Deadly insulation: Zonolite Lawsuit deadline Aug 31.

By: Navraj Pannu · August 24, 2009 · Filed Under Civil Procedure, Health Law · 3 Comments 

Don’t mess around with the insulation in your house. It may be Zonolite. It’s made from minerals naturally laced with asbestos, the deadliest type of asbestos known as Tremolite.

It costs money to remove it. A lot of it. If you get a jump on things and get involved with the lawsuit, depending on where your house is located (U.S. or Canada), homeowners can get some assistance. In the U.S., up to $7500 and in Canada homeowners can also get some money, some good gas money. $300 to those who can prove the presence of Zonolite and costs incurred to contain the insulation, plus an additional $600 for those who’ve taken major remedial measures like removal. And the average cost of removal is $7000 to $8000.

The company that developed Zonolite, W.R. Grace has filed for bankruptcy and the terms of settlement are outlined above. However, Aug. 31 is the deadline for any Canadian home lined with Zonolite to bring a claim, whereas homes in the U.S. can still bring a claim after Aug. 31.

http://www.yourhome.ca/homes/newsfeatures/article/685245

Taser International

By: Law is Cool · August 14, 2009 · Filed Under Civil Procedure · 1 Comment 

Taser maker to file suit over inquiry

… “The assertion is that commission breached basic principles of fairness and fundamental justice,” Mr. Neave said in an interview with CTV at his Vancouver office. “They were biased in the sense that a substantial body of science and medical study we provided to the commission was not considered.”

Interesting.  A commission of inquiry does not administer justice. It’s a “study” commission. How can it breach principles of fairness and fundamental justice?

AdviceScene

Does The Future Of The Revised US-Swiss Double Taxation Treaty Depend On The Outcome Of The UBS Case?

By: Ainsley Brown · July 20, 2009 · Filed Under Civil Procedure, Politics, Regulatory Law · Comment 

First posted on Commercial Law International on July 13, 2009.

UBS, the world´s largest wealth manager, has found itself embroiled in a diplomatic row between Washington and Bern. At issue is the interpretation of the current US-Swiss double taxation treaty and at stake is the newly inked, yet to be ratified, revised US-Swiss double taxation treaty.

Does the future of the revised US-Swiss double taxation treaty depend on the outcome of the UBS case?

As much was indicated by Doris Leuthard, the Swiss Economy Minister, as she called for a speedy resolution of the case. What the Minister is expressing in her pronouncements is simply the reality of the situation. Swiss maintain that the issues in the case are diplomatic and ought to be resolved in forum more appropriate to friendly relations between nations – face-to-face closed door negotiations – rather an the public spectacle of a courtroom. Secondly, while the treaty has been finalized it has yet to be ratified by the Swiss Parliament, a parliament that will be slow to give its blessing if it is dissatisfied with the outcome of the case.

So what exactly is going on in this case? This is a very good question for I myself was a bit confused for two reasons. The first is that UBS already plead guilty to assisting thousands of Americans to evade US taxes in a case brought by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in February of this year. In the same case it also paid fines of $750 million and disclosed 250 names of its US clients. So the case ought to be over, right? Well, yes and no. This was the criminal leg of the – and I am going to substitute strategy here for case to avoid any legal confusion – US authorities strategy to gain the names of as many as 52,000 believed to be evading US taxes.

The current case before the courts is the civil leg of the strategy brought by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). They have served on UBS a John Doe subpoena in an effort to force UBS to reveal the names, so those people can in turn answer to the authorities.

While I know that criminal and civil matters are wholly different creatures, this smacks of double prosecution – persecution if you will. Or is it?

The second thing that was puzzling me was this IRS case seems to have stepped outside the four corners of the existing double taxation treaty. The treaty only requires UBS, through Swiss authorities, to co-operate with US tax evasion investigations if the IRS can provide the specific names of the holders of secret offshore accounts. It is clear from the IRS´s actions, issuing a John Doe subpoena, that it clearly does not know the names of the suspected tax evaders. So that should be the end of it, right. Well, clearly not.

Now, what the IRS is doing is clearly is not only not double prosecution/persecution, it is well within, I believe, the scope of the treaty. In fact I would go as far as saying that it is share genius. This was revealed to me in a brief filed by the IRS in response to one filed by UBS. To see what I mean just take a look at section 2 of the brief, the head tells it all: ¨Nothing in the Tax Treaty Limits the IRS´s Authority to Enforce a Duly Authorized Summons Issued to a Third-Third Party Witness within the United States, or Requires the IRS to Exhaust its Treaty Rights With a Foreign Government Before Seeking to that Summons.¨

Unfortunate for UBS, and as rightly pointed out by the IRS ¨the existence of a treaty….does not limit the rights granted to the United States under the laws of this country¨ (the bold being original). Well, that is in part, it should read doesn’t limit those laws so limited by treaty obligation.

What the IRS has done is not too circumvent the treaty but simply not to bring it into the equation at all. It has kept the issue entirely domestic. As I said, share genius.

In any event the prospects are dim for UBS if a negotiated settlement is not reach soon. If UBS loses, which it looks increasingly probable, it will be faced with either defying US law by refusing to reveal the names or reveal the names and be in violation of Swiss banking law which carries with criminal sanction.

Now that a Floridia judge has agreed to postone the case the excutives at UBS will surely be working over time to reach an amecible resolution of the case.

L´Oreal Found Guilty Of Racial Discrimination

By: Ainsley Brown · July 16, 2009 · Filed Under Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Diversity in Law · Comment 

This is part of the Middle Passage Law Series and is cross posted on Commercial Law International.

BBR - Blue, Blanc, Rouge Now I know I have not posted a piece in this series in quite some time and for that I apologize – I have no excuse.

It may seem that I am either picking on L´Oreal, as I have tracked their recent legal battles with eBay on Commercial Law International, either that or I have an obsession with makeup. Let me assure you that neither in the case. With that over, let´s go to the story.

The La Cour de Cassation, the highest court in France, upheld the ruling by the Paris Court of Appeal, finding L´Oreal guilty of racial discrimination. The court also found Adecco, a temp-employment agency, involved through its Districom division, guilty and fined both it and L´Oreal €30,000. The court however, sent back to the Court of Appeal for its reconsideration the €30,000 each in damages payable to SOS Racisme, an anti-racism public interest group that brought the case.

The ruling ends three years of legal wrangling and is no doubt a huge blemish for L´Oreal.

The main issue of fact in the case was BBR. Yes, BBR. What in the world is BBR, you ask?

BBR or blue, blanc, rouge – the colors of the French flag. Now if you were to ask me I would have simply thought that this was a general patriotic gesture, however, it hides a much more sinister meaning. It, as the Times reports is an expression ¨widely recognized in the French recruitment world as code for white French people born to white French parents.¨ This would of course exclude not only the 4 million ethnic minorities current living in France but also any whites not born of pure French stock, including presumably none other than the French President himself Nicolas Sarkozy whose father is Hungarian.

It would seem that word got out that L´Oreal did not want any black, Asian or Arab sales staff to promote Fructis Style, a hair care product made by its Garnier division. Only BBR would do, I guess – because they are worth it – to play on L´Oreal´s because you are worth it ads. But, why?

And this for me is the most troubling aspect of this case.  The BBR move by L´Oreal hints at a much larger and disquieting issue in French society. Yes, racism, this is very obvious but much more than that it is brand of racism that operates not just on the fringes of society but at its heart – in the labour and retail markets – while at the same time managing to remain in the shadows .

How is it that this BBR policy that so pervades the French employment and retail markets is only now seeing the light of day?

Like I said, very troubling indeed.

However, a silver lining to all of this is that BBR has now been fully exposed in a court of law. From now on the racial prejudice that operates in the French labour and retail markets can no longer be subject to denials of anecdote or conjecture. The court record stands as an official record by the state that BBR does exist and is a proven fact.

As for L´Oreal, this cannot be good for its brand management. For a company that so fiercely defends its brands, just take a look at its battles with eBay, this was not only a poorly conceived recruitment drive but also incorrectly defended case – this is not to be read as a dig at L´Oreal´s lawyers, not at all, I am sure they represented their client the best way they could, however, I am unreservedly criticizing L´Oreal.

L´Oreal forgot that it´s all about the brand. What they sell is much more than simply a product, it is a lifestyle, it is instant gratification, it is control and it is improved self-confidence through a line of beauty products designed for one thing – to improve the true beauty that is you. Nothing can be allowed tarnish the brand less they lose sales and market share.

If this is the basic market reality of the L´Oreal brand, and for that matter any brand, why would you maintain the spectacle of a public trial for three years with a case that even if it comes out in your favor could still blemish the brand?

There is no doubt that L´Oreal´s PR team is hard at work trying to figure out how to either make this go away or finding an angle on how to spin this. A word to the wise, L´Oreal, you have already been found guilty, it would be an exercise in futility to deny any part of this.  In fact such a denial, in whole or in part, direct or indirect, could result in a backlash against the brand. It would be better to fully accept culpability, say sorry and take positive and no doubt public steps in order to combat BBR or other forms of discrimination. That my friend is your angle.

Mau Mau to sue the British Government

By: Ainsley Brown · June 29, 2009 · Filed Under Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Class Action, Criminal Law, Ethics, Politics · 4 Comments 

First Posted on Commercial Law International on June 24, 2009.

Concentration Camps

Concentration Camps

By Charles Wanguhu

The above move by the Kenyan freedom fighters to sue the British government has elicited some very interesting responses from some readers of the times online paper:

This is all about money and bashing the UK. Africa does not want to take responsibility for its current problems
Also if this happened in the 50’s so why have they waited till now?

Lawyers and Money again: A poisonous mix. Why after so long drag up these horrors. The Mau Mau allegedly used to drink the blood of the white farmers they killed. The British allegedly tortured Mau Mau. What good can come of this knowledge now? Time to put these things back in the box of history

While the above sentiments may be of a few it may be worth placing their arguments in a context. Firstly during the emergency in Kenya loads of kikuyu men were rounded up and accused of being Mau Mau based on accusations by guards who were collaboratoring with the british. We can therefore not claim that all those held in prison camps tortured and killed were indeed Mau Mau fighters.

Secondly what is more at stake is the recognition by the UK government that it was official colonial policy to run concentration camps and that it was sanctioned at the top.

In the article :

Professor Anderson states that is doubtful the lawsuit in its current form — targeting the state rather than those surviving individuals who allegedly carried out the abuse — will succeed.

“There can be no doubt that torture was used by British Forces . . . but the question remains ‘who is responsible?’,” he said.

Whoever this notion is flawed in that when a criminal offence occurs it is not the role of the victim to seek evidence against the offender and then bring in criminal charges against them. When a state decides to open up institutions of incarceration it is the states responsibility to ensure that the inmates are treated in a humane way and not subjected to torture. In this instance the British colonial state failed in their duty and they should therefore be brought to account for their inaction when it was clear what is happening. The Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya by Caroline Elkins is an account of the atrocities carried out on the Kikuyu population in Kenya and is worth a read for any individual prior to defending the british actions.

The Mau Mau atrocities cannot be denied and were definitely atrocious. It is however pretentious to claim that they were on a similar scale as the colonial state with their better equipped and organised forces. In addition the fact that they used Machetes and not guns is akin to declaring that the British killings were undertaken in a humane way.

The question is should it be placed in history and forgotten about? Well while seeming to take a leaf from its predecessors the Kenyan Government extra judicially killed up to 400 Kikuyu young men accusing them of being Mungiki (a group not too dissimilar to the Mau Mau if not claiming their inspiration from the Mau Mau) should we forget about them as well.

While it is in the interest of majority of British people to be forward looking, the victims of atrocities still seek justice. History appears to be relative as the World Cup win in 1966 is considered fresh enough to be brought up at every opportunity but atrocities committed six years earlier than the win are too far to be worth remembering.

The issue is not so much monetary compensation but recognition that it was official British Gvt policy to carry out such atrocities and that indeed the victims of these actions were in some instances innocent people who happened to be members of the wrong ethnic community at the time.

The Cozy Bank-Law Firm Relationship May Not Be So Cozy After All…These days Anyway, Part II.

By: Ainsley Brown · June 18, 2009 · Filed Under Civil Procedure, Class Action, Ethics, Securities Law · Comment 

First posted on Commercial Law International on June 17, 2009.

McKenna v. Gammon Gold Inc.

This is case that has the potential to redefine the very cozy relationship law firms have with their banker clients. No longer will bankers be given blanket coverage under conflict of interest rules to prevent law firms from being representatives in claims brought against them.

The operative word here being potential, as you shall will see.

The relevant facts of the case in brief are as follows: the defendants in the case included the underwriting syndicate of Gammon Gold´s public share offering. Two member of the syndicate included BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc. and TD Securities Inc., both subsidiaries of BMO and TD respectively. It just so happens that Siskinds, who represented the representative plaintiff, McKenna, in the class action, was concurrently retained by BMO and TD to undertake debt enforcement and personal bankruptcy matters. As a result the defendants raised the issue of conflict of interest, seeking to get Siskinds removed from the case.

The judge in the case, Madame Justice Lax, was having none of it; holding that there was no conflict. In her ruling Justice Lax made it clear that ¨the underwriters and banks are separate and sophisticated business and legal entities that are individually governed and autonomous. She went on to say further that ¨the banks had no reasonable expectation that their subsidiaries would be treated as clients.¨

And rightly so. While I fully agree with the judgment, it still remains unclear how it will be received by banks but more importantly, law firms. This is why I said it has the potential to redefine the bank-law firm relationship. It will all depends on how it is read. If the case is read very narrowly and confined to the particular facts of the case, that is where there is a parent and subsidiary relationship and they are separate, sophisticated business and legal entities, individually governed and autonomous, then there is no conflict. This is the extreme and I don’t believe that it will be this narrowly read. However, I do believe that there is the strong potential for it to be read narrowly enough as to preserve largely if not totally the existing regime. It will all depend on the mood (i.e. economic conditions) of the law firms I guess.

On the other hand, if the decision is read more globally, it could usher in a new era of freedom to act o the part of law firms. I hope it is the latter; however, I would not be surprised if it is some form of the former.

In a passing note in Part I of this post I referred to lawyers as attack dogs, this was meant as no offence – I even referred to myself as an attack dog in training. However it was said to provoke some self examination and self evaluation on the part of myself and those more senior in the profession. All too often clients see us in that role and we sometimes do little or nothing to disprove this perception. While I know that I have a long way to go in the profession, I am after all only an articling student, for me; a lawyer is an advocate, a professional that aggressively safeguards the interest s of their clients, however, this dusty must be balance against other professional and personal considerations.

Am I wrong or just being naive?

The Cozy Bank-Law Firm Relationship May Not Be So Cozy After All…These Days Anyway, Part I

By: Ainsley Brown · June 17, 2009 · Filed Under Civil Procedure, Class Action, Ethics, Securities Law · Comment 

First posted on Commercial Law International on Jun 5, 2009.

In Canada an Ontario Superior Court of Justice ruling (McKenna v. Gammon Gold Inc.) has the potential to go viral like the latest YouTube sensation and challenge what can only be called one of the most incestuous relationships in the commercial world.

What am I talking about?

Well I am referring to the relationship, the very close relationship, between banks and law firms.

Ever wonder why, if and when, a bank or other financial institution is being sued it is very rare to find a big name law firm representing the plaintiff but they are very much present to represent the defendant bank? This my friends is no coincidence, it is a deliberate strategy on the part of the banks and other financial institutions. They set out to exploit the conflict of interest rules that lawyers are bound by – a lawyer may not generally represent two clients on opposite sides on the same matter – and they do a very good job of it. This is evidenced by the fact that banks and other financial instructions will spread the legal work they have around to as many international, national, regional and local based (powerhouse) law firms as they can in any market they operate.

The strategy is simple but effective: tie up the biggest, the brightest, the best and if need be the most belligerent legal talent out there. The benefits of this strategy accrue to banks in two significant and interconnect ways. The first is that they have the best legal talent working for them on ordinary transactions while at the same time having them in reserve ready to be unleashed like a pack of attack dogs. The second, which flows from the first, is that having such well trained and impressive attack dogs – oh sorry, I mean lawyers – at the ready will and does inspire fear in not only prospective claimants but other lawyers as well (though most would not admit it).

The law firms are not entirely innocent here, in fact not at all. They are willing subjects or is that objects of the strategy to exploit the conflict of interest rules. They enter this relationship; in fact they actively seek to forge these links, with their eyes, arms and billable hour’s dockets´ all wide open. Law firms know that the work from the banks is not only constant but very lucrative as well, so they are more than happy to be attack dogs for hire.

However, we now live in different times, as this once cozy relationship is being undone or at least it has hit a rocky patch called the current global recession. Whoever first said: it´s all about the money was so right. It is indeed all about the money for both banks and law firms. The former having less work to spread around now is also lacking a commercial rational that would satisfy shareholder costs´ accountability of having such high paid attack dogs in reserve. Consequently, the banks are now looking to cut costs and have aggressively gone after external legal costs reducing the number of attack dogs – sorry, I mean lawyers – it holds in reserve and how much it pays them.

The law firms for their part, seeing the writing on the wall have, have begun to seek out other clients. In fact this has resulted in the once impossible, law firms, well at least in this case, have begun to represent claimants against the banks.

The conflict of interest rules once untested and applied broadly, I would say too broadly, to the bank-law firm relationship is now set for realignment. No longer will law firms simply refuse or not actively seek out work, simply because a suit might be brought against one of their clients. I know I am only an attack dog in training- pardon me, I should say student at law – but my reading of the conflicts section of the Ontario Rules of Professional Conduct does not support such a broad application. Provided the issues are not related, the clients’ information in possession of the lawyer bares no relevance to each other and the lawyers that handle each client´s matter are different, it is difficult to see where a conflict of interest would be created.

Thankfully I don’t have to stand alone in my opinion. I now have Justice Lax in McKenna v. Gammon Gold Inc. to back me up when she ruled that Siskinds should not be disqualified for a conflict of interest from prosecuting a class action against an underwriting subsidiary of a client bank that it acts for in separate matters.

And how so? Well you are just going to have to stay tuned for part two.

Shell & The Elephant In The Room

By: Ainsley Brown · June 10, 2009 · Filed Under ADR/Mediation, Civil Procedure, Ethics, Politics · Comment 

First posted on Commercial Law International on June 9, 2009.

By Charles Wanguhu

A report by the Economist Intelligence Unit indicates that protecting a firm’s reputation is the most important and difficult task facing corporations. With the development of global media and communication channels, managing reputational damage is seen as crucial with events undertaken in even the remotest areas affecting the international brand of a corporation.

For Shell the stark reality of reputational damage is all too clear. After years and years of denial and expressing its innocence of the Ogoni affair (it still maintains its innocence), Shell has decided to settle a case brought against it out of court for a sum of 15.5 Million US $. The lawsuit had accused the company of colluding with Nigeria’s former military regime over the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and other peaceful anti-oil protesters.

Like Nike before it Shell remains in many minds as the poster child of a lack of corporate responsibility especially in big multinationals. The Saro Wiwa case is largely sited not only in commercial classrooms but across NGO conferences worldwide. Multinationals are viewed as bulldozing their way with the help of corrupt and dictatorial regimes to fulfill their interests with complete disregard to vulnerable communities.

The perception of Shell as the irresponsible corporate persists despite the fact that it has invested millions in engaging communities in areas that it works in and has increasingly taken on human rights in its business models and stakeholder engagement strategies.

still life about the concept of  the nostalgy

In response to the case filed Malcolm Brinded, Shell’s executive director for exploration and production, was quoted,

“While we were prepared to go to court to clear our name, we believe the right way forward is to focus on the future for Ogoni people, which is important for peace and stability in the region.”

The settlement could be seen as a magnanimous move by Shell in some quarters with some already hailing the move as groundbreaking in terms of holding corporations accountable. However when looked at broadly the settlement will be seen as a coup for Shells PR team: instead of having weeks, months or even years of a contested trial where Shells actions or lack of thereof would be once again stirred up in everyone’s mind globally, a quick settlement offers a quick escape route.

All in all $15.5Million may well be considered a bargain when factoring in legal costs, reputation risks and lost revenue. There could well have been some champagne popped at Shell HQs but am sure downstairs in the legal department the wait is on with baited breath to see whether the floodgates have been open.

Privy Council In Bank Ruling Wraps Jamaican Judiciary On the Knuckles, Part III

By: Ainsley Brown · May 20, 2009 · Filed Under Civil Procedure, Contracts · Comment 

First posted on Commercial Law International on May 19, 2009.

Injunction, injunction, what´s your function?

Sorry I just could not resist. Despite my lame attempts at a joke, it is a very valid question.

What is the function of an injunction?

It is a power whereby the court may order positive action be taken or an order to refrain from acts being currently done. It may be granted at the interlocutory (that is to say at any stage before the end of a trial) or it could form part of a judge´s final judgment. In either case it is a very powerful tool of the courts and one that is not exercised lightly. Special attention, however, should be paid to the interlocutory injunction as it is a pre-trial determination, it is also a subject on which the Privy Council had a few choice words for both the Jamaican judiciary and Jamaican Bar in National Commercial Bank Jamaica Limited vs. Olint Corporation Limited.

The interlocutory injunction is best thought of as a pause button. It is designed to freeze in place the item that is in dispute by ideally preserving the status quo. However, we do not live in a static world and there are going to be winners and there are going to be losers with such an order – you could go as far as saying such an order creates only losers and worse losers. This is why judges are or ought to be extremely cautious in the exercise of this discretion. It should not be that the making of such an order – one that is done without the full rigors of a trial – be determinative of the (main) issue or issues in dispute. This is why judges look to what is called balance of convenience (American Cyanamid Co v. Ethicon Ltd) or more accurately the balance of inconvenience. As Lord Hoffman explains in the NCB case, ¨the basic principle is that the court should take whichever course seems likely to cause the least prejudice to one party or the other.¨

Having decided that Mr. Justice Jones was correct in the first instance to dismiss the case, holding that there was no triable issue, their Lordships had no need to go any further. However (a favorite word of a lawyer), their Lordships went on to deliver a dicta that wrapped the knuckles of the Jamaican judiciary and Bar – as would a school master a disobedient pupil in days of old. As many a current and former law student come to learn, while the ratio of a case deals with the issues at hand, it is often the dicta though said by the way, that is the most significant aspect of a judgment.  And this I believe is the case here.

Their Lordships wanted to point out, provide some guidance and in a display of judicial politics, gave the Jamaican legal establishment scolding – that was at times not so well veiled.

There were two features of this case that troubled the Privy Council. The first was that, ¨there appears to have been no reason why the application for an injunction should have been made ex parte, or at any rate, without some notice to the bank.¨ An injunction applied for and given without presence or notice to the other party ought to be a very rare thing, ¨although the matter is in the end one for the discretion of the judge, audi alterem partem is a salutary and important principle.¨ Audi alterem partem – sorry for the Latin but it had to be done -  is a fundamental tenet and a cornerstone of justice and cannot be trotted on lightly. It is the right for the other side in a dispute to be heard – like I said a cornerstone of our justice system.

Given the facts of the case, especially the nature of what was in dispute, there should have been no reason why the application for the injunction should not have been inter partes but at a minimum with there should have been some notice to the bank. As their Lordships pointed out, ¨any notice is better than none.¨ The guidance provided to judges considering such applications was made by Lord Hoffmann in no uncertain terms.  He lays down the law (literally), ¨that a judge should not entertain an application of which no notice has been given unless either giving notice would enable the defendant to take steps to defeat the purpose of the injunction…or there has been literally no time to give notice before the injunction is required to prevent the threatened wrongful act.¨ The italics are Lord Hoffmann´s.  Lord Hoffmann further went on to point out these two conditions are enshrined in the Section 17.4 (4) of the Jamaican Civil Procedure Rules 2002.

What characterizes both these alternatives is a sense of urgency. Olint it would seem feared that the immediate closure of its accounts would prejudice it in its main action against the bank. However such fears are not substantiated by the facts of the case. Not only was Olint given ample notice, they were given an extension. Moreover, the closure of a bank account, with or without extensive notice, is not sufficient grounds on which to say that there was no time to give notice. Their Lordships wondered why, ¨no explanation has been given for why it was not possible for the bank to be given notice of the application.¨

However, it was later explained to their Lordships that such last minute ex parte applications had become common practice in Jamaica. The recent cases of World Wise Partners Ltd v RBTT (2008) and Smith v NCB (2008) were cited as examples.

The Privy Council, expectedly, took exception to such blatant disregard for the law and the Civil Procedure Rules by both the judiciary for granting such injunctions and the Bar for applying for them.   They went on to say, ¨these cases appear to show a disregard of rule 17.4 (4) for which no justification is offered. If the rule is not generally enforced, plaintiffs will be encouraged to make a tactical use of the legal process which should not be allowed.¨

Like I said a wrap on the knuckles – actually in legal terms a wrap is highly understating things.

The second feature that troubled the Privy Council was the way in which both Smith J and the Court of Appeal applied the balance of convenience test in the refusal, in the case of the former, and the granting, in the case of the latter of the interlocutory injunction. The basic principle that both had to be mindful of, ¨is that the court should take whichever course seems likely to cause the least irremediable prejudice to one party or the other.¨ Moreover, ¨what is required in each case is to examine what on the particular facts of the case the consequences of granting or withholding of the injunction is likely to be¨

It appears that what the Jamaican courts did was first to characterize the injunction as either mandatory (requiring positive action) or prohibitory while applying the balance of convenience test. Each requires different factors to be taken into account. A mandatory interlocutory injunction would require a ¨high degree of assurance¨ that the applicant would be prejudiced by its refusal, while a prohibitory interlocutory injunction required a ¨serious issue to be tried.¨ At first instance Mr. Justice Jones characterized it has mandatory and refused to grant it while the Court of Appeal characterized it as prohibitory and granted it.

As it turns out the judge at fist instance was correct in result but not in his reasoning. Because what matters is what the practical consequences of the injunction are, ¨arguments over whether the injunction should be classified as prohibitive or mandatory are barren (Films Rover International Ltd v Cannon Films Sales Ltd). Their Lordships made it clear that they ¨consider that this type of box-ticking approach does not do justice to the complexity of a decision as to whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction.¨

Yet another wrap on the knuckles….Ouch.

It will be very interesting to see what that reaction of the judiciary and Bar will be in Jamaica. This may be a bitter pill to swallow; however, to my mind their Lordships are wholly correct in fact and in law.

Privy Council In Bank Ruling Wraps Jamaican Judiciary On the Knuckles, Part II

By: Ainsley Brown · May 15, 2009 · Filed Under Civil Procedure, Contracts, Regulatory Law · Comment 

By: Ainsley Brown

The claims advanced by Olint, though ultimately would proven to be groundless is very important because it, gave us a brief glimpse into the subtleties of judicial politics. Before I go any further some context by way of an example I believe would be useful. The words with all due respect, seem quite mundane or you could even say respectful, however, not so in a court room – it is quite disrespectful. The respect for a judge and his or her court room flow naturally from their position and there is no need to remind the judge that you are being respectful. This is something that lawyers and judges know alike, so whenever such words are uttered it is code for hey, judge I am right and you are just full of it – like I said disrespectful.

Though totally unrelated to the case, this example illustrate the point nicely, that words matter and that in the politics of the courtroom they often have much greater meaning than they seem at first glance. Now back to the case.

Olint´s first argument would provide the ground for strongest rebuke by their Lordships of the Jamaican Court of Appeal. Lord Hoffmann even went as far as calling out the reasoning or better yet lack thereof of one of the judges of the Court of Appeal – a one Morrison JA. In the Court of Appeal Morrison JA criticized Mr. Justice Jones, at first instance for disposing of the matter by way of mini-rail, holding that the matter gave rise to a serious issue and ought to be tried. However, Lord Hoffmann goes on to point out, saying of Morrison JA that ¨ he did not explain what the issue would be and their Lordships consider that one has only to read section 4(3) (c) to see that it is irrelevant to any issue in this case.¨

This is Lord Hoffmann´s way of saying: your work is sloppy and you don’t know what you are talking about. Like I said a strong rebuke.

The claim, by the way, was that s. 4(3)(c) of the Banking Act had modified the bank´s contractual right to terminate the banking relationship by giving reasonable notice. Unfortunate for Olint s. 4(3)(c) of the Banking Act is part of the general fit and proper licensing provisions of s.4, under which the Bank of Jamaica grants licenses. It therefore does not take a legally trained mind to see that Olint is simply fishing and that there is not only no serious issue here but no issue at all – no wonder the strong rebuke.

The second argument advanced by Olint was that NCB by closing its accounts was abusing its market position. As I like to call it, and to put it in the Jamaican vernacular: dem a fight gainst man (translated: they are opposed to us) argument. This argument while it has great cultural resonance, and it could be argued reflects a commercial reality; it however has no basis in law.

Firstly, no evidence was furnished that NCB did indeed have a dominant position in the commercial banking sector in Jamaica. However, their Lordships did take judicial notice that NCB was ¨the second largest in Jamaica, with 34-37% of total loans and 30-35% of total deposits, but the Bank of Nova Scotia is larger and there are four other commercial banks in Jamaica, to say nothing of the foreign banks. They are all in competition with each other. It is not easy to acquire dominant position in the banking market.¨ Secondly, even if NCB had a dominant market position the refusal to continue be Olint´s banker does not procure for NCB some market advantage. If anything it does quite the opposite by enabling ¨competitors to pick up another customer if they felt inclined to do so.¨

The third claim by Olint, was that NCB was attempting to induce breaches of contract between itself and its club members.  Inducement of breaches of contract is a tort (a civil wrong) that would require not only that NCB knew that it would cause the breach of contract but that it intended to so ( OBG Ltd v Allan 2008). This by far was Olint´s strongest argument I think. However, their Lordships described it as a ¨hopeless proposition.¨ It will be remember from Part I that it was the refusal of Olint to furnish its audited books that kicked off this sequence of events. NCB could not without proper knowledge of the relationship of Olint and its members know or set out to cause breaches of contracts. What Olint was in fact saying was that NCB knew its actions would cause the breach and with this certain knowledge set out to cause the said breach of contractual arrangements. But how can you set out to cause or much less know that a breach would be caused in a contract that you haven’t even seen?

Stay tuned for Part III as it will deal with the injunction issue.

Privy Council In Bank Ruling Wraps Jamaican Judiciary On the Knuckles, Part I

By: Ainsley Brown · May 14, 2009 · Filed Under Civil Procedure, Contracts · Comment 

First posted on Commercial Law International on May 12, 2009.

The House of Lords, with its Judicial Committee of the Privy Council hat on, as Jamaica’s court of final appeal, handed down a judgment that is set to have repercussions well beyond the interests of the parties involved. In fact the consequences of this judgment go beyond just banking or investing but engages commercial dispute resolution, specifically commercial litigation.

The injunction is a very important – that should read indispensable – tool in the commercial lawyer’s arsenal. It is a power that is highly discretionary and exercised with sensitivity to the peculiarities of the case which by the way includes the idiosyncrasies judge. It is a power jealously guarded by the judiciary and as a matter of judicial comity and judicial politics the power to exercise this discretion is largely left unquestioned, with limited exception, to a judge at first instance. Therefore, whenever a court, much less the highest one in the land, is critical of the way in which this discretion is or has been exercised by other courts all involved in the legal process have right to take pause.

However before I get into what I believe to be the more important aspect of the ruling I should deal with the ratio of the case – for the non lawyers/ non Latin speakers the ratio or ratio decidendi are the reasons or rational for a decision. It will provide not only context for the more important dissuasion on injunctions but will also bring to the fore the importance of this ruling to the banking sector n Jamaica.

National Commercial Bank Jamaica Limited vs. Olint Corporation Limited, is a case that exemplifies why commercial awareness is global.

The question that their Lordships had to focus their minds on was whether a bank, by giving reasonable notice, could lawfully close an account that was not n debit, where there was no evidence of the account being used for unlawful purposes? In the judgment delivered by Lord Hoffmann, ¨their Lordships have no doubt that in the absence of express contrary agreement or statutory impediment, a contract by a bank to provide banking services to a customer is terminable upon reasonable notice.¨

The facts of the case, in brief are: Olint  provided administrative and other services to an investment club. The club allegedly derived its profits from foreign exchange trading which was proffered as an explanation for its high rate of returns to its member. It opened two accounts with National Commercial Bank (NCB) in 2005  and a third in 2007. Near the end of 2006 Olint, along with other investment clubs, began to attract  very unfavorable coverage in the press . They faced allegations that they were operating a Ponzi scheme where returns to older investors were being paid out of money from newer investors.

It is interesting to note that Olint and other investment  clubs sprouted up as a specific  market response to the lack of investment alternatives, especially for the lower and middle strata  of Jamaican society. In this respect they were in direct competition with the financial establishment  - the  commercial banks and other financial institutions.

In August of  2007 NCB as per its anti-money laundering and terrorist financing legal obligations – but no doubt also motivated by its concerns over the fraud allegations – asked to see the audited accounts of Olint. None was forthcoming. NCB being apprehensive that the allegations could turn out to be true, opening it up for reputational damage and or claims for negligent or dishonest assistance, decided to end is relationship with Olint. It wrote to Olint in November informing them of the decision to close their accounts on December 17 – a notice period of 32 days.

This action by NCB only added to the atmosphere at the time that NCB and the financial establishment were using at best the strictures of the law or at worst under handed tactics in order to remove the competition that Olint and the other investment clubs offered. To put it in the Jamaican  vernacular: dem a fight gainst man (translated: they are opposed to us) . Unfortunately, even if  this is a commercial reality and I offer no opinion pro or con, it finds no basis in law.

In response on November 21st Olint asked NCB for an extension to March 14 2008, NCB believing that this period was too long agreed to extend until January 14 2008. On January 1, days before the extension period was going to expire Olint without any notice successfully applied ex parte (from (by or for) one party) injunction preventing NCB from closing its accounts until January 15th.  An application inter parties (between the parties) came before Mr. Justice Jones on the 17th and 18th of March. He dismissed the application because he did not find that it gave rise to a serious issue. Olint appealed and on July  18th 2008 the Court of Appeal grated the injunction until trail.

Based on the allegations in the particulars of claim served by Olint, it did not claim that the extended period was too short, ¨instead , it is alleged that the bank was acting maliciously, contrary to its statutory obligations under the banking Act and Fair Competition Act and with the intent of inducing breaches of contract between the company and members of the investment club.¨ their Lordship review each of these agreements and had no problem dismissed each in turn as being baseless.

Stay tuned for Part II.

German Multinational Loses Teapot Battle

By: Ainsley Brown · April 9, 2009 · Filed Under Civil Procedure, Intellectual Property, Pro Bono · Comment 
Have a cuppa.

Have a cuppa.

First posted on Commercial Law International on April 3, 2009.

It is an understatement to say that the English take their tea very seriously. And it is little wonder why a small teashop in Surrey, England, even when faced with potential financial ruin, would not back down from a much larger German multinational. This is a tale about tea better yet teapots; a David and a Goliath; and lest I forget the rights to uses a logo.

Not long after the Tea Box opened, providing an up-market alternative to the run of the mill ‘main street’ coffee shop, it was faced with a legal challenge from a Duesseldorf based company. It would seem Teekanne, which happens to mean teapot in German, took exception to the hand painted teapot logo that Tea Box was using. Teekanne claimed that it was too similar to its own logo and could cause customer confusion.

What Teekanne wasn’t counting on – I guess they expected such a small time operation to be impressed by its sized and resources and cave in but this is the UK and we are talking a bout tea but I digress. What they were not counting on was that one of the UK’s leading intellectual property firms coming to the rescue of Tea Box. Withers & Rogers LLP took on the case pro bono- for my none legal people out there this means free. This is good to see, as a profession we need more of this. The words pro bono for lawyers as become all too often associated with criminal, civil rights, family or judicial review matters, please don’t read this as a dig at the lawyer who perform such work, they are doing a great community service, however, the community can also be served when commercial law firms take on such cases.

And now back to the story.

After receiving early indications from the UK Intellectual Property Office that it would likely rule in favour of Tea Box, Teekanne promptly withdrew, great for Tea Box but not so great for Teekanne. Not did it lose money from mounting this legal challenge but it also had the effect of improving the market awareness of the Tea Box brand. You could even say that for Tea Box Commercial Awareness Is Global – hahahhahah, sorry about the cheesy plug for the site but hey I am a future lawyer trying to carve out a niche for my self.

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