The Life and Times of Ivan C. Rand

From Volume III, Issue II of Amicus Curiae, Western Law’s Student Paper

Canada was a different place before Trudeaumania swept the nation, and the man we know as Ivan Rand, founding Dean of this law school and former Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, was a product of his times.  It would be easy to dismiss Dean Rand as an intolerant bigot, but as William Kaplan explained to an audience at Western Law on Nov. 11, [2009,] Rand was complicated character.

“Canadian judicial biography has been, with a few exceptions, mostly uncritical and largely celebratory, written by unabashed admirers,” Kaplan writes in his new book, Canadian Maverick – The Life and Times of Ivan C. Rand. “To my great surprise, this book turned out to be different.”

Ivan Rand was born and raised in the Maritimes and graduated from Harvard Law in 1912. It was his exposure to the American Bill of Rights that, according to Kaplan, differentiated Rand from other Canadian lawyers. And it’s Justice Rand’s decisions as a Justice of the Supreme Court that make his legal legacy so difficult to reconcile with his private views, which have been largely hidden until now.

By 1951, the court in Noble v. Alley assessed a restrictive covenant against selling property in the Grand Bend area to Jews, blacks, or those with “coloured race or blood.” It was Justice Rand who interrupted oral submissions by the respondent saying,“If Albert Einstein and Arthur Rubinstein purchased cottages there, the property values would increase, and the association should be honoured to have them as neighbours.”

Despite his position on restrictive covenants in this case, he was a member of two restrictive clubs that excluded Jews. He defended the right of Communists to hold elected positions, and famously opposed the internment of Japanese citizens, all the while refusing to meet his sister’s Acadian husband for 30 years because of his background.

“It’s this hypocrisy – because he did know better – that ultimately leads me to conclude: first-rate mind, third rate temperament,” said Kaplan, noting that the most influential judges are rarely collegial consensus builders. “Not such a bad combination.”

What, if anything, changed during his lifetime?

Kaplan suggests that Rand’s exposure to Jews in the Palestine Mandate may have led him to develop a more favourable impression of Jews. Rand was impressed by the largely secular, often highly educated and industrious, and was sometimes even disdainful of the religious establishment of the Holy Land. He believed that rational law could resolve all human conflict, and was a social engineer at heart.

Robert Mackay, one of Rand’s colleagues at Western who would eventually succeed him as Dean, recalls Rand’s rants against Jews and people with ethnic names that ended with a vowel: “Rand would declare he had enough of them.”

Yet he continued to donate to Hebrew University in Jerusalem for the rest of his life. A forest in Israel was named after him, and he would tour the country receiving awards.

So what is Rand’s legacy for this school?

Kaplan tellingly notes, “Almost all of his great civil libertarian decisions reversed the actions of state authorities in Quebec.” Mackay explained, “Rand had to decide who he hated more – the French-Canadian Roman Catholics, or Jehovah’s Witnesses.”

Rand believed that ethics could not be taught – either you had them or you didn’t. Western is now known as a pioneer in legal ethics education.

The Ivan Rand window in the Moot Court Room looms menacingly above all those who dare try their hand at advocacy. Rand himself believed that mock trials courts were entertaining, but not educational. He preferred his old 1909 Harvard law texts for the students.

Rand felt that women were good as solicitors but did not have the fortitude for criminal law, a notion that would not bode well for our classes in which women outnumber men , the legal aid clinic, or our struggling criminal law program.

Dean Rand defied utilitarian economics by taking surplus budgets and returning them to the university, much to the chagrin of his staff. He abandoned the administration of the law school only months after its opening to attend to a coal crisis in Cape Breton.

Yet the students loved him.

The Rand formula, where workers pay union dues irrespective of membership, is still one of the hallmark characteristics of Canadian labour law. One of Rand’s recommendations (which was never adopted) was that unions be recognized as legal entities that could sue and be sued [directly, and not through agents]. Another was abolishing picketing altogether.

Overall, Kaplan describes Rand’s own hand at labour relations as nothing less than “disastrous,” with nearly every stakeholder and political party expressing strong criticism. “Reforming labour law,” Kaplan said, “is best done incrementally.”

As our own Dean Holloway acknowledges, “it’s difficult to write fairly about Ivan Rand… What emerges is a picture of a principled man, who thought deeply about the best way to enhance the standards of this profession.”

Kaplan suggests that what makes Rand impressive is his ability to draw bright lines between his public and private life, especially when on the Court. And for a man whose vision in many ways may have been ahead of his time, perhaps that is the most we can ask for.

Cross-posted from Slaw

Panel Proclaims Prorogation Problem Political

By: Ryan MacIsaac · January 22, 2010 · Filed Under Administrative Law, Constitutional Law, Ethics, Law School, Legal Reform, Politics · 1 Comment 

An expert panel on prorogation was convened on Thursday at the University of Toronto’s Faculty of Law. The panel featured law professor David Schneiderman, director of Fair Vote Canada Larry Gordon, Globe & Mail correspondent Michael Valpy, and political science professor Simone Chambers, and its goal was to engage in dialogue about Stephen Harper’s second prorogation of Parliament within a year. The panel was organized by Law Students for Democracy, with Camille Labchuk and Daniel Goldbloom hosting and chairing, respectively, the discussion.

There were two fundamental questions that emerged from the debate: 1) is the latest prorogation legal? and 2) if legal, is the prorogation an ethical abuse of power?

It was conceded by all parties (with the exception of Larry Gordon, who spoke exclusively about voting reform) that the prorogation is legal. It is certainly the prerogative of the Prime Minister to ask the Governor-General to prorogue Parliament. Even if it is perhaps against the spirit of the constitution, there is no black-letter law against prorogation.

So if prorogation is legal, is it right? Without explicitly saying as much, the panellists suggested that the answer is No. Both Schneiderman and Valpy pointed out that the prorogation process has been substantively abused only three times since Confederation: by Stephen Harper in 2008 and 2009, and by Sir John A. Macdonald in 1873 to avoid an inquiry into the Pacific Railway scandal. Chambers argued that it’s a matter of degree: while every past prorogation has been for the advantage of the governing party in some capacity, one must examine the degree of partisanship with respect to the reasons claimed for proroguing.

What were Stephen Harper’s reasons for proroguing? Valpy stated the obvious, that all of Harper’s ostensible reasons are disingenuous (see e.g. the Economist critique of Harper’s “recalibration” reason). Schneiderman suggested that the real motivation was that Harper wanted to avoid having to turn over documents related to alleged complicity in Afghan detainee abuse. Schniederman detailed the history of Harper’s misleading claims that his government was legally obliged to keep the documents hidden – claims that were blown out of the water by Parliamentary law clerk Rob Walsh. Schneiderman suggested the possibility that, had he not prorogued, Harper and cabinet could have been forcibly removed from Parliament for not respecting the majority vote to turn over the documents.

Harper’s behaviour, said Schneiderman, is part of a broader agenda to Americanize the Canadian constitution – evidenced by Harper’s insistence on separation of powers between the Judiciary, Parliament, and the “Executive”; also evidenced by Harper’s desire for an elected Senate.

The panel agreed that the Governor-General did the correct thing in 2009 by agreeing to the prorogation. The Governor-General is not expected to interfere with political affairs beyond what is asked of her; her role today is primarily symbolic, and we wouldn’t want her to begin exercising her black-letter prerogative.

There was debate as to whether Parliament could create a statute governing prorogation. Chambers thought that this would require a constitutional amendment, which is very hard to effect practically. Schneiderman said that it might be possible, and a similar problem is playing out in Harper’s proposed Senate reform.

Perhaps the most crucial point came from Chambers. She said that while the 2009 prorogation is technically legal, it is dependent on the citizens to voice outrage at the audacity of Harper proroguing out of such blatant self-interest. The outrage is manifesting itself in the infamous facebook group, the 10-point hit that the Conservatives have taken in the polls, and the planned protests that will occur all over Canada tomorrow.

In short, the prorogation problem is a political one, not legal.

Do We Need Courses in Ethics and Professional Responsibility?

By: Contributor · January 19, 2010 · Filed Under Ethics, Law School · 1 Comment 

Prof. Michelle Harner shares over at Concurring Opinions,

We started our spring semester today at Maryland, and I am teaching one of my favorite courses, Legal Profession. Having faced ethical dilemmas in practice (and unfortunately seen very talented lawyers disciplined, disbarred and jailed), I believe that this course is extremely valuable. I suspect, however, that most of our students disagree with me, which is why they typically wait until the last semester of law school to take this required course. In fact, the very first time I taught Legal Profession, I asked my class of 75 3Ls to raise their hands if they would “elect” to take Legal Profession if it was not required for graduation. Only one student raised her hand; I promptly commented that she was perhaps the smartest woman in the room. Since that first year, more students have raised their hands, but I attribute at least part of that increase to a note in prior students’ outlines to “raise hand when Prof. Harner asks . . . .”

Are professional ethics courses useful in law school?  Are these better relegated to the bar admissions process and learning on the job?  Or is it too late by that time given the pressures lawyers face, as Prof. Harner suggests?

Do CRU emails show FOIA wrong-doing?

By: Amelio The · November 23, 2009 · Filed Under Administrative Law, Environmental Law, Ethics, Intellectual Property, International Law, Privacy Law · 2 Comments 

There’s been a lot of hype in the past few days about a batch of emails that were either hacked or leaked from the University of East Anglia’s Climate Research Unit (CRU). In the view of some opponents to climate change legislation, these emails depict collusion and conspiracy among leading climate change scientists. Other contrarians accuse at least one scientist of outright illegal conduct: violations of UK’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

CRU

Hundreds of emails spanning well over a decade were released, but the ones important for allegations of illegal conduct are those where some of the scientists discuss the implications of the newly (in the UK) enacted FOIA, those that discuss how to deal with FOIA requests, and one that directs the deletion of certain emails.

I’ve learned a little bit about the US’s version of FOIA, so I thought that it would be interesting to examine this accusation of illegal conduct – at least, to the extent that a Canadian studying law at an American law school can explore British information and privacy law. Read more

Court officer ordered to apologize

By: Amelio The · November 19, 2009 · Filed Under Criminal Law, Ethics, Humour, Privacy Law · 2 Comments 

In the latest developments of this bizarre case in Maricopa County, Arizona, Judge Gary Donohue has ruled that detention officer Adam Stoddard acted inappropriately when he removed and photocopied a document from the file of defence attorney Joanne Cuccia. Judge Donohue has ordered Stoddard to apologize, however Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio has responded that such an apology is unlikely to happen.

The case began when, during a sentencing hearing, the defendant alerted his attorney to the fact that court officers had removed a document from her file, behind her back while she was making arguments.

courtroom_video_stoddard

Bailiffs behaving badly: Detention Officer Adam Stoddard (officer on the right)

Previously, Stoddard had argued that he was justified in searching the file and removing the document because certain keywords had made him suspicious. It has been revealed that those keywords were “going to”, “steal”, and “money”.

In his ruling, Judge Donohue held that Stoddard had no reasonable justification for believing a crime was taking place. He found:

“There was no immediate or future security threat that would have justified a reasonable detention officer in DO Stoddard’s situation removing, seizing and copying a document from a defense attorney’s file. A reasonable detention officer would have recognized after spending approximately 37 seconds reading the paragraph in question, that the ‘key words’ had nothing to do with an immediate or future security threat to the jail or anyone else.”

At issue was also the effect that Stoddard’s argument had on the reputation of defence attorney Cuccia. The Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office had issued multiple public statements in which they claimed to have been on “high alert” because of two incidents where defence attorneys had helped smuggle drugs and other items to their defendant – a member of the Mexican Mafia. Since Cuccia’s defendant was also a documented member of the same organization, Stoddard felt he needed to be on “high alert”.

However, absolutely no evidence has been presented that Cuccia – a ten year member in good standing with the Arizona state bar – has ever committed or been associated with any such wrongdoing. Cuccia was therefore concerned that her professional reputation would be unduly tarnished; she felt she was herself being accused of a crime.

In his ruling, Judge Donohue agreed. He found false suspicion had been cast on Cuccia, and he framed this as the central issue. “This case is not about disobeying a court order. It is about protecting a defence attorney from misbehaviour and harassment by another officer of the court.”

As a result, he ordered that Stoddard would be required to hold a press conference where he would publicly apologize to Cuccia. The press conference is required to take place before Dec. 1, and must contain a “sincere verbal and written apology for invading her defence file and for the damage that his conduct may have caused to her professional reputation.”

The ruling threatens jail time if Stoddard does not apologize, or if Cuccia determines that Stoddard’s apology is insufficient.

Sheriff responds defiantly

Yesterday, however, Maripoca County Sheriff Joe Arpaio sounded defiant, stating that he “stands behind” his officer.

Statement by Sheriff Arpaio

“Superior Court judges do not order my officers to hold press conferences. I decide who holds press conferences and when they are held.”

Whether this issue will be put to rest therefore remains to be seen. Sheriff Arpaio’s statement suggests Stoddard may defy Judge Donohue’s order. As for the original defendant, Antonio Lozano, his sentencing hearing has been pushed back to Dec. 14, and he is now represented by new counsel.

Heat City article on ruling
Original video of Stoddard

EPA lawyers who criticize cap-and-trade cautioned by EPA over professional ethics

By: Amelio The · November 11, 2009 · Filed Under Constitutional Law, Environmental Law, Ethics, Politics · 2 Comments 

As the controversy over impeding U.S. climate legislation continues to simmer, one interesting recent development is the spotlight on two California EPA attorneys: Laurie Williams and Allan Zabel.

The N.Y. Times reported that the U.S. EPA has directed the pair to remove or to make changes to a YouTube video they posted which is critical of the cap-and-trade bills currently being tossed around in the legislative houses. (The video, apparently made in September, critiques the U.S. House of Representatives’ Waxman-Markey Bill [H.R. 2454 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009]. Currently, the U.S. Senate is debating its own version [S.1733 Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act].)

According to the EPA, Williams and Zabel violated EPA ethical guidelines when they substantiated their views with their “20 years each working as attorneys at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency” – thereby accenting the credibility of their “personal opinion” with their office.

For some, this issue is censorship thinly veiled in professional ethics. The American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct, for instance, doesn’t prohibit political expression by lawyers. Rule 1.2(b) specifically states that representation doesn’t constitute an endorsement of political views. The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct does restrict a judge’s capacity for political expression under Rule 4.1(A)(2), in order to maintain the impartiality of the position. But should government attorneys shed their capacity for political expression? On the other hand, for government attorneys, the government is their client. You don’t see many lawyers publishing videos where they criticize their client.

In either case, Williams and Zabel’s criticisms of cap-and-trade will no doubt be capitalized on by opponents of climate legislation. This is unfortunate, because their criticisms – which are just the media’s latest recognition of the carbon tax vs cap-and-trade debate (“carbon fees with rebates”… does anyone still fondly remember the Liberal Green Shift Plan?) – do voice very legitimate concerns.

I take Williams and Zabel’s criticisms to be essentially: 1) carbon offsets provide a run-around hard cap-targets; 2) carbon offsets often have unintended consequences; 3) the price instability associated with implementing a cap-and-trade scheme prevents the promotion of the desired innovation. Obviously, where the goal of the legislation is to curb carbon emissions and to shift to alternative energy, these are bad.

But, are their criticisms of the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade scheme, say… equally applicable to that of Kerry-Boxer? With respect to at least one point – offsets – yes, they are a potential problem. But are they an intractable one? Both bills provide mechanisms that attempt to limit the potential unintended consequences of offsets. (i.e. – regulatory bodies to administer, and the ability to reverse offsets). This may or may not completely obviate the point, but it does address it. With respect to price instability and innovation – that’s an economic argument that’s beyond my purview.

But I do know this: any hope of success at Copenhagen rests largely on the ability of the U.S. to pass strong climate legislation, and to thereby commit to hard targets. Most signs seem to indicate Kerry-Boxer will pass. Even if cap-and-trade wouldn’t achieve everything some think it needs to, at the very least it seems to be the first viable step.

Police Were Instigators in Montebello – Report Holds

By: Ryan Venables · October 25, 2009 · Filed Under Criminal Law, Ethics, Legal Reform · 3 Comments 

When the North American Summit Leaders’ Summit was held in Montebello, Quebec in August 2007, something came to the attention of Dave Coles, President of the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union.

Amidst a seemingly peaceful protest, Coles noticed that three bandana-clad “burly” men were attempting to incite the protestors to become violent toward riot police.

ot-youtube-montebello-070822

As with many of these situations at the national level, the R.C.M.P. has jurisdiction or control if you will over security, however, then Minister of Public Safety Stockwell Day indicated that security on the front line and directed toward controlling the protesters was the responsibility of Quebec’s provincial police agency, the Sureté du Québec.  That in my opinion, is fairly normal.

What Mr. Coles charged is that the three burly men were actually police officers.  This seems to go against the rationale to what the police were there to do.  To quell violence not insight it.  After concluding in quickie internal investigation there was no wrongdoing, the Comité à la déontologie policière said yesterday in a media release there was grounds to believe wrongdoing occurred on the part of the officers, and has now summoned them to a hearing on the matter.

Now the committee, which has the power to issue binding rulings on the Quebec police, will hold public hearings on the issue within the next six months. The three officers – Jean-François Boucher, Joey Laflamme and Patrick Tremblay – are required to appear – The Globe and Mail reports.

Aside from the obvious disciplinary sanctions that these officers now potentially face.  Mr. Coles and many like him are asking the tough question of who directed these officers to take such action?  Accountability needs to be had in order to restore faith in the public’s perception of how the police handle these situations.

Like one of my other articles, (also found here), I have the fortunate ability to break this down as a former police officer, who was also part of the York Regional Police’s Public Order Unit.  Just to qualify my skills, I receive basic Public Order training at Downsview park with the Toronto Police Service’s Public Order Unit, and did requalification training at C.F.B. Meaford with a number of Ontario police agencies.  I was also deployed to Caledonia at the height of the tension between the First Nations people and local residents.

In my training we were taught how to deal with such situations and my superiors would have never instructed officers to take up such actions.  Just as the protestors arms themselves with video cameras and other “weapons” of technology, so do the police.  In such public order situations, there could be plainclothes officers in the crowd monitoring situations, recording for evidentiary purposes, and watching certain groups known to police to cause problems.  Nothing wrong with that.

But the thought that the police were the ones instigating the problems is quite saddening.  I hope justice is swift, and those responsible, whether it is the Sûreté du Québec, R.C.M.P., or politicians are able to dealt with appropriately, especially after watching the YouTube video:

And hearing all of the evidence the Committee has ruled in the following manner:

ALLOWS the application for review in respect of the three respondent

sergeants on the allegations stated by the Commissioner in his decision:

Was disrespectful or impolite towards any person (section 5 of the Code);

Used obscene, blasphemous or abusive language (section 5 of the Code);

8 Item 4.10 of the Commissioner’s investigation report.Failed to respect the authority of the law by inciting persons to violence (section 7 of the Code);

Refused to produce identification when a person asked him to do so (section 6 of the Code);

Furthermore, now that the Committee has overruled the Commissioner, the door has probably been opened for a criminal investigation in relation to assault charges against one officer, and potentially this:

Unlawful Assembly:

63. (1) An unlawful assembly is an assem- bly of three or more persons who, with intent to carry out any common purpose, assemble in such a manner or so conduct themselves when they are assembled as to cause persons in the neighbourhood of the assembly to fear, on rea- sonable grounds, that they

(a) will disturb the peace tumultuously; or

(b) will by that assembly needlessly and without reasonable cause provoke other per- sons to disturb the peace tumultuously.

(2) Persons who are lawfully assembled may become an unlawful assembly if they conduct themselves with a common purpose in a man- ner that would have made the assembly unlaw- ful if they had assembled in that manner for that purpose.

Like all interesting developing stories, we shall see where this leads us.

Bill C-300

By: Navraj Pannu · October 8, 2009 · Filed Under Corporate Law, Environmental Law, Ethics, Regulatory Law · Comment 

A single gold ring leaves in its wake, on average, 20 tons of mine waste.

Bill C-300

Purpose

3. The purpose of this Act is to ensure that corporations engaged in mining, oil or gas activities and receiving support from the Government of Canada act in a manner consistent with international environmental best practices and with Canada’s commitments to international human rights standards. 

Barrick Gold Corporation, the largest Gold Mining Corporation in the world, and Canada’s largest publicly traded company put a lot of heat on the Canadian Government in the last year when Norway’s Ministry of Finance back in January of this year, sold shares of Barrick Gold from Norway’s pension fund for ethical reasons.

Norway is the best place to live. They must be doing something right.

Norway’s Council on Ethics conducted a fairly comprehensive investigation spanning four years regarding the use of a natural river system to transport and dispose of mine waste in Papua New Guinea.

The council established “the mining operation at Porgera entail[ed] considerable pollution.” The 2008 report went on to condemn the heavy metals contamination, particularly mercury, produced by the tailings. It concluded that severe and long-term environmental damage is likely to continue, and that it represents a serious health hazard for residents of the mining area and for the indigenous peoples living downstream from the mine.

As Marie-Claude Poirier of CCODP writes, in 2008 Canada was a base for 75% of the world’s exploration and mining companies. And Canadian mining companies accounted for 43% of all global exploration spending.

And at most, the Canadian government promotes mining companies to voluntarily conduct their activities in a socially and environmentally responsible manner that companies have failed to undertake.

The Canadian government does nothing more than endorse current CSR standards and create administrative mechanisms, rather than legal ones, within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and at Canadian offices abroad.

Recently, Minister Day Announces Appointment of First Counsellor to Promote Responsible Practices for Canadian Businesses Abroad.

This is where Bill C-300 comes in.

On April 22, 2009 Bill C-300, sponsored by Hon. John McKay PC, MP, passed second reading in the House of Commons with a vote sending it to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development for further study. C-300 passed by a close margin – Yeas: 137; Nays: 133.

http://www.johnmckaymp.on.ca/newsshow.asp?int_id=80507

Marie-Claude Poirier, notes that Bill C-300 doesn’t include provisions for an ombudsperson and independent investigation into complaints from overseas, since private member’s bills cannot require the support of a budget.

However, what the Bill does do is directly forward complaints to the Minister of International Trade and Foreign Affairs. Investigation ensues as to the alleged violations of the CSR standards. If any evidence of violations is found, then the stick of bad PR for those that are caught. The companies would be required to submit annual reports, which would fall under scrutiny of the House of Commons and Senate for review.

Bill C-300 has baby teeth, but it’s better than no teeth. Even baby teeth are sharp.

Call Them Feel-Good Expenditures, but These Girls Will Cost You

By: Omar Ha-Redeye · September 27, 2009 · Filed Under Ethics, Health Law, Humour, Law Career, Tax Law · Comment 

Running a call-girl business is an inherently risky venture.  The lines frequently blur, and participants end up in what the law would describe as prostitution.

To sort out these complicated legal dilemmas operators frequently have to hire counsel.  Should these expenses be reportable for tax purposes?

The now-defunct Exchequer Court examined the issue back in 1964, in Canada (Minister of National Revenue – M.N.R.) v. Eldridge, when several employees of the respondent were arrested on prostitution charges.


The Taxation Division provided Notices of Assessment of $22,046.75 and $19,103.77 for the previous two years.  Objections over the government collecting taxes on illegal revenue were dismissed by Mr. Justice Cattanach,

25 … it is abundantly clear from the decided cases that earnings from illegal operations or illicit businesses are subject to tax. The respondent, during her testimony, remarked that she expressed the view to the officers of the Taxation Division that it was incongruous that the government should seek to live on the avails of prostitution. However, the complete answer to such suggestion is to be found in the judgment of Rowlatt, J. in Mann v. Nash ((1929-1932) 16 T.C. 523.) where he said at p. 530:

It is said again: “Is the State coming forward to take a share of unlawful gains?” It is mere rhetoric. The State is doing nothing of the kind; they are taxing the individual with reference to certain facts. They are not partners; they are not principals in the illegality, or sharers in the illegality; they are merely taxing a man in respect of those resources. I think it is only rhetoric to say that they are sharing in his profits, and a piece of rhetoric which is perfectly useless for the solution of the question which I have to decide.

The court was more lenient with some of the substantial business expenses excluded, namely $1,925 legal fees for some of the girls who had been arrested.


The court held that the fees were properly deductible because:

  1. it was for the purpose of income, because the call girl could not earn any income while she was imprisoned
  2. it was part of the arrangement that the operator would assume legal fees in the possibility of legal troubles

Most criminal lawyers would say that $1,925 is  not a lot of money for that kind of an operation, even back then.  And maybe there’s good reason why they skimped on legal fees.  A more sizable deduction for $16,500 was rejected, because it was claimed as “protection fees.”  The recipient of the fees was none other than the local law enforcement.

So if prostitutes can claim their legal fees as a tax deduction, can lawyers claim prostitutes as a legitimate tax deduction as well?  It’s a disbursement that many Bay St. firms probably wouldn’t flaunt in their recruiting brochures.

Garry Slapper of Times Online suggests that the answer, at least before the U.S. Tax Court, is that they cannot.

William G Halby, a tax lawyer from Brooklyn, claimed $111,364 in 2002 for therapeutic sex.  His 2005 claims were more detailed, $5,005 in books, magazines, and videos, and $42,152 for specifically for prostitutes.  He cited section 213 of the Internal Revenue Code:

§ 213. Medical, dental, etc., expenses
(a) Allowance of deduction
There shall be allowed as a deduction the expenses paid during the taxable year, not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, for medical care of the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent (as defined in section 152, determined without regard to subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), and (d)(1)(B) thereof), to the extent that such expenses exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income.

Brian L. Friedman, Administrative Law Judge, said in the case,

…portions of petitioner’s “sex therapy” were, in fact, sex for a fee, in violation of Penal Law § 230.02. Such expenses were not paid to medical professionals or for activities prescribed by medical professionals but were made to unlicensed providers for legally proscribed services. (See Penal Law § 230.00.)

Additionally, even if it were accepted that sex constitutes medical care, such expenses would be more for petitioner’s general well-being rather than cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of a specific disease or condition.

…petitioner failed to produce evidence that the claimed expenses were for prescribed activity, and he had little regard for physician’s advice on sexually related matters. As the periodicals cited by petitioner were neither specific towards him nor for a specific illness, they cannot possibly constitute a prescription or medical advice. Because petitioner purchased the videos, books, periodicals, pornographic materials and sexual performance aids without prescription, and they were not medically necessary to treat a specific disease or condition, they are not medical expenses for which an income tax deduction is warranted.

We still have to overcome cases like Nina Baccala of North Providence, cum laude from the New England School of Law and clerk for Superior Court Judge Raymond J. Brassard, one of the many new law graduates who moonlight as an escort. Her case was only revealed after an assault last year while on the “job.”

With a clever title for a Constitutional paper like, “A Guide to Aborting Roe v. Wade and All of Its Bastard Progeny,” I would’ve hoped Baccula could come up with some fundamentally different choices in life.

But at least next time someone cracks, “What’s the difference between a prostitute and a lawyer,” you can give them a different answer:

“Taxes.”

Cross-posted from Slaw

The Case of Derek Twyman: A Punishment of Unusual Cruelty

By: Shane Martinez · September 7, 2009 · Filed Under Criminal Law, Ethics, Immigration Law · Comment 

From time to time we read or hear about sentences for startling amounts of time to be served by those convicted of serious crimes south of the border. Hundreds of years in prison or multiple life sentences are examples of some of the extreme punishments ordered by U.S. judges in cases where society is expected to agree that the crime committed is simply so heinous that the offender should never be free again.

Could burglary be such a crime?

Derek Twyman was 14-years-old when he and his family moved from the province of Ontario to the state of North Carolina. His father, Donald, had plans to start a furniture business there, and the family was going to build a future for themselves in the south. Unfortunately, shortly after moving to the U.S., Derek fell in with the wrong crowd and got caught up in a lifestyle that included a tendency to participate in acts of juvenile delinquency.

In 1989 he was on parole when he was picked up by the police in connection with a series of break-and-enters of homes belonging to affluent residents in North Carolina. Derek plead guilty to the offences he was accused of, but was shown little mercy by Judge Thomas W. Ross, who sentenced him to four consecutive 40-year sentences in prison – an astonishing total of 160 years behind bars for non-violent property offences. His projected release date is the year 2055, when he will be approximately 90-years-old.

The law that provided for such an excessive sentence was the misnamed Fair Sentencing Act, which was replaced in 1994 by the Structured Sentencing Act in an attempt to restore credibility and appropriateness to sentencing. Under the new law, someone who is facing the same groups of charges that Derek did in 1989 would only serve a maximum of 7 ½ years upon conviction, as opposed to the unthinkable century and a half given to Derek.

Putting aside for a moment the well-founded allegations that the original sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, many would think that the new law would at least apply retroactively in order to halt the continuation of unjust sentences set down under the old law. Unfortunately, the Structured Sentencing Act does not apply to offences committed before October 1994, undeterred by the fact that a comparison between the old and new legislation clearly depicts a gross disproportionality between the sentences that raises serious constitutional concerns.

And given that Canada is the only country to which Derek holds citizenship, where might the political forces of Ottawa enter into this mess? Nowhere it seems. Despite Canada being a signatory to the International Prisoner Transfer Program with the U.S., Derek says that to date the Canadian government has not yet attempted to help him in any way, instead choosing to ignore such inhumane treatment of a Canadian citizen imprisoned abroad. If one looks to the requirements a prisoner must meet in order to be considered for a transfer, he is a perfect candidate with the exception of one thing: restitution.

The presiding judge who sentenced Derek to prison also ordered that he pay over $60,000 in restitution to the affluent residents whose homes he was convicted of burglarizing, even though insurance policies likely covered most (if not all) of the losses. The restitution order states that this amount must be paid before Derek can even be considered for deportation to Canada. Apparently it wasn’t considered at sentencing that the convicted person going to prison for 160 years eliminates any realistic possibility of the restitution ever being paid.

Nor did it appear to dawn on the court that by the time Derek is eligible for his next parole review (on merely the second of the four 40-year sentences) the total cost of incarcerating him will be approximately $675,000. In the unlikely event that the intended recipients of the restitution were not covered by insurance, and actually needed it as compensation, the potential fulfillment of that opportunity was most definitely quashed in the most ironic of ways.

Even through the desperate arguments that the prison sentence and accompanying restitution were attempts at promoting deterrence, this entire fiasco reeks of a typical “tough on crime” attitude gone terribly wrong. Word of this travesty is spreading, but at the present time Derek’s liberty is the price being paid for the complete and ignominious failure that was the Fair Sentencing Act.

Derek hasn’t lost hope though. Having now spent over 19 years behind bars for this crime, he still manages to keep his spirit up and remains confident that people will take notice of this injustice. No human being should have to endure the kind of wrongful treatment that he has been subjected to. Now is the time for all of us to add our voices to the growing call for Derek Twyman’s long overdue release.

To help Derek gain the justice and freedom he deserves, please take a moment to sign this online petition:

www.petitiononline.com/dtwyman

The hidden side of the abortion issue

By: Law is Cool · August 31, 2009 · Filed Under Civil Rights, Ethics · Comment 

MDs face scrutiny over duty to unborn

Does an obstetrician have a duty of care to an unborn child?

A Guelph hospital, citing a 2008 court decision that found a doctor had no such obligation in the case of a girl born with birth defects because of an acne drug prescribed to her mother, says no.

But the family of another child says yes.

AdviceScene

August 1: A Day Of Remembrance

By: Ainsley Brown · August 1, 2009 · Filed Under Civil Rights, Diversity in Law, Ethics, Law Foundations, Legal Reform, Politics · Comment 

This is part of the Middle Passage Law Series and is cross posted on Commercial Law International.

Why am I wearing all black today?

Am I in mourning? No, not exactly. Then why?

Well it is August 1: Emancipation Day. Remember

I am wearing black today not to so much mourn but to remember. To remember that it was today 175 years ago that the British set my ancestors free – well in a manner, they still had six years of apprenticeship to look forward to. Why? Because being free people made them some how forget all the skills acquired during a lifetime of toil.  

The Slavery Abolition Act 1833 took effect one year after passage this day 1834 and outlawed slavery in the British empire – including British North America aka Canada – with the exception of all but a hand fully of territories.

So I remember – let’s remember together.

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