RSS FeedSupremacy of God and the Canadian Charter
Did you know that the “supremacy of God” is Canada’s founding principle? Read the Canadian constitution, if you don’t believe me. This is the preamble to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: “Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law …” Recently, a Quebec Superior Court Judge Gérard Dugré relied on these words to stop the Quebec government from blocking one private school’s religious curriculum. This caused secular activists to call for removing the reference to God from our Charter.
Secular Canadians took offence. To them, Judge Dugré’s novel use of the preamble appears to make non-religious Canadians second-class citizens. His ruling may also look like an attempt to cut the ancient Gordian Knot of whether God exists in one judicial stroke. Of course, this cannot be the meaning of the preamble to the Charter. But the words about God do not have to be empty rhetoric ignored by the courts either. A reasonable interpretation of the preamble treats “God” as a power that is superior to the state and that have endowed Canadians with rights and freedoms secure from the state.
I do not know if judge Dugré’s decision is correct. Nor am I trying to answer this question here. But regardless of his ruling, there is a reasonable interpretation of the entire preamble to the Charter.
First of all, the purpose of the Charter is to protect rights and freedoms of the people against the government. This principle should imbue every interpretation of this constitutional document.
One of the fundamental methods of testing legality is tracing claimed powers and freedoms to their source. Many state agents’ powers come from or are allowed by the sovereign—the federal parliament or provincial legislatures. Police powers, for example, come from statute or are allowed by statute because they pre-existed legislative intervention. No state power can exist without parliamentary consent or an explicit constitutional grant. Even “Crown prerogatives” such as international relations powers exist only until legislatures wish to withdraw them.
But people are not agents or creatures of the state. We pre-date the state.
To reserve some freedoms to the people, to protect them from the overarching sovereign, and to ensure the legality of freedoms, you need a source other than the sovereign itself. Otherwise, the sovereign would be free to take freedoms back from the people. This source cannot be the state, it cannot be a person, and it cannot be a corporation. The humanity have always imagined a source of power and freedom completely independent of the state. It’s been called different names but a common one in English is God. Why not? It’s good enough to symbolize the idea that fundamental human rights and freedoms are not a gift from the sovereign. We have them by birth or naturalization, or symbolically as a gift from “God.”
Second, to emphasize the idea that the state and our legislative sovereigns cannot expropriate the independent rights and freedoms of the people, a concept of supremacy is necessary. Not only is the source of our freedoms and rights independent from the state, it is also supreme to the state. This concept leaves not a shred of doubt about any ability of the government to repossess our freedoms.
For these two reasons, “Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God.” It is to protect our freedoms and rights from state intrusion, which is exactly the purpose of the Charter. The rule-of-law part is equally critical, because unless there is an institution that deeply believes in these principles and holds the state in check, the words alone are not worth much. Thank God for the independent judiciary and the independent legal profession. Yes, essentially: thank God for lawyers.
According to the Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed.), a preamble may help interpreting its enclosing document. The dictionary cites Den v. Urison, 2 N.J.L. 212 (1807), a New Jersey case: “… in case any doubt arises on the enacting part, the preamble may be resorted to to explain it, and show the intention of the law maker.” If our courts turn to the preamble of the Charter to inform their interpretation of that document, they should treat the words “supremacy of God” not in a religious sense but as an affirmation of Canadians’ rights and freedoms secure from and independent of the government.
(Post sponsored by AdviceScene)
Considering the Constitutionality of Bill 94
May 18 is the national day of action against Bill 94, the proposed legislation in Quebec, which if approved, would deny essential government services, public employment, educational opportunities, and health care to Muslim women who wear niqab (face veil). A rally has been arranged in Toronto to take place at 1PM at 20 Queen Street W. Other actions, such as contacting MPs, are also urged for that day.
In her essay, Bill 94: Quebec’s Niqab Ban and Sex Equality, Beverley Baines, professor of Law and the head of the Gender Studies Department at Queen’s University, considers the Bill within Constitutional a framework that should, by now, be familiar to all the former first-years who’ll have written very similar case scenarios during their final exams lo these two weeks ago:
If Bill 94 becomes law, a constitutional challenge would begin with the two preliminary issues that are raised in any Charter challenge. First, does the Charter apply to the impugned action? Here the answer is yes because the impugned action is a statute and the Charter applies to legislation. Second, does the party bringing the Charter challenge have standing to proceed, that is, does the party have an interest that is harmed by the law? Again the answer is yes because the party bringing this hypothetical Charter challenge is a woman who has been or is about to be excluded from providing or receiving a government service in Quebec because her face is covered by the niqab. With these preliminaries satisfied, the next steps are to ask: (i) have one or more Charter rights been violated? And if so, (ii) can Quebec justify violating these Charter rights? What follows are two possible Charter scenarios, the first more conventional than the second.
She concludes:
Women seeking to challenge the niqab ban should invoke their right to sex equality to emphasize their belief in the consistency between this right and their reasons for wearing the niqab. Their challenge would force Quebec to fall back on its second or institutional justification – reasons of security, communication, identification – to justify denying reasonable accommodation. If Quebec has any evidence to sustain these reasons, why should it not be produced, contested and evaluated? The failure to manifest transparency suggests this evidence may not be as conclusive as Quebec asserts. Moreover, Quebec needs to explain why other more minimally rights-impairing processes would not be sufficiently responsive to its institutional concerns. Finally, Quebec should articulate how its institutional reasons could possibly trump sex equality, given everything this province claimed about the priority that should be given to sex equality during the drafting of s. 50.1? Does sex equality matter only when Quebec claims to be its primary exponent?
Warman v. Fournier et al: Balancing Disclosure, Privacy, and Freedom of Expression Interests in Internet Defamation Cases
While the internet provides users with an environment in which socially valuable anonymous speech can flourish, it also provides users with an opportunity to defame others behind a shield of anonymity. If these users can be identified, they may be held liable for defamation. Unfortunately for plaintiffs, the identities of these individuals are usually known only by the website or internet service provider (“ISP”) through which the statements were made, and these entities generally decline to disclose a user’s identity in the absence of a court order compelling them to do so. Faced with a growing stream of plaintiffs who seek these kinds of orders, courts have sought to craft approaches to evaluating applications for disclosure that strike an appropriate balance between the privacy interests of anonymous internet posters and the reputational interests of plaintiffs.
Yesterday, the Ontario Divisional Court released its decision in Warman v. Fournier et al, 2010 ONSC 2126 (Div. Ct.) rev’g (2009), 309 D.L.R. (4th) 227, 76 C.P.C. (6th) 155 (Ont. S.C.J.) (“Warman”). At issue was whether the disclosure provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 (the “Rules”) automatically entitle plaintiffs in internet defamation cases to obtain the identifying information of anonymous posters from websites and ISPs, or whether courts must balance the interests of plaintiffs with the freedom of expression and privacy interests of anonymous posters. The decision is now the leading authority in Ontario for the proposition that the objectives of the disclosure obligations under the Rules must be balanced with the right of freedom of expression in internet defamation cases. This article discusses the background, holding, and implications of Warman.
1. Background
The Respondent commenced an action against the Appellants, the operators of an internet message board, and eight anonymous message board participants with respect to a series of allegedly defamatory postings. After commencing the action, the Respondent brought a motion for an order compelling the Appellants to comply with Rule 76.03 of the Rules which required the Appellants to file an affidavit of documents that disclosed the email and internet protocol (“IP”) addresses of the anonymous posters in order to allow the Respondent to identify the posters and serve them with the statement of claim.
The motions judge rejected the Appellants’ submission that the Respondent was required to establish a prima facie case of defamation before disclosure could be ordered. Instead, Justice Kershman concluded that Rule 76.03 of the Rules required the Appellants to disclose all documents in their power or control and that such disclosure should be automatic upon the issuance of a statement of claim because the information was relevant and not protected by privilege.
This decision stood in stark contrast with earlier cases that offered some protection to the privacy interests of internet users by requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate a bona fide or prima facie case of defamation before ordering disclosure (see: previous posting). The motions judge distinguished these cases on the basis that the Respondent was seeking to compel the Appellants to follow the Rules as required by named parties to the action, whereas the other cases involved discretionary orders for the production of documents from third parties.
2. Holding on Appeal
The Divisional Court unanimously allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to a different motions judge for re-consideration, recognizing that the anonymous posters’ right of freedom of expression under the Charter should have been taken into account in considering the Respondent’s request for disclosure under the Rules. Moreover, the Court noted that the posters’ express decisions to remain anonymous gave them a reasonable expectation of privacy that weighed in their favour.
In rejecting the notion that disclosure should be automatic, the Court also expressed concern for the ease by which a plaintiff could abuse the Rules by filing claims in a spurious manner simply to identify an anonymous poster:
If disclosure were automatic, a plaintiff with no legitimate claim could misuse the Rules of Civil Procedure by commencing an unmeritorious action for the sole purpose of revealing the identity of anonymous internet commentators, with a view to stifling such commentators and deterring others from speaking out on controversial issues. For this reason, the commencement of a defamation claim does not trump freedom of expression or the right to privacy.
[Warman, at para. 33]
After surveying previous decisions, Justice Wilton-Siegel set out four considerations, aimed at preventing abuse of the Rules and respecting the privacy of internet users, that should have been considered by the motions judge in deciding whether to order disclosure under the Rules:
- whether the unknown alleged wrongdoer could have a reasonable expectation of anonymity in the particular circumstances;
- whether the Respondent has established a prima facie case against the unknown alleged wrongdoer and is acting in good faith;
- whether the Respondent has taken reasonable steps to identify the anonymous party and has been unable to do so; and
- whether the public interests favouring disclosure outweigh the legitimate interests of freedom of expression and right to privacy of the persons sought to be identified if the disclosure is ordered.
[Warman, at para. 34]
In concluding that plaintiffs should be required to meet a prima facie standard rather than a lower bona fide standard, the Court emphasized the importance of protecting freedom of expression and noted that there was no concern that the higher standard would deprive applicants of a remedy:
In para. 34 of BMG [2005 FCA 193], the Federal Court of Appeal expressed the concern that, in that case, imposition of a prima faciecase standard would effectively strip an applicant of a remedy because the plaintiff could not know the actual case it wished to assert against the defendants until it knew not only their identities but also the nature of their involvement in the [internet] file-sharing activities. Because the present proceeding is a defamation action, that concern does not arise. Unlike BMG, the respondent knows the details of precisely what was done by each of the unknown alleged wrongdoers.
In addition, because this proceeding engages a freedom of expression interest, as well as a privacy interest, a more robust standard is required to address the chilling effect on freedom of expression that will result from disclosure. It is also consistent with the recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court that establish the relative weight that must be accorded the interest in freedom of expression. In the circumstances of a website promoting political discussion, the possibility of a defence of fair comment reinforces the need to establish the element of defamation on a prima facie basis in order to have due consideration to the interest in freedom of expression. On the other hand, there is no compelling public interest in allowing someone to libel and destroy the reputation of another, while hiding behind a cloak of anonymity. The requirement to demonstrate a prima facie case of defamation furthers the objective of establishing an appropriate balance between the public interest in favour of disclosure and legitimate interests of privacy and freedom of expression.
[Warman, at paras. 41 - 42]
3. Implications
Warman represents an important recognition that while internet users’ anonymity ought not to be protected absolutely, the mere commencement of a defamation action should not give rise to an automatic entitlement to information identifying a previously anonymous poster without a consideration of the interests of privacy and freedom of expression.
Nevertheless, there is still uncertainty with respect to the degree of protection that courts will afford to anonymous posters in the future. Under Canadian law, plaintiffs have two ways to seek disclosure in internet defamation cases. Apart from identifying anonymous defendants by seeking pre-action discovery or production of relevant information under procedural rules, as occurred in Warman, plaintiffs may also bring independent actions for disclosure of the identity of anonymous defendants by way of an equitable bill of discovery known as a “Norwich order”. Norwich orders were introduced in the decision of the House of Lords in Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Customs and Excise Commissioners, [1974] A.C. 133 (H.L.) in which it was held that where a third party becomes involved in the tortious acts of others, that third party has a duty to disclose the identity of the tortfeasor so that the plaintiff may pursue its remedies. The Norwich factors were recently confirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in GEA Group AG v. Flex-N-Gate Corporation, 2009 ONCA 619 and applied in the internet defamation context by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in York University v. Bell Canada Enterprises (2009), 311 D.L.R. (4th) 755 (Ont. S.C.J.) (“York University”):
- whether the applicant has provided evidence sufficient to raise a valid, bona fide or reasonable claim;
- whether the applicant has established a relationship with the third-party from whom the information is sought, such that it establishes that the third party is involved in the acts;
- whether the third party is the only practicable source of the information;
- whether the third party can be indemnified for costs to which it may be exposed because of the disclosure; and
- whether the interests of justice favour obtaining the disclosure.
[York University, at para. 13]
Although the second and fourth Norwich factors were not relevant in Warman because they apply only to third party respondents rather than co-defendants [see Warman, at para. 39], some of the other Norwich factors are similar to the considerations set out in Warman that are now applicable to the question of whether a court should order disclosure under the Rules. However, an important difference remains. While the approach under Warman requires plaintiffs to demonstrate a prima facie case of defamation, Norwich jurisprudence has required plaintiffs to meet the lower bona fide standard. For example, even though the plaintiff in York University managed to establish a prima facie case of defamation, the court did not require the plaintiff to demonstrate more than a bona fide case. Although Warman provides compelling reasons to prefer the higher prima facie standard where the plaintiff seeks disclosure through a Norwich order, it remains open for courts to require plaintiffs to meet the lower standard instead.
Originally posted on Defamation Law Blog
New security bill is hazardous
By Kashif Ahmed and Eric Miller, Special to The StarPhoenix
April 30, 2010
Following is the viewpoint of Ahmed and Miller, recent law graduates from the University of Saskatchewan.
Few actions score more political points than announcing that the threat of terrorism requires strong government powers to ensure public safety. That’s exactly what Justice Minister Rob Nicholson did last week when he introduced in Parliament the Combating Terrorism Act.
The proposed bill attempts to quietly reinstate two divisive security measures that were first enacted as a response to the panic in the wake of 9/11. The investigative hearing and preventive arrest provisions would give law enforcement agencies expanded powers.
Although the House of Commons allowed the previous provisions in the Criminal Code to lapse in 2007, they have demonstrated a stubborn longevity as a threat to basic civil liberties — something recognized by both security and legal experts.
Most importantly, these powers were never used after they were first enacted in 2001.
The proposed act does not conform to Canadian principles of justice. It would allow for the police to detain suspects for up to three days without a warrant — a clear violation of the constitutional freedom from arbitrary detention.
Although the police would be required to eventually produce such an individual before a judge, the mere suspicion of terrorist activity could leave the imprisoned person without access to a lawyer for the same time period.
Investigative hearings pose another serious difficulty for individual liberties. To compel a person to testify in court interferes with the basic constitutional right to remain silent and to not incriminate oneself.
The bill further allows for secret proceedings. As U.S. examples have shown, coercive testimony is unreliable, and fails to provide intelligence of value to our security apparatus.
The act is far reaching, will not increase security, and is a hazardous exercise in public policy.
Former CSIS chief Reid Morden has spoken out against the proposed legislation, saying that law-enforcement organizations already have adequate powers to carry out their duties to protect Canadians.
For the Harper Conservatives to suggest extraordinary powers are required to safeguard national security is a fanciful stretch of the public record. Indeed, the tabled legislation ignores the milieu of cases that have struck at the heart of planned terrorism through ordinary security investigations.
The biggest terror case in Canada was disrupted in 2006 through standard, though diligent and excellent, police work and intelligence gathering.
More recently, Momin Khawaja of Ottawa was found guilty, in open court, of terrorism offences with respect to a British plot.
This leads us to ask: Why has the government abruptly proposed reinstating these high-handed measures that our elected MPs rightly had determined were needless?
Despite attempts to portray themselves as the party of law and order, the Conservatives are acting contrary to their traditional philosophical support for individual rights and less government.
It may be a bitter pill to swallow, but Prime Minister Stephen Harper is showing his party to be standing for coercive measures at the expense of age-old constitutional rights.
One wonders if the Conservative party’s concern is to strengthen support within its political base, significant elements of which have been long upset with the minority government’s uncertain agenda.
The Combating Terrorism Act could be the first step in a broader government agenda of repressive lawmaking. It represents a renewed push towards expansive state powers that threaten civil liberties and it promotes those same powers through the menacing spectre of terrorism and chaos.
Ultimately, it is clear that the proposed legislation rests on a threadbare position: That our public safety is in jeopardy without highly intrusive measures and risky state powers.
Fortunately for Canadians, the country and its security agencies have diligently proven otherwise.
Note that this piece is provided for interest alone.
Bilingualism and the Supreme Court
As reported by the Globe and Mail, a bill requiring that all future Supreme Court justices be bilingual was passed last week and now awaits Senate approval. The private member’s Bill C-232, tabled by NDP language critic Yves Godin, was harshly criticized by former Supreme Court puisne judge John Major on CBC’s “The Current” radio show.
Major argued that the only way to uphold the Rule of Law in Canada is to have the most competent people in the Supreme Court, not to put the emphasis on linguistics. Since there is far more bilingualism in the East, requiring bilingual Justices from the West would lower the grade of the talent pool. Major noted that both Parliament and the UN use translators. He said that in his 13 years on the Court there was never a single case where he didn’t fully understand the case, between translators and extensive case preparation. Major argued that “fluently bilingual” is a very high threshold to achieve, and most justices only learn French after they are appointed. Interestingly, Major criticized several times former justice minister Irwin Cotler and former lawyer Bob Rae for their support of the bill.
While Godin argued that Harper broke a fully bilingual Court by appointing Rothstein (who is currently taking language lessons), Major countered that it’s actually only two or three current Justices who are truly bilingual. Godin’s primary concern was that someone arguing a case before the Court would not be fully understood, a concern that Major effortlessly debunked.
Phil Fontaine, former National Chief of the Assembly of First Nations, called the bill is “elitist” because it does not fully reflect the diversity of Canada. I would call it elitist because it is only a small subset of Canada’s English-speaking population that has access to quality French-language instruction at a young age.
Why Québéc Cannot and Should not Ban the Niqab
An article jointly written by David Shulman and Lawrence Gridin
Last week the government of Québéc announced that it would restrict female Muslims from covering their faces with the niqab. This article is about the fundamental freedoms that we enjoy as Canadians and human beings, and the power of the government to encroach upon those freedoms.
The legislation proposed in Québéc will prevent a woman wearing a niqab from being able to access public services, including consulting doctors at a hospital or attending classes at university. It also prevents all government employees from wearing a niqab, including those employees who have no contact with the public. More details can be found here.
Prime Minister Harper and Liberal Leader Michael Ignatieff have announced that they support the ban, and a large (if not overwhelming) majority of Canadians agree with them.
A Primer on Freedom
Let’s begin our discussion with a review of the Ann Coulter affair, which bears some analogues to the Québéc niqab issue.
We cannot think of another person whom we personally disagree with more on virtually every dimension than Ms. Coutler. We have difficulty thinking of anyone else who spews out as much vile hate, ignorance and prejudice as Ms. Coulter. We’re bothered by the fact that there is any demand — outside of perhaps morbid curiosity — for her wares at all.
Here are three pieces, taken from Ms. Coulter’s repertoire, that support our opinion:
“They’re [Democrats] always accusing us of repressing their speech. I say let’s do it. Let’s repress them. Frankly, I’m not a big fan of the First Amendment.”
- University of Florida speech, October 20, 2005.
“I have to say I’m all for public flogging. One type of criminal that a public humiliation might work particularly well with are the juvenile delinquents, a lot of whom consider it a badge of honor to be sent to juvenile detention. And it might not be such a cool thing in the ‘hood’ to be flogged publicly.”
- MSNBC, March 22, 1997.
“I think [women] should be armed but should not vote…women have no capacity to understand how money is earned. They have a lot of ideas on how to spend it…it’s always more money on education, more money on child care, more money on day care.”
- Politically Incorrect, February 26, 2001.
Despite our profound disagreement with her views, we would fight vigorously to protect Ms. Coulter’s right to express them. The right to freedom of expression is guaranteed by our Charter of Rights and Freedoms. We would proudly defend her right to freedom of expression in any court with every ounce of our ability and integrity, just as vigorously as we would defend our own right to criticize and disagree with her views.
Why?
Jedi Freedom of Religion
Food for thought: Is being a Jedi a sufficient “nexus with religion” (see Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 SCR 551) to invoke freedom of religion protection?
The Guardian reports of a Jedi Knight refused to dehood in the workplace, and earned an apology from his employer. But unsatisfied, he intends now to sue for discrimination. The UK’s Equality and Human Rights Commission does not include Jediism in its enumerated list of religions, even though it is statistically the fourth most common religion in the UK & Wales, with nearly 400,000 adherents. (Canada, on the other hand, has a comparatively paltry 55,000 Jedi.)
At the very least we can be fairly certain that because the Jedi hood does not obscure the face, it would not violate Quebec’s proposed anti-niqab legislation.
How to secede from Ontario
So what if Toronto became a province? Why would that be a bad idea? Regardless of the arguments for and against, Toronto can never become a province unless there is a lawful way to that goal, and there are several. In any case, separation will require a referendum in the city. If Toronto wishes to leave, Ontario will have to start good-faith negotiations. And even if the talks break down, there seems to be a constitutional way for Toronto to become a province without Ontario’s consent.
First, any decision to separate will require a referendum in Toronto. Just a vote in the city council will not be enough because the issue is so momentous. We have some legal precedent on this issue because the independence question was raised in referendums several times in Quebec. In the Reference re Secession of Quebec, the Supreme Court said that a successful referendum will give necessary legitimacy to Quebec government’s effort to secede. I don’t see any other way to give legitimacy to the effort of Toronto to form its own province.
Second, if the people of Toronto say yes to becoming a province in a referendum, Ontario will be under an obligation to negotiate with representatives of the city. This also follows from the Reference re Secession of Quebec. The difference, of course, is that Quebec has original sovereignty as a province, and the City of Toronto is legally a creature of an Ontario statute. But in essence, the same principles should apply: if a huge number of people in a large community want something, the government should listen and talk. Besides, Toronto is not just a city: it’s older than both Ontario and Canada. Its population and economic output are bigger than population and GDP of nine Canadian provinces. It’s a critical part of the country, and if it speaks loudly about its own destiny, Ontario has a legal duty to negotiate.
There are at least three possible outcomes of these negotiations:
1. The Legislative Assembly of Ontario passes a law granting unique and broad powers to the City of Toronto. The new authority should approach that of a province. The law should be a super-statute like the Ontario’s Human Rights Code. It should prevail over any other Ontario law. The problem with this solution is that Queen’s Park will keep the power to change or repeal this statute despite its “super” attribute. Unless there is way to bind the Ontario legislature with stringent amendment limitations like those found in the Canadian constitution, the super-statute will last only as long as the political will of the provincial parliament.
2. Ontario adopts a written constitution with amendment restrictions similar to those of the federal constitution. The new powers of the City of Toronto become a part of the Ontario constitution subject to amendment only in rare cases of clear consent of a great majority of Torontonians and Ontarians. I have no idea how to make this work. When Canada needed a constitution binding on its own parliament, it had to ask the UK parliament to pass a special law. It’s unclear how the federal parliament could play the part the UK parliament once played for Canada, because a future Ontario government could challenge that intervention on federalism grounds. How a province can adopt a binding constitution is a great topic for legal scholars, but I don’t see a practical way to do it.
3. Canada amends its own constitution making Toronto a full province. That’s the best way for the city. It will ensure more legitimacy and legal certainty so Toronto can focus on its future instead of endless litigation with Queen’s Park. Sections 42 and 38(1) of The Constitution Act, 1982 set the procedure for forming a new province: consent of the Parliament of Canada and legislatures of at least two thirds of Canadian provinces that together have at least half of Canada’s population. In my reading of the Constitution, Ontario’s consent won’t even be necessary, but if Ontario says no, then Quebec’s and probably BC’s yes will be required. Imagine the headlines: “Quebec helps Toronto secede from Ontario!”
Hopefully, it will not come to this, and the growing crisis in the relations between Toronto and Ontario will be resolved. But if Toronto is determined to get a special status to reflect its role in Ontario and Canada, it certainly has lawful paths to that objective. What’s needed is the political will on both sides.
(Post sponsored by AdviceScene)
Don’t hate, U of O Provost warns U.S. pundit
When the University of Ottawa Campus Conservatives invited U.S. political pundit, Ann Coulter, to speak, they had to know she would attract attention. Coulter has always been outspokenly controversial with her political positions. But it’s unlikely that she, nor the Campus Conservatives, expected that her anticipated visit would provoke words of warning from the University of Ottawa Provost.
In a letter to Coulter, Vice President Academic and Provost François Houle wrote the following:
I understand that you have been invited by University of Ottawa Campus Conservatives to speak at the University of Ottawa this coming Tuesday. We are, of course, always delighted to welcome speakers on our campus and hope that they will contribute positively to the meaningful exchange of ideas that is the hallmark of a great university campus. We have a great respect for freedom of expression in Canada, as well as on our campus, and view it as a fundamental freedom, as recognized by our Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
I would, however, like to inform you, or perhaps remind you, that our domestic laws, both provincial and federal, delineate freedom of expression (or “free speech”) in a manner that is somewhat different than the approach taken in the United States. I therefore encourage you to educate yourself, if need be, as to what is acceptable in Canada and to do so before your planned visit here.
You will realize that Canadian law puts reasonable limits on the freedom of expression. For example, promoting hatred against any identifiable group would not only be considered inappropriate, but could in fact lead to criminal charges. Outside of the criminal realm, Canadian defamation laws also limit freedom of expression and may differ somewhat from those to which you are accustomed. I therefore ask you, while you are a guest on our campus, to weigh your words with respect and civility in mind.
There is a strong tradition in Canada, including at this University, of restraint, respect and consideration in expressing even provocative and controversial opinions and urge you to respect that Canadian tradition while on our campus. Hopefully, you will understand and agree that what may, at first glance, seem like unnecessary restrictions to freedom of expression do, in fact, lead not only to a more civilized discussion, but to a more meaningful, reasoned and intelligent one as well.
I hope you will enjoy your stay in our beautiful country, city and campus.
Sincerely,
François Houle
Vice-recteur aux études / Vice-President Academic and Provost
Université d’Ottawa / University of Ottawa
Given Coulter’s colourful history, I would think she would be grateful to learn more about a foreign country. However, even in Canada, some have been quick to criticize the letter. And in the National Post, Prof. Ed Morgan reminds us that, as far as hate speech goes in Canada, we criminalize only words conveying “emotions that belie rationality.” After all, even in Canada, we wouldn’t want to approach anything resembling censorship, now would we?
Wikileaks considered a “threat” by US Army
WikiLeaks logo (via Wikipedia)
WikiLeaks, the whistle-blowing website that provides confidential and sensitive documents for free to the media, human rights groups and the public, has been deemed a threat by the US Army.
WikiLeaks has been responsible in the past for providing a copy of the Standard Operating Procedures for Camp Delta, the contents of Sarah Palin’s Yahoo account, and a membership list of the far-right British National Party which got at least one police officer dismissed, among many other significant stories.
A 2008 document recently posted there, entitled U.S. Intelligence planned to destroy WikiLeaks, states,
The possibility that current employees or moles within DoD or elsewhere in the U.S. government are providing
sensitive or classified information to Wikileaks.org cannot be ruled out.
Plans included trying to shut down the website using a variety of techniques, including exposing their sources to embarrass and intimidate them, and even litigation.
Considering that this document was considered “secret,” and presumably came from someone who had access to confidential files, the concerns may be valid. But the appropriateness of the response by the military towards a media channel providing a significant and overwhelmingly positive contribution to issues of public interest is also suspect.
The editors of WikiLeaks note that 2 years have passed without any exposure of their sources, indicating that this response may also be particularly ineffectual. They also point to inaccuracies regarding the editorial control of the site.
Even if the Army was able to shut down WikiLeaks, they concede that the problem is not limited to a single site,
Web sites similar to Wikileaks.org will continue to proliferate and will continue to represent a potential force protection, counterintelligence, OPSEC, and INFOSEC threat to the US Army for the foreseeable future.
Although security interests are pressing and substantial, when a democratic government administration is known to participate in systematic abuses of human rights and widespread violations of international norms, the balance of favour should continue to support sites like WikiLeaks.
Iacobucci to Investigate on Detainee Documents
Former Supreme Court Justice Frank Iacobucci was enlisted Friday to investigate whether the release of documents relating to Afghan detainee torture would cause an “injurious” effect.
The release of these documents – which could prove damning if they show government complicity in torture – was widely cited as being the underlying reason for PM Stephen Harper’s most recent prorogue of Parliament.
The unsettled issues here seem to be the following:
- Is this, as critics allege, simply a transparent effort to hide from opposition pressure to release the documents?
- Will Iacobucci actually be given all of the relevant documents?
- Should Iacobucci fear personal reprisal – à la Richard Colvin – if his findings do not please the Conservative government?
- How binding will his decision be, given that it’s not a Supreme Court reference?
- If Iacobucci decides that releasing the documents would be injurious, is a Parliament majority vote to release them nonetheless binding on the executive?
Iacobucci previously led an independent commission from 2006 to 2008 investigating Canadian government involvement in the torture of three Arab-Canadian men in Syria and Egypt. He found that CSIS and the RCMP indirectly contributed to wrongful detainment and torture of the individuals.
Former NHL’er Ramage Has Appeal
Former St. Louis Blue and Toronto Maple Leaf has had his second day in court. This time to appeal a conviction that led to a four year sentence for Impaired Driving Causing Death in connection with the accident that claimed another former NHL’er, Keith Magnuson.
The appeal will focus around two specific issues:
1. Was Ramage’s Charter rights violated through the collection of his urine at the hospital?
2. Should the court find that they were not violated, is the four-year sentence imposed by the Ontario Superior Court too harsh?
The court appears to be already leaning toward reducing the sentence through the words of Justice David Doherty who indicated
I think it’s fair to say we’re all concerned about the length of sentence.
To me this is an interesting case and one that affects me personally. I worked with many (if not all) of the officers involved in this case, however, this specific incident was before my time. No police officer likes losing a case because of an error that they committed (i.e. Charter breach), however, although the defence has suggested the officer wilfully breached Mr. Ramage’s rights. It is more likely the officer was acting in good faith with respect to the investigation.
But this begs the question. If an officer, who acting in good faith, breaches an accused person or suspect’s rights, in situations such as this, is justice better served in upholding a conviction or upholding a what would ultimately be a minor Charter violation.
You may wonder why I say minor? Because ultimately, although a breach may have occurred, a warrant surely would have been granted to obtain bodily fluids.
Discuss.
