Hatred on the Internet

Section 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act (“the Act”) makes it a discriminatory practice for a person or group of persons to communicate by means of the Internet, material that is likely to expose someone to hatred or contempt by reason of the fact that he or she is identifiable on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination.

Hate messages

13. (1) It is a discriminatory practice for a person or a group of persons acting in concert to communicate telephonically or to cause to be so communicated, repeatedly, in whole or in part by means of the facilities of a telecommunication undertaking within the legislative authority of Parliament, any matter that is likely to expose a person or persons to hatred or contempt by reason of the fact that that person or those persons are identifiable on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination.

Due to the interpretation given in s. 13(2) there can be no dispute that the Act includes messages conveyed via the Internet.

Interpretation

(2) For greater certainty, subsection (1) applies in respect of a matter that is communicated by means of a computer or a group of interconnected or related computers, including the Internet, or any similar means of communication, but does not apply in respect of a matter that is communicated in whole or in part by means of the facilities of a broadcasting undertaking.

Undoubtedly, in the majority of cases the pivotal contention lies on what constitutes hatred and contempt.

Defining Hatred

Fortunately, the Supreme Court of Canada has shed some light on this issue, and by so doing, have not left this question in the hands of argumentation and speculation.

“Hatred” has been defined as a feeling of deep ill-will, an emotion that allows for no redeeming qualities in the person to whom it is directed.

Contempt suggests looking down upon or treating as inferior the object of one’s feelings (Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 at paras. 60 – 61).

This is captured by the dictionary definition relied on in Taylor in the use of the terms “despised”, “dishonour” or “disgrace”.

In defining “hatred” the Tribunal [in Taylor] applied the definition in the Oxford English Dictionary (1971 ed.) which reads (at p. 28):

active dislike, detestation, enmity, ill-will, malevolence.

The Tribunal drew on the same source for their definition of “contempt”. It was characterized as

the condition of being condemned or despised; dishonour or disgrace.

As there is no definition of “hatred” or “contempt” within the [Canadian Human Rights Act] it is necessary to rely on what might be described as common understandings of the meaning of these terms. Clearly these are terms which have a potentially emotive content and how they are related to particular factual contexts by different individuals will vary. There is nevertheless an important core of meaning in both, which the dictionary definitions capture. With “hatred” the focus is a set of emotions and feelings which involve extreme ill will towards another person or group of persons. To say that one “hates” another means in effect that one finds no redeeming qualities in the latter. It is a term, however, which does not necessarily involve the mental process of “looking down” on another or others. It is quite possible to “hate” someone who one feels is superior to one in intelligence, wealth or power. None of the synonyms used in the dictionary definition for “hatred” give any clues to the motivation for the ill will. “Contempt” is by contrast a term which suggests a mental process of “looking down” upon or treating as inferior the object of one’s feelings. This is captured by the dictionary definition relied on in Taylor . . . in the use of the terms “despised”, “dishonour” or “disgrace”. Although the person can be “hated” (i.e. actively disliked) and treated with “contempt” (i.e. looked down upon), the terms are not fully coextensive, because “hatred” is in some instances the product of envy of superior qualities, which “contempt” by definition cannot be. [Emphasis added.]

Although the person can be “hated” (i.e. actively disliked) and treated with “contempt” (i.e. looked down upon), the terms are not fully coextensive, because “hatred” is in some instances the product of envy of superior qualities, which “contempt” by definition cannot be unusually strong and deep-felt emotions of detestation, calumny and vilification.

CHRC Definition

The Canadian Human Rights Commission (“CHRC”), has incorporated this definition when they held that material is likely to “expose” members of the targeted group to hatred or contempt if it is more likely than not to leave members of the targeted group vulnerable to extreme ill-will, or if it creates the conditions in which hatred and contempt are likely to flourish (Citron v. Zundel, (No. 4) (2002), 41 C.H.R.R. D/274 at para. 134).

For our purposes, it is sufficient if the communications at issue create conditions that allow hatred to flourish, leaving the identifiable group open or vulnerable to extreme ill will and hostility. We must determine whether members of a group are placed at risk of being hated, or being held in contempt by virtue of the messages communicated by the Respondent.

Thus, actual effects or lack thereof, resulting from any form of communiqué, have no bearing beyond providing evidence of hate or contempt towards a target group.

Put another way, actual deleterious effects need not be proven.