RSS FeedGoblins crave to eat the Charter
The Abdelrazik affair exposed some of Canada’s poorly known but in-your-face draconian laws. James Yap of Osgoode Hall Law School wrote a fantastic post about the federal United Nations Act and the United Nations Al-Qaida and Taliban Regulations on TheCourt.ca. Go read it.
Facebook status update corroborates alibi
Popular social networking sites such as Facebook have been the focus of legal attention for issues of privacy, and for their increasing use as evidence against parties in legal matters. Many criminal defendants and parties to divorce proceedings have been considerate enough to record their misdeeds for posterity, and savvy prosecutors and divorce attorneys have been keen enough to try to use them.
One recent incident stands in stark contrast: using Facebook helped one New York teen to clear his name by corroborating a much needed alibi. Rodney Bradford, 19, was arrested as a suspect in a robbery case. The district attorney found his alibi – his parents claimed he was at home with them – dubious, up until Rodney’s attorney pointed out this Facebook status update made near the time of the robbery:
“Where’s my pancakes? Oct. 17, at 11:49 a.m.”
Charges were dropped after Facebook confirmed the status update was made from a computer located at Rodney’s father’s apartment.
Reported in NY Times Local for Fort Green
Access to justice or abuse of legal aid?
Killer cop seeks funds for appeal
Peter Edwards writes:
A Toronto police officer who ran up a $1.2-million legal aid bill while on trial for his mistress’s murder is now seeking taxpayer funding to appeal his conviction.
EPA lawyers who criticize cap-and-trade cautioned by EPA over professional ethics
As the controversy over impeding U.S. climate legislation continues to simmer, one interesting recent development is the spotlight on two California EPA attorneys: Laurie Williams and Allan Zabel.
The N.Y. Times reported that the U.S. EPA has directed the pair to remove or to make changes to a YouTube video they posted which is critical of the cap-and-trade bills currently being tossed around in the legislative houses. (The video, apparently made in September, critiques the U.S. House of Representatives’ Waxman-Markey Bill [H.R. 2454 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009]. Currently, the U.S. Senate is debating its own version [S.1733 Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act].)
According to the EPA, Williams and Zabel violated EPA ethical guidelines when they substantiated their views with their “20 years each working as attorneys at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency” – thereby accenting the credibility of their “personal opinion” with their office.
For some, this issue is censorship thinly veiled in professional ethics. The American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct, for instance, doesn’t prohibit political expression by lawyers. Rule 1.2(b) specifically states that representation doesn’t constitute an endorsement of political views. The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct does restrict a judge’s capacity for political expression under Rule 4.1(A)(2), in order to maintain the impartiality of the position. But should government attorneys shed their capacity for political expression? On the other hand, for government attorneys, the government is their client. You don’t see many lawyers publishing videos where they criticize their client.
In either case, Williams and Zabel’s criticisms of cap-and-trade will no doubt be capitalized on by opponents of climate legislation. This is unfortunate, because their criticisms – which are just the media’s latest recognition of the carbon tax vs cap-and-trade debate (“carbon fees with rebates”… does anyone still fondly remember the Liberal Green Shift Plan?) – do voice very legitimate concerns.
I take Williams and Zabel’s criticisms to be essentially: 1) carbon offsets provide a run-around hard cap-targets; 2) carbon offsets often have unintended consequences; 3) the price instability associated with implementing a cap-and-trade scheme prevents the promotion of the desired innovation. Obviously, where the goal of the legislation is to curb carbon emissions and to shift to alternative energy, these are bad.
But, are their criticisms of the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade scheme, say… equally applicable to that of Kerry-Boxer? With respect to at least one point – offsets – yes, they are a potential problem. But are they an intractable one? Both bills provide mechanisms that attempt to limit the potential unintended consequences of offsets. (i.e. – regulatory bodies to administer, and the ability to reverse offsets). This may or may not completely obviate the point, but it does address it. With respect to price instability and innovation – that’s an economic argument that’s beyond my purview.
But I do know this: any hope of success at Copenhagen rests largely on the ability of the U.S. to pass strong climate legislation, and to thereby commit to hard targets. Most signs seem to indicate Kerry-Boxer will pass. Even if cap-and-trade wouldn’t achieve everything some think it needs to, at the very least it seems to be the first viable step.
Law School 2.0?
The traditional sense of lecture is obsolete.
Hate crime in London, Ontario
A woman had her head covering torn off and was pelted with anti-Arab slurs in an attempted stabbing London police are treating as a hate crime.
Exclusive school accused of coverup
A lawsuit accuses an exclusive Ottawa prep school of refusing to make a sexual assault complaint to police after a 16-year-old boy was allegedly attacked by fellow students during a Grade 11 trip to Boston.
Sex assault and consent
Rookie officer acquitted in sex assault
A man meets a woman on a dating website. They get together for coffee. Later, they move on to her car and start making out and talking about sex. But she changes her mind and he gets charged with sexual assault. Did she consent to the making out?
Peter Small writes for the Toronto Star:
The judge discounted much of her version, noting they were parked either in the coffee shop parking lot or at a gas station, where she could easily have alerted passersby.
Protecting internet anonymity: the case for providing notice to anonymous defendants in defamation cases
An open issue in Canadian internet defamation law is whether courts should require that anonymous defendants be given notice of, and an opportunity to oppose, applications to compel the disclosure of their identities by third parties such as websites and internet service providers (“ISPs”). Because applications to compel disclosure are generally left unchallenged by third parties who would rather evade the costly cross-fire of litigation, courts have tended to review such applications ex parte. The concern in these cases is that anonymous defendants may be stripped of their anonymity – and thereby subjected to embarrassment, social stigma, or harm to their career prospects – all without an initial opportunity to anonymously submit a written response or retain counsel to oppose the application. This post discusses the status of a notice requirement in Canadian, American, and English law and evaluates the different approaches.
1. Canadian Law
Only one Canadian case has commented on the appropriateness of a notice requirement. In York University v. Bell Canada Enterprises, [2009] O.J. No. 3689 (S.C.J.) (“York University”) a plaintiff sought pre-action discovery by way of an equitable bill of discovery known as a Norwich Order. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice granted the Norwich Order, which required ISPs to disclose information necessary for the plaintiff to obtain the identity of the anonymous author of allegedly defamatory emails and web postings. Justice G.R. Strathy noted that it might be appropriate to impose a notice requirement, but declined to do so without providing reasons:
[I]t may be appropriate, in a given case, to require that the unknown publisher of the offending material be given notice of the proceedings. It does not appear to have been done as a matter of course in other Norwich order cases and I did not consider it necessary to do so in this case.
York University was discussed by other commentators in two excellent blog posts on Slaw: the first generally outlining the case, and the second commenting on specific points including the notice issue.
2. English law
The appropriateness of a notice requirement has received more attention in English law. In Totalise plc v The Motley Fool, [2001] E.M.L.R. 29 (H.C.), [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1233 (C.A.) (“Totalise”), the English Court of Appeal described the rationale for a notice requirement. In that case, Justice Owen of the English High Court first granted a Norwich Order that compelled a website operator to reveal the identifying information of an anonymous defendant that posted allegedly defamatory statements about the plaintiff. When the case was appealed on the issue of costs, Justice Aldous noted in obiter that it would have been desirable to require the third party to give the anonymous defendant notice of the application and then allow the anonymous defendant to make written submissions through the third party in order to better inform the court’s decision:
It is difficult to see how the court can carry out this task [i.e. whether to grant the requested order] if what it is refereeing is a contest between two parties, neither of whom is the person most concerned, the data subject; one of whom is the data subject’s prospective antagonist; and the other of whom knows the data subject’s identity, has undertaken to keep it confidential so far as the law permits, and would like to get out of the cross-fire as rapidly and as cheaply as possible. However the website operator can, where appropriate, tell the user what is going on and to offer to pass on in writing to the claimant and the court any worthwhile reason the user wants to put forward for not having his or her identity disclosed. Further, the court could require that to be done before making an order. Doing so will enable the court to do what is required of it with slightly more confidence that it is respecting the law laid down in more than one statute by Parliament and doing no injustice to a third party, in particular not violating his convention rights.
Although the obiter from Totalise is compelling, English courts have yet to impose a notice requirement. In the recent case of Sheffield Wednesday Football Club Ltd v. Hargreaves, [2007] EWHC 2375 (Q.B.) a justice of the English High Court dealt with a similar case and, after considering Totalise, concluded in the absence of reasons that
It did not seem to me that this was a case where I should require that the website users [i.e. the anonymous defendants] be contacted before making an order.
3. American law
American law, by contrast, strongly supports a notice requirement. In the leading case of Dendrite International, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. App. Div. 2001) (“Dendrite”), a New Jersey appellate court articulated a series of requirements for plaintiffs to meet before a court would order disclosure. The first of these requires that the plaintiff make efforts to notify the anonymous defendant that they are the subject of an application for an order to disclose their identities so that the defendants have a reasonable opportunity to respond:
We hold that when such an application is made, the trial court should first require the plaintiff to undertake efforts to notify the anonymous posters that they are the subject of a subpoena or application for an order of disclosure, and withhold action to afford the fictitiously-named defendants a reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition to the application. These notification efforts should include posting a message of notification of the identity discovery request to the anonymous user on the ISP’s pertinent message board.
Several notable American cases have adopted the same or similar notice requirements post-Dendrite: Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005); Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231 (Ct. App. 2008) (“Krinsky”); Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941 (D.C. 2009) and Swartz v. Does (“Swartz“) (Swartz, the most recent of these cases, was discussed in a previous post).
4. Analysis
Although both English and American jurisprudence supports a notice requirement, the approaches differ: while Totalise advocates imposing the requirement on third parties, Dendrite and subsequent American cases have consistently imposed the burden on plaintiffs. The problem with the later approach is that plaintiffs are generally in a relatively poor position to give reliable notice because, unlike third parties, they lack access to the defendant’s contact information. As a result, Dendrite and subsequent American cases have merely required plaintiffs to provide indirect notice by posting on the ISP’s pertinent message board, by posting on the same website or medium used by the anonymous defendant to publish the statements at issue, or, if the statements originated in an email, by sending notice to the anonymous defendant’s email address. The concern with these types of notice is their unreliability. There is no guarantee that a defendant will check these sources, or that the website or medium will still exist by the time the plaintiff commences action. And, in the case of email, a similar concern still exists due to the increasingly common use of disposable email accounts that defendants may abandon after sending allegedly defamatory statements.
Yet, imposing the burden of notice on plaintiffs may have some notable benefits. Unlike the approach advocated in Totalise wherein third parties would directly notify anonymous defendants, plaintiffs under the Dendrite approach generally have no choice but to provide indirect notice by posting in a publicly accessible forum. The public nature of a plaintiff’s notice will expose the matter to the oxygen of publicity and may affect the extent of the plaintiff’s reputational harm, depending on the context. In some cases, public scrutiny might result in further reputational harm if the public perceives the plaintiff to be unjustifiably attempting to silence the anonymous defendant. In other cases, however, public scrutiny might serve to alleviate the existing reputational harm by calling into question the veracity of the statements. Third parties might even be persuaded to mount a defence against a plaintiff’s application in cases where there is significant public support in favour of an anonymous defendant but they lack the resources to defend their anonymity.
Another option is to require both the plaintiff and the third party to provide notice. Although this approach would increase the reliability of notice and preserve the beneficial qualities of plaintiff-based notice, the approach seems redundant in the absence of evidence to suggest that the benefits of dual notification outweigh the costs. This is likely one of the reasons why the California appellate court in Krinsky rejected the notion of requiring a plaintiff to provide notice where a third party had already voluntarily done so:
When ISPs and message-board sponsors (such as Yahoo!) themselves notify the defendant that disclosure of his or her identity is sought, notification by the plaintiff should not be necessary.
In summary, a notification requirement imposes a relatively light burden on plaintiffs or third parties while providing defendants with the valuable opportunity to defend their anonymity and better inform the courts’ decision. Although a plaintiff-based approach may have some ancillary benefits, a third party approach provides more reliable notice and should be preferred because it best furthers the primary rationale underlying notice requirements.
Originally posted on Defamation Law Blog
Iacobucci: Recognizing History of Residential Schools a “Necessary Step”
Notes from a keynote speech by Justice Iacobucci at the Federation of Asian Canadian Lawyers (FACL) Fall Conference.
Grew up in the East End of Vancouver, where there was lots of diversity of people from many backgrounds. Justice Iacobucci noted that he entered the law exactly 50 years ago, in 1959, when he graduated from UBC. There wasn’t a lot of visible minorities in the profession back then. There also wasn’t a lot of “funny names” in it back then. He recalls that when he told by one of his undergraduate professors that he wanted to do law that he shouldn’t go, “You don’t have the right name for it.” But another told him that he should, because “Canada is changing.”
Canada is changing, and the proof is the numbers of visible minorities that are entering law, a profession that historically has not been welcoming to women or minorities. But there is more to do with inclusiveness, and creating strength in diversity.
He started by reminding us all that everyone in Canada can be put into two groups – native Americans, and the rest of us are immigrants. It’s just a question of timing. We’re all immigrants. Many come with values, and not much else going for them. But those values, with an opportunity, can accomplish a lot.
Not all of us have had those opportunities. The focus of Justice Iacobucci’s talk was on the Aboriginal Residential School file, one of the most challenging files he was exposed to. The talk was not about the legal aspects, but rather how a country deals with its past in a way that is fair and honourable.
Part II: Soldiering on? The invisible injuries of war
Guest Post by Krystalline Kraus | Reproduced from www.rabble.ca with permsision
Next week, on November 11, veterans will get only two minutes of recognition — if people stop to reflect at all — while the rest of the year their sacrifice is forgotten.
If Canada’s mission in Afghanistan does end in 2011, 35,000 men and women will have served in that theatre — 133 have been killed thus far — and the Canadian Forces’ (CF) low estimate is that as many as 2,000 could be returning home with an Operational Stress Injury (OSI) such as PTSD.
These soldiers will return home with, among other things, an OSI or plagued by survivor’s guilt and the pressure to do good by their dead friends; first they bury them and then they bury their own feelings. As the saying goes: Survivors die twice.
Massacre at Fort Hood
The problems the U.S. military would prefer to hide violently surged to the public’s attention when Major Nidal Malik Hasan, a 39-year-old U.S. Army psychiatrist, allegedly opened fire yesterday afternoon at Fort Hood, Texas. He is accused of killing 13 people and wounding 30.
A New York Times article features an interview with Hasan’s cousin, who states that he expressed deep concern about being sent to Iraq or Afghanistan; the cousin also notes that Hasan’s job was to counsel returning soldiers suffering with PTSD which gave him an intimate window into the horrors of war. This made him fearful of deploying to either theatre. His cousin also claims he was having second thoughts about his military career a few years ago after other soldiers harassed him for being a Muslim.
Belief in global warming protected from discrimination in UK labour law
Image From National Post via WattUpWithThat?
In the public policy debates over climate change, critics of strong action to mitigate global warming have often described proponents as “religious zealots”, and vice-versa. Moreover, since the concern over global warming has entered the mainstream consciousness, religious groups have been increasingly drawn to the discussion. Now, in the UK, a recent decision by an employment tribunal has actually equivocated belief in global warming with religious belief, for the purposes of workplace discrimination.
The case centers around Tim Nicholson, whose position as Head of Sustainability at Grainger, plc was terminated over what he claims was “contempt” for his beliefs about anthropogenic global warming. Nicholson alleged that his termination was due to his beliefs – which he argued should be protected from discrimination by the UK’s Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations of 2003.
In its decision this week, the employment tribunal ruled Nicholson would be allowed to bring his discrimination claim because Nicholson’s beliefs in global warming passed the tests formulated for “philosophical belief” for the purposes of the regulations:
From the tribunal’s ruling:
Grainger Plc & Ors v. Nicholson [2009] UKEAT 0219_09_0311 (3 November 2009)
In no way could this ever be taken out of context by anybody on either side of the larger debate…
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