lawyer’s Weekly,

Reputation matters… But it’s not just companies and trade-mark owners who have reputations to protect. We all do, and these days, much of our personal reputation is on the web for all the world to see.

Like many professionals, physicians in Canada operate by word-of-mouth referrals, largely based on the personal experiences of patients or other referring physicians. RateMDs has become an increasingly popular site for patients to share experiences about their physician.

It’s become enough of a concern to physicians that Sam Solomon provides some advice to MDs in this month’s edition of Parkhurst Exchange:

  1. Ask for the review to be taken down
  2. The Medical Justice approach of providing patients a contract allowing them to only post reviews on sites that confirm poster identity
  3. Sue
  4. Encourage patients to post positive reviews
  5. Use the criticism as an opportunity to improve practice

It’s unclear whether option 2) would hold up in court, and 1) is rarely effective, either due to confidentiality issues, site administrative policies, or simple refusal.

RateMDs was founded by the same people who made RateMyProfessors.com, RateMyTeachers.com, and the Ratingz.net network of rating sites that includes LawyerRatingz.com.  It seems quite a few of my law professors are up there.  A quick survey reveals that many Canadian attorneys have been rated, and most not favourably.

Assuming that the only people to ever review professionals are clients who have utilized their services is far too presumptuous.  Competitors, business rivals, people with personal vendettas, and even opposing parties in lawsuits can pose as a client in an attempt to portray the person in a negative light.

It can and has happened.  Solomon points to the case of  Dr. Mohamed Foda of Leduc, Alberta, who forced RateMDs to provide information about a negative poster through the California Northern District Court in Foda et al v. RateMDs, Inc.   On April 28, 2008, the Edmunton Sun covered the story,

An Edmonton urologist has launched a $12-million defamation lawsuit against two unidentified people for allegedly posting bogus poor ratings about him on the California Internet site RateMDs.com. In a March 31 statement of claim, Dr. Mohamed Foda alleges the postings were not made by actual patients of his, but by someone who has a “malicious” motive to harm his medical business, and states he will seek to identify the unknown defendants by searching for their computer identifying information. Foda claims the defamatory comments have caused irreparable harm to his reputation and medical practice and caused him emotional distress and anxiety.

The posts in question stated:

“This doctor prescribed me an antibiotic that causes birth defects after I clearly told him I was 4 months pregnant!! Apparently he made a ‘mistake.’” — Posted on RateMDs.com on October 1, 2007

“I found Dr Foda to ignore problems until drastic measures were required. Had to call numerous times to get an appointment. Felt that Dr Foda did not do required follow up in a timely manner. Did not inform patients of what he did in the OR [such as] remove tumours. Would have died if not for another [doctor].” — Posted on RateMDs.com on May 26, 2007

Administrator of RateMDs, John Swapceinski, says that the site gets letters from lawyers once a month.  Not surprisingly, they do not comply with the requests.  The site does serve an important public function for consumers of healthcare.  But Swapceinski also said that Dr. Foda’s suit is the first time a lawyer has actually followed through and sued the site, and he indicated he would cooperate with a subpoena to release the information if one was provided.

In light of the Cohen v. Google and York University v. Bell Canada Enterprises cases I’ve covered previously, it’s probably no great surprise that the court did reveal the identity of the poster.

What is also unique about this case is that the person identified as the RateMDs poster was involved in different lawsuit on the other side of Dr. Foda in Foda v. Capital Health Region, [2007] A.J. No. 22; 2007 ABQB 19, where he was making a claim for breach of contract, conspiracy, harassment, defamation, and direct interference with economic relations.

The Court of Appeal ([2007] A.J. No. 668;2007 ABCA 207) upheld a motion to add a party to his statement of claim, but the defamation claim agains this party was struck for lack of evidence using the test in Botiuk v. Toronto Free Press Publications Ltd.,

62 …it is sufficient to observe that a publication which tends to lower a person in the estimation of right‑thinking members of society, or to expose a person to hatred, contempt or ridicule, is defamatory and will attract liability.  See Cherneskey v. Armadale Publishers Ltd., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 1067, at p. 1079.  What is defamatory may be determined from the ordinary meaning of the published words themselves or from the surrounding circumstances.  In The Law of Defamation in Canada (2nd ed. 1994), R. E. Brown stated the following at p. 1‑15:

[A publication] may be defamatory in its plain and ordinary meaning or by virtue of extrinsic facts or circumstances, known to the listener or reader, which give it a defamatory meaning by way of innuendo different from that in which it ordinarily would be understood.  In determining its meaning, the court may take into consideration all the circumstances of the case, including any reasonable implications the words may bear, the context in which the words are used, the audience to whom they were published and the manner in which they were presented.

But if the party Dr. Foda was seeking to add in the Alberta case – a Donna Canart,  Surgical Clinic Coordinator at Leduc Community Hospital – is the same person identified in the California proceedings, this evidence may now be available.  Canart allegedly filed a report against Dr. Foda according to the Capital Health Corporate Workplace Respect Policy, raising issues in the Alberta case of malicious prosecution.  However, similar defamation claims in Alberta were made against co-defendant Linda Scott.  The California case has only had two hearings to date, and Dr. Foda only spoke in general terms to Sam Solmon, so it is difficult to ascertain which specific party was behind the RateMDs posting.

Even when a claim is substantiated, it is possible for either party to turn malicious.  The Foda case highlights that litigants in lawsuits can and will attempt to affect the reputation of the opposing party online, something I’ve predicted repeatedly.  All types of litigation will invariably cross over into this specialized area of law.

Some of these rating sites allow the professors to respond to their students, even with video.  Or, as they put it,

Your professors have been reading your comments on RateMyProfessors.com. Now it’s their turn…

I don’t see other professions going the same way, given the nature of client solicitation.  So where do people turn for help?

Wilson concludes,

Just like there was no such thing as Internet law before the Internet or franchise law before there were franchises, a new and growing niche area is “reputation management law.” It straddles libel, slander and defamation law, freedom of speech, privacy law, copyright and trade-mark law, employment law and the rules governing Youtube, Facebook, Twitter and other social media. And like environmental law 25 years ago, it has nowhere to go but up…

Either way, it’s clear that online reputation management is the next big thing that everyone will have to deal with.

Everyone reading this is now searching their name on LawyerRatingz.com, or other sites like  CanLaw.  They’re probably wondering what they would do if they were deliberately maligned, and trying to figure out who is the best”reputation management lawyer” they know, if any.

And that’s assuming that you waited until the end of the article to do so.

Cross-posted from Slaw

Withler We Go From Here: The Future of Pension Reform

Western Law hosted a forum on pension reform this past Thursday, featuring community leaders, legal academics, and practitioners.

Pension Plan Basics

Prof. Robert Brown of the University of Waterloo explained some of the basics behind pensions.

There are two kinds of pension plans, defined benefit and defined contribution plans.  A defined benefit plan provides flat benefits at a specified amount per year of work.  They can present a pretty good idea of what to expect in terms of benefits, but if investments are hit hard it can decrease amount of funds, and they are often open to the vagueries of the market.  A defined contribution plan allows you to determine how much goes into the plan, but you don’t know what you will get when you retire.

A multiple employer pension plan allows you to work for many different people, all of whom contributing to funds in your pension, and are common in the building trades. Single employer pension plans are far more common, and are usually what people think about when they refer to pensions.

A further refinement of types of plans are jointly sponsored pension plans, quite common in the public sector, where there is a shared risk with the government, who matches contributions to the plan. The largest of these Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, which is considered one of the better plans available, with a 12% matching.

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A Different Kind of Employment Discrimination

By: Law is Cool · September 11, 2009 · Filed Under Humour, Labour & Employment Law · Comment 

Sometimes they can kill you softly with that love.

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